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The Twilight of Customary Land Systems? Effects of The New Wave 
Land Formalisation Programmes on Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania 
By Ulrick Peter Mumburi 
  Forms of customary land ownership in sub-Saharan Africa are a key element 
of African social organisation and have sustained and continue to sustain millions of 
subsistence and smallholder farmers by maintaining livelihoods in spite of significant 
economic and political change. More recently, attempts to increase productivity in 
rural areas, thereby enhancing development efforts, have taken the form of land 
formalisation programmes aimed at the privatisation of customary lands and the 
adoption of agricultural policies that emphasize growth rather than development. Yet 
these have often resulted in the failure to protect the livelihoods of rural populations 
and facilitating land grabbing. In light of these failures, they have since been 
reformulated into a ‘new wave’ of land formalisation whose objective is to 
incorporate elements of customary systems. The thesis asks therefore whether the new 
wave programmes have been successful in improving the quality of life and economic 
well-being of rural populations?  
We argue that even these new wave programmes will not protect rural 
livelihoods in the communal areas because they emphasise instead market 
fundamentalism which sees rural organisation and agricultural policy as driven by 
competition, profit motive, privatisation, and commodification of land. We undertook 
a qualitative case study of the implementation of ‘new wave’ land formalisation 
programme in three villages in Tanzania, which are Mbagwi, Mzeri, and Sindeni, all 
located in Handeni district, Tanga region. The study sought to find out how rural 
social organisation has been altered since the implementation of the formalisation 
programmes, and also information on agricultural production in order to demonstrate 
how smallholder farmers’ tenure security, sources of income and food security are 
being affected. 
The study found that the implementation of the new wave formalisation 
programmes is eroding key elements of customary ownership systems. Custom and 
norms of cooperation and reciprocity are dwindling, as evidenced by participants 
reporting the disappearance of such things as labour and food sharing practices, as 
well as norms that exhort eschewing selfishness in favour of actions that benefit all 
the members of the village. Further, strict land use plans eliminate flexibility in the 
use of land, and enhanced functioning of land markets undermines the permanency of 
land availability to poorer members of the society. Furthermore, the thesis concludes 
that agricultural models associated with the formalisation programmes have resulted 
in policies and economic strategies that are focused primarily on how to increase 
production, disregarding the implications on environment and on the livelihoods of 
rural dwellers.  
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In the last two decades a new wave of land formalisation has been implemented in 
Tanzania as well as in many other sub-Saharan African countries as part of a mechanism 
articulated within the framework of agricultural development. Land formalisation is the 
practice by which government officials document, register, title, and assign property 
rights in land now held in an allegedly tenuous and insecure state.  In sub-Saharan Africa, 
this implies converting customary ownership systems that are dominant to a formalised 
universal land administration system. This is done by overhauling land policies and laws 
with the aims of bringing ‘greater clarity of tenure’ and facilitating markets in land, in the 
hope that this will attract more investment and improve agriculture productivity. The 
programmes are, therefore, being claimed, by the World Bank and other development 
partners, to be a means to boost agriculture production or productivity and improve the 
life and economic well-being of the rural population (World Bank, 2007; USAID, 2011).  
 However, the critics of the programmes argue that the programmes destroy 
customary social organisation, which is central to how rural people construct their 
livelihoods using land and a range of land-based resources. It is argued that land in rural 
sub-Saharan Africa is more than a factor of production, it is the bases for organising 
social, cultural, political and economic life for the well-being of individual members and 
the community at large1.   
Further, the critics have said that the agricultural models associated with the 
formalisation programmes favour large-scale mechanised systems and market production, 
 
1 The centrality of land is well substantiated in the Guidelines for Land Policy formulation in Africa: “Land 
is regarded not simply as an economic or environmental asset, but as a social, cultural and ontological 
resource. Land remains an important factor in the construction of social identity, the organisation of 




which lead to the adoption of agricultural policies that emphasize growth rather than 
development. This includes policies which encourage land to change hands from less to 
more efficient producers, and which favour production of cash crops at the expense of 
food production for local consumption. The implications could include fuelling land-
grabbing and creating landless people and/or pushing small-scale farmers to the marginal 
lands. Other implications could also include escalating land and land-related conflicts, 
rampant hunger and creation of agricultural proletariat.  
Recent estimates indicate that between 2000 and 2010 about 71 million hectares 
of transnational land acquisitions2 were recorded (triangulated and cross-referenced) 
globally, within Africa accounting for almost half of this—that is, 34 million hectares 
(Anseeuw et al., 2012). In the same period, deals reported as approved or under 
negotiation were much higher, amounting to a total of 203 million hectares for worldwide 
and 134 million hectares for sub-Saharan Africa.  Similarly, the World Bank figures 
indicate that in 2009 alone, acquisition of 45 million hectares was under negotiations, and 
70 percent of that was in Africa (World Bank, 2010). Although these data confirm the 
unprecedented scale of the land rush over the past decade, still many other deals are 
presumed to go unreported.  
The escalating land rush is concerning because in rural sub-Saharan Africa, most 
households have relied and continue to rely on traditional customary ownership of land as 
a mechanism by which to construct a livelihood (Okoth-Ogendo, 2002). It is estimated 
that nearly 90 percent of all arable land in most countries in the region is under customary 
 
2 Transnational land acquisitions is the practice that involves the purchase or lease of large tracts of land 




systems, while the remaining 10 percent is held under statutory (state registered rights) 
system, mostly as large farms (Byamugisha, 2013: 55; Wily, 2011b: 735; Deininger, 
2003: 62).  Further, it is estimated that as high as 70 percent of rural population in many 
countries in the region depends on indigenous customary systems to access land 
resources (FAO, 2014:2). Customary lands are not only important as a means of 
production, but also their ownership systems are an indispensable means of social 
organisation for rural dwellers. Further, in the absence of dependable social security 
systems in the developing economies, customary land has acted as indispensable social 
safety net for the most of non-agricultural population, which rely on land resource for 
many reasons, such as supplementing urban wages, life after retirement, and as fall-back 
position when things fail in town. 
Transnational land acquisition is often considered harmful for local populations, 
particularly smallholder farmers to whom land is a basic livelihood asset, the principal 
form of natural capital by which people produce food and earn a living (Cotula et al., 
2009; Hall, 2011), and a means of social organisation (Peters, 2009). Thus, land 
acquisition that overrides smallholder farmers’ customary land rights and denies them 
access to land-based natural resources result in decreased food security and ultimately the 
replacement of smallholders by poorly paid labourers and unemployed landless poor.  
Secure access to land, water, and other natural resources is central to the ability of 
women and men to construct their livelihoods in rural sub-Saharan Africa. 
While alleviating poverty through enhanced agricultural productivity is a 
compelling reason put forward by the proponents of formalization, the very real 




organisation systems while also seeking to encourage agricultural investments to 
stimulate local economies. However, the belief that formalisation will induce newly titled 
“owners” to alter their behaviour and begin to act like shrewd landlords rather than mere 
temporary residents, leads to decreasing government support to small-scale farmers. 
When left alone these farmers are forced to bear large asymmetrically distributed 
transaction costs as they come into contact with sellers of inputs or buyers of products. A 
purposeful government intervention is necessary, not only to ensure fairness but also to 
support small-scale farmers in their interactions with big corporations who supply 
agriculture inputs or buy their products. But this diverges form neoliberal policies that 
have required rolling back the state, resulting in shrinking agricultural spending and 
declining productivity especially of the small-scale farmers (Bernstein, 2010) 
At the same time, formalisation erodes and displaces existing social networks and 
arrangements that do offer security (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006). Customary land 
regimes are notable for their multiplicity of interests and tenures on the same parcel of 
land.  That is, various members of the family (and the village) will often have socially 
recognized overlapping claims on different attributes of (and products from) the same 
land parcel—one individual may cultivate and harvest the crops on that parcel, another 
individual may gather fuel wood on that parcel, and yet another individual may obtain 
dry-season forage or fodder from that parcel.  In this customary property system, the poor 
are protected against exclusion from their social networks and means of livelihood 
through well established norms, customs and taboos on land use and management 




The offer of formal titles to the customary landowners compel them to exchange 
their current embeddedness in one familiar form of community for an embeddedness in 
another uncertain form of community. The new form of community (which relies on 
market forces) has proved to offer less protection to small players (small-scale farmers). 
Left unchecked, market forces exert unfair competition that could hurt or wipe out the 
small operators. Large agro-processing and agricultural inputs producers have been found 
to exploit small scale farmers. As a result, more and more people are exposed to risks of 
falling deeper into poverty (Nyambu-Musembi, 2006).  
 
The earlier forms of formalisation programmes 
Calls for property formalisation are not new in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonial 
authorities were at irregular intervals concerned with formalising rural institutions, 
variously choosing to superimpose the law of the coloniser or formalising (and in many 
instances inventing) customary institutions, for instance through reestablishment of tribal 
authorities. During colonial period fragmented holdings, collective use, and 
transhumance were seen as messy obstacles to modernisation, and rules of various kinds 
were devised and enforced in order to simplify and make these practices more legible for 
state institutions (Scott, 1998). Hence, formalisation was not merely an aid to solve 
particular problems, but an essential part of the transition towards structured governance, 
order, and ultimately civilisation in the context of the colonial authorities. Consequently, 
the colonial authorities were able confiscate native land, force locals to grow certain 
crops, and collect taxes among others (Benschop, 2002). The imposition of the new land 




simplify colonial administration and facilitate exploitation and plundering of African 
wealth. 
After independence, the colonial legacy would hinder the nation-building 
endeavours of post-colonial states such as the establishment of independent political 
systems and the design of policies and development strategies including land reforms and 
land policy making. Many colonial structures and policies that were formulated to 
facilitate colonial exploitation continued to exist long after independence in many sub-
Saharan African countries. For example, a major land tenure legislation passed by British 
in 1923, called the Land Ordinance Cap. 113, was inherited unmodified by the 
independent government of Tanzania for 40 years (Okoth-Ogendo, 1999).  
The law introduced a land tenure system called the Right of Occupancy which 
was either granted or deemed right. The granted right of occupancy was statutory while 
deemed right was customary which is a title of a native or a native community lawfully 
using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom. However, the deemed 
rights have never enjoyed the same security as the granted rights under the statute. In 
practice the customary rights were governed by administrative policy, while the granted 
rights were subject to legal stipulations. The basic principle of customary land tenure is 
that land is held for use, and as long as it is used, the occupier maintains control over it 
(Shivji, 1998).  
Land issues in the post-independence era in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates a 
clear colonial legacy. Land policies promoted in the region from the late 1960s to the 
early 1980s were all based on the premise that customary systems did not provide the 




(Peters, 2009). It was thought that tenure insecurity was caused by the absence of clearly 
defined and enforceable private property rights, and thus the appropriate policy direction 
was for the state to create such rights. In this context, security of tenure was used to refer 
to strong, government-backed protection of one’s exclusive rights to use and benefit from 
the asset in question. However, most of these programmes failed to reach their 
expectations for many reasons, including ignoring the customary land systems that were 
widely known and used in the rural areas, and because they were being centrally 
coordinated, cumbersome and costly (Peters, 2009).  
 
The new wave of formalisation programmes 
The new-wave of formalisation programmes are trying to address the 
shortcomings of the earlier programmes, but they are also conceived within a broader 
framework of poverty alleviation of the so-called “Washington Consensus”, which 
identified property rights reform as one of the major areas of reform for the developing 
world (Williamson, 2004). The World Bank is supporting and financing programs for the 
formalisation of property rights and the creation of titling programmes in the Global 











Map 1: Land Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2016 
 
Source: Created by author using information from Wily, 2003; African Union, 2012; Deininger 






The Bank argues that, “economic reforms will require formalising the often 
highly informal property rights held by the poor; improving the security of tenure, and 
thus the functioning of land rental and possibly also of sales markets; addressing the 
legacy of reforms that were only partially successful” (World Bank, 2003: 4). While 
some of the research emanating from the World Bank in recent years has advocated a 
more nuanced approach to its policies relating to property rights and development 
(Deininger, 2011, Byamugisha, 2013), other documents have seemed to support its claim 
that the formalisation of property rights is virtually always desirable, arguing that 
“Securing rights benefits both individual landholders, through investment incentives and 
credit access, and the community at large, through its impact on growth and poverty 
reduction” (World Bank, 2004: 82).  
Further, the World Bank has doubled down on its land strategies as witnessed in 
the agricultural development policies recommended in the World Bank’s (2007) 
landmark World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. The report, 
which has become a benchmark in agricultural and land policies formulation in 
developing countries, argues for market-oriented strategies for development, saying 
“Land markets, particularly rental markets, can raise productivity, help households 
diversify their incomes, and facilitate exit from agriculture” (World Bank, 2007: 9). 
Proponents of these policies seem to be fixated at economic growth with less regard to 
what happens to the massive population who depend on land for their livelihood, they 
assert that “well-functioning land markets are needed to transfer land to the most 
productive users and to facilitate participation in the rural nonfarm sector and migration 




The new-wave land formalisation programmes attempt to convert customary 
ownership systems that are dominant in the region to some form of a hybrid property 
system. That is, attempting to develop a formalised universal land administration system 
while including elements of the existing informal land tenure regimes, such as group 
titling. However, the pick and choose from the elements of customary land ownership 
system may result in a faulty land system, which is not supportive of the livelihoods of 
rural population.  This is because the customary land ownership system works as a whole, 
and a disruption of any element of the system sets off a domino effect of other important 
elements being crippled and hence the entire system failing to work. For example, 
imposition of new land management system—supplanting customary leaders/elders’ 
roles—leads into the demise of local conflicts resolution mechanisms, failure to enforce 
protection of common resource, poor spatiotemporal cohesion, and so forth. 
The new-wave formalisation programs have been conceived within the market 
fundamentalist ideals of neoliberalism, which are driven by competition, profit motive, 
privatisation, and commoditisation of land, undermining the very nature of customary 
ownership systems in the region. The customary land systems in sub-Saharan Africa are 
based on a complex interconnectedness of people and their physical environment and 
emphasises the “relations between people and groups in terms of their mutual rights and 
obligations with regard to land” (Middleton 1988: ix).  The undermined elements of 
customary ownership systems include land rights flexibility and their permanent 
availability across generations; and land acting as a social safety net. It may also weaken 
the use of social capital, which includes custom and norms of cooperation and 




facilitates spread of capitalistic property rights system and agricultural models that may 
not be in favor of promoting the welfare of smallholder famers. 
The African Union in its Framework and Guideline on Land Policy in Africa calls 
for the “need to blend tradition and modernity in land rights regimes”, but the details on 
how the blending should be carried out was left to individual countries (African Union, 
2010: 14). Since ‘the devil is in the detail’, through examination of individual country’s 
formulation and implementation of land and agricultural policies, it would highlight how 
indigenous’ livelihoods are been affected by the programmes.  
Hitherto, forms of customary ownership systems have provided varieties of local 
foods, an important dimension in food sovereignty; have acted as social “safety net” in 
the absence of social insurance services, especially in rural areas Chimhowu & 
Woodhouse, 2006: 348); have provided livelihoods through land rights flexibility and 
their permanent availability across generations (past, present, and future); and created 
peace and security out of various land sharing systems and local conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Cousins, 2008; Knight, 2010). Further, a unique social organisation, which 
is embedded in the customary land ownership systems, has been essential in the rural 
people’s ability to use land, land-based resources in constructing their livelihoods.  For 
example, households can cooperate and exchange labour during production—a crucial 
diversity in agriculture input or help each other during disaster through various forms of 
reciprocity (Peter, 2009; Toulmin & Quan 2000). 
Formalisation offers little assurance that beneficial outcomes are inevitable. 
However, it serves the purpose of making land, its uses, its claimants, and its transactions 




since practices, institutions, and laws that expunge local rights and claims to land and 
replace them with state rights are fundamental to the creation of frontiers of capitalist 
expansion. In the genesis of agrarian capitalism, changes in social relations emerging out 
of a reconfiguration of access to and control over productive assets gave rise to changes 
in the structure of economic processes, leading to rural transformation. Eventually non-
capitalist property relations and labour processes are subordinated and integrated into 
capitalism. Consequently, profit becomes the main motive of production—hence efforts 
to increase production and productivity by any means. With the objective of securing 
livelihoods, especially in rural areas at the centre of land tenure reforms, there is need for 
a deeper examination of how and who benefits and who loses from instances of land 
rights interventions.  
 
The research question and thesis objective 
This thesis addresses a question of whether the ‘new wave’ of land formalisation 
programmes that claim to uphold customary land rights can provide some protection 
against the negative outcomes of land rights interventions. That is, are the new wave 
programmes been successful in improving the quality of life and economic well-being of 
rural populations? Because of differences in the historical evolution and actual patterns of 
land use and ownership, the nature of land rights and institutions varies significantly 
across countries and even regions within the same country. Consequently, the design and 
manner of implementation of the formalisation programmes varies accordingly. Thus, 
deeper understanding of the effects of the formalisation of land rights requires analysis of 




I posit that the new-wave land formalisation programmes, as currently formulated 
and implemented, are unlikely to improve rural life, and may in fact worsen their 
situation because the attempt to develop a universal land administration system destroys 
social organisation that is embedded in the customary land ownership systems. Further, 
the agricultural models associated with the formalisation programmes favours large-scale 
mechanised systems and market production. This leads to adoption of agricultural 
policies that emphasize growth rather than development.    
The study sought to find out how rural social organisation and social capital have 
been altered since the implementation of the formalisation programmes. Further, the 
thesis seeks to find out changes in agricultural production, in order to demonstrate how 
both small scale farmers’ sources of income and rural population’s food security is 
affected. To this end, the thesis undertook a qualitative case study of the implementation 
of ‘new wave’ land formalisation programme in three villages in Tanzania: Mbagwi, 
Mzeri, and Sindeni, all located in Handeni district, Tanga region. 
The objective of this thesis is to gain an understanding of how a neoliberal 
programme to transform customary land ownership patterns to some hybrid form of 
market-based ownership pattern could maintain the well-being of people living on those 
lands and even enhance production/productivity that improves their quality of life and 
economic well-being. The conclusions are expected to offer policy makers and other 
stakeholders, insights into the specific contexts and factors that allow for the likely 
success of land rights interventions that will benefit the rural population. Helping 
governments to make such informed policies is more pertinent now for reasons that 




interventions and increasing scarcity of land due to population growth and increasing 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review has two main sections that are considered pertinent in 
developing a framework for answering our research question. First section is land, 
agriculture and development, which is imperative given that land is the main productive 
asset, and agriculture is the main source of income and employment for smallholder 
farmers in almost all of the sub-Saharan Africa. The section covers an overview of 
literature on the role of land and agriculture in development, essentially aiming to 
determine what agricultural model best suits the needs of the rural population in sub-
Saharan Africa. In this section, I begin with the early development theories—growth and 
modernisation. Growth theorists saw land as original and inexhaustible gift of nature and 
their concern was uncovering the causes of poverty and underdevelopment or economic 
stagnation. The modernisation theorists problematized the agrarian transition in terms of 
a national project of capitalist development as their concern was the need to change 
social, cultural and economic structures of the backward societies so that they become 
more like the Western societies.  
This is followed by a review of a new set of approaches to development—
agriculture in the eyes of structuralists, dependency and world system theorists—that 
emerged with a common vision of going beyond the role of the market and capital 
investment to solve development problems. Then, I analyse the rise of neo-liberalism and 
structural adjustment ideas, which become a staple of the development strategies in the in 
the period 1980 to 2000. I, then move on to the basic needs approach, which gave priority 
to meeting the basic needs of all the people, with emphasis on agriculture and especially 




strives to build an integrated framework to development initiatives, aiming to promote 
development that is sustainable not just ecologically, but also institutionally, socially and 
economically and to produce genuinely positive livelihood outcomes.  
The objective of the foregoing section is to develop an argument for what a 
certain agricultural and development policy should look like if it were to support rural 
livelihoods. In other words, what agricultural policy best improves quality of life and 
economic well-being of the rural population in Tanzania and the sub-Saharan Africa in 
general. 
Second section is land tenure systems and rural livelihoods, which is essential 
given that a customary land is not only a means of production, but it also has a unique 
social organisation of those living on it that is fundamental to how they construct their 
livelihoods. The section reviews theoretical analyses of the customary land ownership 
systems—the dominant landholding systems in sub-Saharan Africa—detailing its 
suitability and strength in how the rural population construct their livelihoods. So, the 
section reviews the origin and uniqueness of the customary ownership systems, and most 
importantly their centrality in the livelihoods of the rural people. This is followed by 
analysis of land tenure reforms in the region, specifically the theoretical debates about the 
pros and cons of private property rights vis-à-vis customary land rights.  
The second section aims to reveal the significance of the customary land 
ownership systems in sub-Saharan Africa, which are based on a complex 
interconnectedness of people and their physical environment and emphasises the relations 
between people and group in terms of their mutual rights and obligations with regard to 




activities and interactions that emphasises the diversity of ways rural people construct 
their livelihoods. It highlights the multidimensional aspect of customary lands, which is a 
fact that in sub-Saharan Africa land is more than a factor of production.  
 
Land and development 
“Land is the main productive asset, and major source of income, for poorer 
groups in almost all the developing world” (Lipton, 2009: 2). Land, in economics, is the 
resource that encompasses the natural resources used in the production of food for both 
people and animals, fibre, cash crops, traditional medicines and building materials. In 
classical economics the factors of production are land, labour, capital, and 
entrepreneurship. Land was considered to be the “original and inexhaustible gift of 
nature” (Fisher, 1987: 614). In modern economics, it is broadly defined to include all that 
nature provides, including, forests, minerals deposits, and water and land resources. 
However, while many of these are renewable resources, they are not ‘inexhaustible’ and 
greater attention is needed in order to assure their sustainability (Ibid, 1987).  
For agricultural production the basic input is land. Satisfactory agricultural 
production and distribution brings peace, prosperity, harmony, health and wealth to 
individuals of a nation by driving away distrust, discord and anarchy. Agriculture is an 
important part of the livelihoods of many poor people, and it is frequently argued that 
agricultural growth is a fundamental pre-requisite for widespread poverty reduction 
(Szirmai, 2005; World Bank, 2008; Borras, 2009; Bernstein, 2010).  Agriculture provides 
abundant food driving out famine and bringing in friendship that eliminates fights. It 




economic, and political life (Dorward, et al, 2003). This implies that land, when properly 
used and managed, can bring development, that is can improve people’s quality of life 
and their economic well-being. However, the bigger issue is who controls the use of 
land? Is the desired increase in agricultural production or productivity coming from the 
small-scale farmers?  
In rural sub-Saharan Africa, land is more than a factor of production—it is a 
means of community organisation; thus, a meaningful analysis of land rights 
interventions calls for a comprehensive approach. Indeed, a study on customary land 
administration in Zambia revealed that “land is inherently intertwined with social 
organisation, cultural imaginaries, succession rights, and norms of reciprocity” (Tamara, 
2014: 29). Anseeuw and Alden (2010) argue that land in Africa is a multifunctional and 
multidimensional physical resource at the heart of complex processes that define 
territories and regions. With the rise in population placing ever-increasing pressures on 
scarce land, governments of developing countries ought to have a long-term vision with 
respect to rational land use, improved land management, and avoidance of degradation. 
Further, the role of land and agriculture in development need to be re-examined 
considering the harrowing forces of globalisation, which swiftly are transforming land 
into a commodity.   
Use and management of land, of its soils, water, forests, pastures, and wildlife, 
has been and continues to be central to rural population, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Consequently, changes in land tenure systems and as a result agriculture’s role in society 




relationships to food, sources of income, employment, peace and security, and the general 
social organisations of the whole society. 
 
 Agriculture’s role in development 
Since agriculture constitutes a large share of national output and often employs a 
large share of the labour force in the sub-Saharan Africa, the sector is integral to any 
thinking about development. However, the way in which agriculture contributes to 
development has changed in the last half-century. Early classical theorists, including 
Julius Herman Boeke and William Arthur Lewis observed that most developing countries 
are comprised of ‘dual’ economies, hence developing a theory of dualism. The basic idea 
was the existence of a dichotomy in developing economies and societies between 
traditional and modern sectors, between stagnation and dynamic change (Boeke, 1953; 
Lewis, 1954). A dominant view was that activities in the traditional sector, including 
small-scale peasant farming were mere remnants of a past that, sooner or later, 
modernisation will transform them and surplus labour in the traditional sector would be 
gradually absorbed by the expanding modern sector. 
Instead, even industrialised countries are increasingly experiencing massive 
phenomena of social exclusion, as a result of slow and fairly jobless growth combined 
with the inability to translate increases in labour-productivity into an equitable process of 
reduction of working time that would ensure full employment. In consequence, dualism, 
initially considered as a symptom of underdevelopment, is being reinterpreted as an 




while others go as far as to view the traditional sector as an “engine of growth” for 
African economies (Blunch & Verner, 1999).  
Although growth theorists view traditional agriculture as a low-productive sector 
that only passively contributed to development by providing food and employment, 
agricultural growth was still considered necessary for development and for countries’ 
transformation from traditional to modern economies. They argued that while non-
agricultural innovation and technological change can occur independently of the 
agricultural sector, both labour and savings must be released from agriculture in order to 
satisfy labour demand and finance capital investment in industry (Fei & Ranis, 1961). 
This explains “why industrial and agrarian revolutions always go together and why 
economies in which agriculture is stagnant do not show industrial development” (Lewis 
1954: 433). Furthermore, the fact that demand for agricultural goods does not keep pace 
with per capita income growth (Engel’s Law) implies that agricultural surpluses can be 
generated as long as agricultural productivity growth exceeds the population growth rate. 
Further, critics of the dual economy theory have also argued that shifting labour 
from agriculture to manufacturing was not always helpful unless labour was sufficiently 
skilled, and the right kind of manufacturing was able to develop; and some developing 
economies have achieved a better return from increasing investment in agriculture rather 
than manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1992; Lipton, 2010). It is, therefore, an 
oversimplification to say manufacturing has a profit incentive lacking in agriculture. The 
agricultural sector can also benefit from similar investment and productivity growth and 




The modernisation theorists problematized the agrarian transition in terms of a 
national project of capitalist development, arguing for the acceptance of cultural values 
such as the profit motive, accumulation of goods and wealth, private property, gain the 
entrepreneurial spirit. The modernisation theory has a notion that by modernising 
agriculture and increasing output, a country can export food but also cheapen the cost of 
food, which is needed in periods of urbanisation and industrialisation, thereby making it 
possible to pay urban workers lower wages. Lewis (1954) argued that because employers 
could pay them less, they would make more profits and savings which they would 
reinvest and increase levels of productivity, thus producing growth.  
In early formulations of the modernization theory, the low productivity associated 
with traditional agricultural societies was understood to be the chief ‘obstacle’ to 
capitalist development. As reflected in Rostow’s theory, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(Rostow, 1960), who, like Lewis, emphasised that the important element in growth and 
development was to find a way to lift an economy out of low income stagnation and into 
sustained growth through higher savings rates and investment in the national economy. In 
his thesis, Rostow posits that developing countries could develop if they followed in the 
footsteps of North America and Europe, which is he described as a unidirectional 5 
Stages of Growth process, comprised of capital formation and investment, entrepreneurial 
shrewdness and modern sets of values. 
Rostow’s theory of the five stages was highly influential at the time but 
subsequently faced strong criticism, including that it was based on the observable 
features that would remove obstacles to capital formation and thereby allow for a society 




modernisation theory has attracted many criticisms, including his lumping together of a 
great range of societies he called ‘traditional societies’, a weakness pinned down by 
Davidson (1974) writing: ‘it was to perpetuate the colonial rulers’ myth, that Africa, 
along with other one-time colonies, had no history’. Critics argued that many countries 
were different, especially those that had been through colonial rule and whose economies 
had been manipulated to serve the demands of agricultural and mineral resource 
extractions to service manufacturing sectors in metropolitan countries, would have to 
follow a very different set of stages. Another criticism is that not only the sequencing can 
very different but also the model does not apply to the African countries as events in 
these countries are not justified in any stage of his model. 
Two key characteristics of agriculture during the early stages of development 
justified its place in early development thinking. First, agriculture produces goods that 
directly satisfy basic human needs. Second, agricultural production combines human 
effort with natural resources, such as land and agroecological assets. Since natural 
resources were assumed to be freely available, early development theorists believed that 
agriculture could grow independently of other economic activities. However, in reality, 
agriculture’s dependence on a fixed supply of land meant that its expansion was 
constrained. This implied that agricultural output cannot proportionally increase with 
increased labour supply under a given technology (that is, agriculture suffers from 
diminishing returns on labour). On the demand side, the need to satisfy basic needs 
implied that, at the very least, agricultural growth must match population growth in order 




The need for agricultural growth during the early stages of development has also 
been examined in recent neoclassical literature. For example, Yang and Zhu (2004) use 
growth theory to capture the intertemporal dynamics of the development process. The 
authors demonstrate that, without increased agricultural productivity, a traditional 
economy cannot overcome the fixed supply of natural resources and thus, cannot 
generate sustained economic growth. Regardless of how fast the non-agricultural sector 
grows, stagnant agricultural production during the early stages of development prevents 
the structural transformation from a traditional to a modern economy.  
Beyond agriculture providing a ‘reserve army’ of labour, classical economists 
also highlighted the importance of food supplies in stimulating economic growth. If 
traditional agriculture remains stagnant, then increased employment in the non-
agricultural sector may result in food shortages. Food price increases would raise the cost 
of living, especially for low-income households with high food consumption shares (that 
is, large Engel coefficients). The pressure to raise wages would hamper industrial growth, 
especially during the early stages of development when technologies are typically labour-
intensive. Increased labour costs eventually drive the economy into a ‘stationary state’ 
without further growth. This is the famous ‘Ricardian trap’ (Ricardo, 1817 in Sachs, 
2004: 1804), which formed the foundation for subsequent development theorists (Schultz, 
1953; Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1961 & 1964; and Jorgenson, 1961). According to 
Hayami (2001: 84), these theorists understood that “successful industrialisation cannot be 
expected without the parallel effort of increasing food production to avoid the danger of 
being caught in the Ricardian trap”. While early development economists saw 




rest of economy, the process by which this growth was generated remained beyond the 
concern of most development economists (Ruttan, 2002).  
 
Agriculture in the eyes of structuralism, dependency and world system theorists 
The early structuralist approach was influenced by John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946), a British economist, who argued for the need to address the underlying economic 
structures of developing countries as the only way of overcoming economic problems, 
and to do this required major government intervention in the economy. The role of the 
state in the economy was seen as central, the state was viewed as the main agent of 
development. Keynes argued that aggregate demand (total spending in the economy) 
determined the overall level of economic activity, and that inadequate aggregate demand 
could lead to prolonged periods of high unemployment . Keynes advocated the use of 
fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the adverse effects of economic recessions and 
depressions (Keynes, 2018).  
In contrast to the early developmental theorists who were focused on 
modernisation and growth (industrialisation) as a solution to development problems, a 
new set of thinkers, such as Emil Durkheim (1858-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920), 
emerged emphasizing the interdependence of individuals and institutions (structures).  
These structuralists aimed to go beyond the role of the market and capital investment, 
advocated by the modernisation theorists, in solving development problems. They were 
concerned with the capacity of modern industrial societies to maintain social order in the 
face of a growing division of labour resulting from industrialization. Talcott Parsons 




have to be understood as systems, much like a human body where all parts of the body 
work together to ensure the survival of the system. The idea is to present a series of 
abstract functions in which all governments engage or should engage. 
Keynes and structuralist ideas in general have withstood the test of time, 
especially with advent of the global crises which necessitated major government 
intervention in the economy.  Structuralism development theory focuses on structural 
aspects which impede the economic growth of developing countries. The unit of analysis 
is the transformation of a country’s economy from, mainly, a subsistence agriculture to a 
modern, urbanized manufacturing and service economy. This approach calls for the 
ending of the reliance of the underdeveloped country on exports of primary goods 
(mainly agricultural products) and pursuing inward-oriented development by shielding 
the domestic economy from that of the developed economies. 
  Seen as the founder of structuralism applied to international development, Raul 
Prebisch and Hans Singer, associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), argued that the predominantly agricultural nature of the 
developing countries was a question of the structural imbalances between the countries, 
of the centre and the periphery. That is, the periphery of poor and underdeveloped states 
produce and export low valued commodities while the core of wealthy countries produce 
and export high valued manufactured goods. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis of the 
decline in the terms of trade between the raw material-producing peripheral countries and 
the industrialised core posed a challenge to the notion that developing countries’ role in 
the globalized economy was that of provider of raw materials for industrialised core 




international specialisation along the lines of ‘static’ comparative advantage had excluded 
developing countries from the fruits of technical progress that had so enriched the 
industrialized world. Prebisch (1950: 15) concluded that, ‘since prices do not keep pace 
with productivity, industrialisation is the only means by which the [developing] countries 
may fully obtain the advantages of technical progress.’ Hence, the essence of coining 
strategies for endogenous, state-led industrialisation and the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI).  
Critics argued that the structuralists had an urban bias in their assertion that 
development was a question of urban industrialisation which did not incorporate a 
sufficient concept of agricultural development (Lipton, 1977), may be largely explained 
by powerful oligarchic forces dominating the periphery countryside.  As will be 
discussed in more details below, the ‘urban-bias’ generated by structuralists attempts at 
industrialisation revealed that agricultural and non-agricultural growth could not occur 
independently of each other. Some structural changes proposed in the agrarian sector 
were intended to ensure adequate demand for industrial products. This included the need 
to bring about land reform to break down (Latin America's) large, privately held 
landholdings into smaller plots, putting them in the hands of social groups that would 
improve the consumption capacity of rural groups. 
Cardoso & Faletto (1979) criticised the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) ideas arguing that they had failed to sufficiently account for 
the state interests and class forces surrounding the development process. Their alternative 
account argued for the need to examine the possibilities of development in peripheral 




imperial forces and their relations with national elite classes and internal markets. Using 
the dependency theory, in his book, “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”, Rodney 
(1972), described an Africa that had been consciously exploited by European 
imperialists, leading directly to the modern underdevelopment of most of the continent. 
His lucid and truthful explanation of Africa’s historical role in the international capitalist 
system exposed a relationship of economic exploitation, the exploiter—European 
imperialists—becoming developed and the exploited—Africa—becoming 
underdeveloped.  
One of the most developed versions of underdevelopment theory has been put 
forward by Andre Gunder Frank (1969; 1979). Frank analysed a chain of exploitative 
relationship running from the centre of the world economy to the rural sector of the 
developing economies. Frank challenges neoclassical “development” and neopositivist 
“modernisation” theories which postulate that the developed countries of Europe and 
North America diffuse capital and social institutions or values down to the 
underdeveloped regions of Africa, and Latin America, which then use this help and 
guidance to follow in the road to development. He treats modern history as a single 
worldwide process driven by the motor force of spatially unequal and temporally uneven 
capital accumulation, which differentiates the world capitalist system into centre and 
periphery, that is “developed” and “underdeveloped” regions respectively. In effect he 
rejected the notion of a dualistic system, demonstrating instead the overall integration of 
the world economic system and the differential integration into that system of different 
countries and even regions within a country. Rural regions that others argued were 




world system as they were also shaped by capitalist relations of exploitation, linked 
through trade and labour relations of even the poorest agricultural workers. 
Further, developing the dependency school of thought was Immanuel Wallerstein 
(1974) and his world-systems theory. Wallerstein argues that the world was divided into 
core, semi-periphery and periphery, but all countries were integrated in one world-
economy/world-system, in which the core benefitted from “primitive accumulation” in 
the process of global flow of goods and capital. The expansion of the world-system 
results into the commodification of things: including labour, natural resources, land, and 
even human relationships, which are turned into commodities to be traded in a market. 
Using the world-systems approach Alain Lipietz (1997), of the French regulation school, 
saw an integration of the structures of production, trade patterns, the method of 
accumulation and state regulations as forming a global economy in which regimes of 
accumulation and modes of production are balanced, changing only when the system 
enters a crisis. The focus of world systems analysts therefore is on contemporary trends, 
the need to understand business cycles, global systemic change and the associated 
realignments of economic power and potential. This approach is useful in understanding 
the dynamics of the agrarian transition in the developing countries, specifically the 
emergency of land grabbing and new agricultural production systems.  
Samir Amin established the dependency approach in the African context. 
Focusing more on a model of self-reliant economy and less on trade, Amin argue that the 
problem with developing countries is the extent to which the different economic sectors 
of the economy are not integrated with each other. Instead they are disarticulated due to 




production for export and trade, the principle characteristics of a peripheral economy 
(Foster, 2011, Kvangraven, 2017). Contributing further to the dependency school Amin 
argues that rich countries create an international division of labour in which they 
subordinate and exploit other countries, originally through colonial conquest, and now by 
creating “monopolies” (Brauch, 2014). The global model is monopolistic, establishing 
monopolies for the core countries on technology, control of financial flows, military 
power, ideological and media production, and access to natural resources. The monopoly 
systems lead to ‘super-profits’, above the level which can be made in competitive 
markets. This means the beneficiaries of imperialism cannot be out competed in world 
markets, implying that the global rankings are locked in place, despite ‘free’ market 
processes preached by WTO (Robinson, 2011).  
In conclusion, dependency and its variants interpreted  policies leaning towards 
externalisation of the economy as leading  poor countries to be bound within an unjust 
multilateral trading system, with deteriorating terms of trade and worsening their balance 
of payments, and resulting in a loss of national autonomy in defining their development 
trajectory. The world-system functions through a division of labour among countries. 
Poor ‘peripheral’ countries are assigned the role of providing low-value inputs into global 
processes, at below their actual value. The periphery specialises in producing primary 
goods—such as agricultural crops and mined ores—which are mainly exported to the 
center. Unlike the center, the periphery is primarily focused outside itself. This implies 
the need to re-focus periphery economies.  
For agriculture the emphasis should include the domestic needs of food security 




inputs into other economic sectors, as well as on taking care of the environment in the 
production process. Producing domestically other agricultural products used as inputs 
into other economic sectors has important positive inter-industry effects, which comprise 
both consumption and production multipliers (Valdés & Foster, 2010).   These backward 
and forward linkages are necessary for a county’s more sustainable and equitable 
development that can command autonomy from world trading system, save on foreign 
exchange, lower and stabilize food prices, and create employment (Amin, 1997, 2011). 
 
 
Neoliberal agenda on land and agriculture 
Contemporary policies promoting land formalisation are born out of the neoliberal 
agenda which generally refers to the new political, economic and social arrangements 
within society that emphasize market relations, re-tasking the role of the state, and 
individual responsibility. Therefore, examining formalisation programmes with the 
neoliberal lenses on, makes the objectives clearer and easier to gauge the possible 
outcomes.    
From the 1980s, based on laissez-faire economic philosophy, and promoted by the 
World Bank and the IMF, the neoliberalism in the Global South pushes for a reform 
agenda of trade liberalisation, privatisation, and rolling back the state, (Bernstein, 2010; 
Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2012).  Trade liberalisation requires lowering and/or eliminating 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade in food and agricultural products. This 
goes hand in hand with deregulation, which is removing or reducing state regulations in 
the operation of domestic agricultural markets, including investment and price 




capital flowing in and out of a country in order to boost growth and efficiencies within 
the home country (Friedman, 2014). As a general rule, one can determine to what degree 
a country is liberalized economically by how easy it is to invest and do business in the 
country. A World Bank Annual Doing Business project, launched in 2002, provides 
comparative indices for the level of ‘openness’ (World Bank, 2005b).  
On rolling back the state, the reforms are geared at recasting the state’s role in the 
economy and reconfiguring control over national resources. It involves relaxing state 
control over many aspects of the economy, such as eliminating the state’s role in business 
investment (as called for under privatisation) and removal of extension services and 
subsidies to small-scale farmers (Desmarais, 2007). This restructuring of the state’s role 
is always accompanied by other policies that seek to prioritise the functioning of 
‘markets’ above all else. Such policies include privatisation reforms, which involve 
transfer of publicly owned enterprises to private ownership and control. This includes 
plantations, ranches, and parastatals (crop boards, research institutions, agro-industries) 
that operate in the rural economy. 
Further, the neoliberal development strategies promote export-oriented production 
according to ostensible comparative advantage, which as popularized by David Ricardo, 
stipulates that countries are better off if they specialize in a certain class of products for 
export, but import the rest, even if the country holds an absolute advantage in all products 
(Matsuyama, 1992). In this context, developing countries deemed uncompetitive in agro-
processing/light industries ought to concentrate in the production of primary 
commodities, while importing finished consumer products. The implication is to abandon 




market, specifically import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies (Bernstein, 
2010). 
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by UN member 
states at the turn of the millennium shifted the focus in development from fostering 
economic growth per se to encouraging poverty reduction. Most of the MDGs seemed at 
first sight unobjectionable. Nevertheless, they were not the result of an initiative from the 
South itself, but were pushed primarily by the triad (the United States, Europe, and 
Japan), and were co-sponsored by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All of this has raised the 
question of whether they are mainly ideological cover (or worse) for neoliberal initiatives 
(Amin, 2006). Could the triad have seen some of the basic needs elements that are central 
to creating a situation of the expansion of capitalism? 
While both the contribution of each sector to economic growth and the 
participation of poor people in it remain on the policy agenda, the neoliberal globalisation 
of the World Bank and IMF dominates the course of agriculture in the developing world. 
It is, however, acknowledged that the organisations are not ideologically homogeneous 
throughout. Their strategies increasingly recognise the importance of equity (World 
Bank, 2005) and domestic policy ownership as illustrated in the replacement of the 
Bank/IMF’s controversial neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) with so-
called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In general, however, these institutions 
continue to promote neoliberal laissez-faire approaches to economic policy in developing 
countries aiming at economic liberalisation and openness to stimulate growth. Analysis of 




process of [the] programmes. “‘Poverty’ is used as window dressing to peddle more or 
less the same SAPs to low income countries that led them into a state of chronic 
economic crisis to begin with” (Malaluan, & Guttal, 2003: 1).  
Establishment of private property rights system as the panacea to low growth and 
poverty under the neoliberal agrarian restructuring process has instilled capitalist social 
relations in the countryside (Purdon, 2014; Peters, 2014). This leads to less access to land 
by smallholder farmers and the simultaneous concentration of land in fewer hands as a 
result of appropriation through the operation of land markets regulated by neoliberal 
policies. Vergara-Camus (2012), studying the case of property rights in Brazil and 
Mexico, argued that formalisation became a “catalyst that completed the 
commodification of land, pushed the fully capitalist development of agriculture, and 
further marginalized peasant producers and rural workers”. With the commodification of 
land, ‘social reproduction’ of peasants in rural areas gradually becomes dependent on the 
‘reproduction of capital’. According to Karl Marx, development of capitalist social 
relations in agriculture requires subordination of land to capital (Marx 1991:936), a 
process that unfolds gradually. The market-based tenure reforms facilitate capitalist 
formation of new enclosures through “a process of erosion and seizure of the commons 
by spatial means” (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015:3).  
 
Critics of the neoliberal approach 
Agriculture’s role in development has proved a rich source of alternative debates, 
given its close links to sustenance and the land, with the emotional resonances that this 




liberalizing trade in food and agricultural products, deregulate the operations of domestic 
agricultural markets, privatising parastatals that function in the rural economy, and 
formalising the ownership and control of property that had been held in public, common 
or, in some cases, privately (Peine & McMichael, 2005). However, alongside looming 
concerns about food security, the need to foster agriculture’s role in overall development 
has been a strong motivation for seeking alternatives to the neoliberalism approach 
(McCarthy & Prudham, 2004).  
From the foregoing development theories, discussed above, it is evident that the 
evolution of capitalist agriculture has not comprehensively generated capitalist farming in 
the developing countries. A common theme in their explanation is that “capitalist 
agriculture devices ways of subsuming or incorporating smallholder famers” within its 
market structure and dynamics of accumulation, as long as this provides benefit to the 
capital (Weis 2007: 82). This is often, if not necessarily, associated with some notion that 
farmers are exploited by capital, directly or indirectly, where farmers’ share of the total 
value of agricultural output has been in steady decline, relative to increasing shares of 
inputs, which benefit agro-input corporations, and of processing and marketing, which 
accrue to agro-food corporations (Bernstein, 2010). The exploitative economic relations 
between peripheral and core countries within the global economic system explain 
underdevelopment. However, it is important, within this paradigm, to highlight the 
significance of the structural features and geographies of production in order to 
understand the problems of underdevelopment. 
 Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his Globalisation and its Discontents book posits that the 




unsound. He argues that IMF has done great damage through the Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs) it has prescribed, that countries must follow in order to qualify for IMF 
loans, or for loans from banks and other private-sector lenders that look to the IMF to 
indicate whether a borrower is creditworthy. According to Stiglitz, the theories which 
guide the IMF's policies are empirically flawed. Free market, neoclassical, and neoliberal 
are all essentially euphemisms for the disastrous laissez-faire economics of the late 19th 
century. The IMF strongly advocated "shock therapy" in a rush to market economies, 
without first establishing institutions to protect the public and local commerce3. Local 
social, political, and economic considerations were largely ignored. He posits a direct 
causal link between globalisation and bad policymaking and concludes by suggesting 
suitable rules for global economic management. Stiglitz believes that promoting local and 
international democracy is fundamental to reforming global economic policy. Democracy 
aids social stability, it empowers the free flow of information, and promotes a 
decentralized economy upon which efficient and equitable economies rely. 
Similarly, joining the dissenters is David Harvey (2007), who argues that 
neoliberal globalisation is a particular ideology and political programme built on the 
principles of “accumulation by dispossession” to resolve the problem of capital. He 
explained that the neoliberalism idea is the continuation and proliferation of 
accumulation practices which Marx had treated of as ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ during the 
rise of capitalism. He argues that “include the commodification and privatisation of land 
and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations …; conversion of various forms of 
 
3 The term "shock therapy" refers to the concept of figuratively shocking, or shaking up, the economy, 
with sudden and dramatic economic policies that affect prices and employment. Characteristics of shock 
therapy include the ending of price controls, the privatization of publicly-owned entities, and trade 




property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights” 
(Harvey, 2007: 159). There is widespread occurrence of suppression of rights to the 
commons, commodification of labour power and the suppression of customary forms of 
production and consumption all in line with triumph of a capitalist system in the 
developing world.  
He argues that these practices have been “integrated into the ongoing evolution of 
capitalism”, in which alongside the exploitation of workers and the extraction of surplus 
value, there is simple plunder: “the naked transfer of wealth from the world’s working 
class and poor to the ruling class” (ibid, 2007). The effects of the global market are taken 
to ‘distort’ production towards export, primary raw materials, and light rather than heavy 
industry. In agriculture, peasant production is replaced by commercial agribusiness, 
which depends on imported components and export markets. 
An important dimension in these criticisms is the role of state and other agents in 
supporting institutional development that will reduce the transaction costs of critical 
transactions, including financial, input and output, in the smallholder agriculture sector. 
Here the focus is not so much on institutions as organisations but on institutions as the 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990). These include “institutional environments”, for 
example those that govern land tenure security for smallholder farmers and general 
relations between economic agents, as well as “institutional arrangements” that include 
the specific rules governing specific transactions (Dorward et al., 2004). Equally 
important is the role played by CSOs and NGOs in land policy debate and advocacy, 
generally benefiting from a constructive, although sometimes also critical relationship 




checks and balances on governmental policy processes, facilitating public debate and 
civil society inputs that is important for participatory development. 
 
 Basic needs approach 
The developing world and sub-Saharan Africa in particular have witnessed 
policies and strategies coined by development partners with the aim of addressing 
poverty issues and sparring development. Understanding how these strategies performed 
in terms failures and successes would be useful to understand the formalisation 
programmes, which have much in common in terms of origins and objectives. One such 
strategies is the Basic Need Approach (BNA), which was first introduced at the World 
Employment Conference in 1976 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
displaying a need to return focus to employment, human needs, and people themselves, as 
the centre of development strategy (ILO, 1976). The inception of the BNA was inspired 
by the state of development at the beginning of the 1970s – the period at which the 
growth model was still the prevailing paradigm.  
The prevailing policy question for the growth model was how to stimulate growth 
by applying instruments such as capital, technology, entrepreneurial skills, export 
stimulation, and savings, while the question of the poor was residual. In the Third World, 
economic growth seemed to rely increasingly upon a combination of foreign borrowing 
and rapid natural resource exploitation, agriculture had been neglected as an economic 
sector and output was down, there were obvious problems in food production and access 
to food (Hoadley, 1981). To address these seemingly burgeoning economic problems, in 




1974), which stimulated policy makers to see the possibility of redistributing gains 
without necessarily sacrificing growth. In 1975 the World Bank declared An Assault on 
Poverty (McNamara, 1975), devoted increasing resources to rural development and urban 
slum improvement. The UNDP, FAO and WHO followed suit, orienting their 
programmes increasingly to benefit rural and poor communities during this period, but 
the leading exponent of the basic needs approach remained the ILO (Hoadley, 1981). 
ILO defined basic needs in terms of food, clothing, housing, and public service. 
Employment was both a means and an end, and participation in decision making was also 
included (ILO, 1976). The approach has been justified as explained in the following 
quote by Amartya Sen on the work of Ul Haq: “informed by a general recognition that 
while a poor economy may take a very long time to become a rich country through GNP 
growth, the conditions of human living can be changed much more rapidly through 
intelligent policy making” (Sen cited in Rosenfield, 1998: 1). Agriculture helps to meet 
the basic needs of humans and their civilisation by providing food, clothing, shelters, 
medicine and recreation. Hence, agriculture is the most important enterprise in the world 
from this perspective.  
However, development programs following the basic needs approach do not 
invest enough in economically productive activities that help a society carry its own 
weight into the future; rather it focuses on allowing the society to consume just enough to 
rise above the poverty line and meet its basic needs (Ghai, 1978). Despite being heralded 
as a response to the critics of economic growth orthodoxy—the belief in ‘trickle down’ 
policies or redistribution through growth—the approach suffered from the belief in a 




organisation, voluntary or official, from the North (Wisner, 1988). The ‘fix’ in the 
agricultural sector involve improved food production with new seeds and fertilise. 
According to Streeten, some see it as a “sop to keep the poor quiet” (Streeten et al., 1981: 
26). Samater see the approach as a smokescreen. By this he means it is nothing more than 
“… a new instalment in a long chain of fabrications designed to co-opt and confront any 
challenge to the dominant system” (Samater, 1984: 8). 
The central theme running through the approach is the desirability of making the 
satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor the central focus for national and international 
development efforts (ILO, 1976). It however, lacked a quantified macro- and sector 
framework to make it a success. The BNA programmes’ design weakness couple with 
unforthcoming financial support from donors resulted in significant basic needs projects 
not to materialize to the degree one would have predicted on the basis of the almost 
universal embrace of the basic needs approach evident in 1976. Sustainable development 
requires more than ‘quick fix’ consumption-oriented approaches. Amartya Sen focused 
on “functionings” and “capabilities” rather than consumption (Sen, 1999). ‘Functionings’ 
refer to the things that a person may value doing or being, and thus denote a freedom to 
achieve a certain lifestyle. ‘Capabilities’ refer to the sets of resources (physical, mental 
and social) that a person might command, and which give rise to various ‘functionings’.  
Employment, basic needs, and much else were pushed to the sidelines due to 
dwindling donors’ financial commitment to the BNA programmes, and with the looming 
debt crisis of the 1970s. Figures for the external debt problem of African countries 
pointed to a sharp rise in aggregate debt during the past two decades. From an estimated 




constant (1980) US dollars, total African debt at the end of 1987 was nearly seven and a 
half times its level in 1970 (IMF, 1988). Hence the Fund/Bank developed Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the early 1980s as a means of gaining stronger 
influence over the economies of debt-strapped governments in the South. The succeeding 
“lost decade” (the 1980s) in terms of growth was enforced by mean and lean policies—
the laissez-faire economic policies—that made it a tragic loss for millions (Malaluan, & 
Guttal, 2003). The overarching development concept shifted to development without the 
state at the country level and globalisation without countervailing power at the 
international level—an approach that was labeled the “Washington Consensus” (Harvey, 
2007).  
The policies and programs guided by the Washington Consensus and their 
ramification, especially on land and agriculture, are discussed below under the subject 
Land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods approach 
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods approach (SRL) is one of the initiatives of the 
development agents and academician in addressing development challenges of the South. 
The notion of sustainable livelihood as known today can be said to have arisen out of the 
1992 Earth Summit held in Rio and its promotion of Agenda 21 (Agenda for the 21st 
Century) (Perrings, 1994). A stated aim in Agenda 21 is that everyone must have the 
“opportunity to earn a sustainable livelihood”. SRL emerges at the intersection of 
development and environmental studies to offer a new way to think about work, 




the bottom of the pyramid, indigenous communities, and peasants). It was a central 
concept of the British’s Department for International Development’s (DFID) strategy 
during the later half of the 1990s (DFID, 1999; Krantz, 2001). 
The early pioneers of the approach, Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway, 
defined livelihoods as being made up of a series of capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a living (Chambers & Conway, 
1991). Livelihood is sustainable when it maintains or enhances the capabilities and assets 
on which livelihoods depend, and when it can cope with and recover from stress and 
shocks both now and in the future (ibid., 1991). The approach supports analyses of the 
strengths of particular systems of land tenure, and of their evolution, as well as the 
corresponding agricultural models in relation to the well-being of the people concerned.  
 
Figure 1: The five capitals of sustainable livelihood (after Scoones 1998) 





The approach shows how, in different contexts, sustainable livelihoods are 
achieved through access to a range of livelihood resources (natural, economic, physical, 
human and social capitals) that are combined in the pursuit of different livelihood 
strategies—agricultural modernisation, livelihood diversification, and migration, see 
Figure 1, (Scoones, 1998). 
Like many initiatives in development, SLA did not come out of a vacuum nor 
indeed can it be said to have a definitive starting point. Rather it grew organically from a 
number of older trends and ideas, many linked to agriculture development, so worth 
exploring; the term sustainable livelihood even predates the 1992 Earth Summit. For 
example, there are influences arising from the application of ‘systems’ approaches to 
sectors such as agriculture. ‘Agro- Ecosystem Analysis’ has its origins in the 1960s and 
sought to bring together concepts in ecology along with social and economic aspects of 
agriculture (Conway 1985). These system-based approaches were not just research 
frameworks but also had practical application. An example is the evolution of new 
approaches to knowledge generation with farmers. The historical approach had been to 
consider farmers as mere recipients of ‘new’ knowledge and technologies generated by 
research services and transferred via an extension service; hence the phrase ‘transfer of 
technology’. Again, the model was linear with information flowing one way. Newer 
systems changed this to a partnership approach towards knowledge generation, with 
farmers working together with researchers. Terms using the phrase ‘farming systems’ 
began to evolve in the 1980s to capture this new mentality; for example, ‘farming 




Partnership approaches had to be built upon a genuine participation of farmers in 
the process; not a token representation where farmers were simply lectured to. Indeed, 
SRL itself tapped into the parallel evolution of participatory methodologies since the 
1960s (or indeed earlier) such as rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA). Both RRA and PRA had a strong ‘rural’ focus (and exemplified in their 
respective names) and sought to include households in the knowledge generation process 
(Chambers 1991). RRA was more extractive in that it was intended as an umbrella term 
to cover a suite of methods by which researchers could learn about local livelihoods and 
so arrive at recommendations for intervention. PRA had the added thrust that potential 
interventions became part of the participatory-based discourse. This suite of methods 
used within PRA is much the same as those of PRA, and often used within SLA.  
Although SLA has resonance with older ideas, one of its most prominent 
influences is the rise of what is referred to as ‘human development’ in the 1980s and 
promoted especially by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Indeed, 
SLA has been regarded by some as the ‘operational vehicle’ of human development 
(Singh and Gilman 1999). Human Development was influenced by the work of the Indian 
economist Amartya Sen and his writing on capability (Sen 1984, 1985).  ‘Human 
development’ took as its central tenet the importance of enhancing capability, with 
UNDP declaring in its report that “human development is a process of enlarging people’s 
choices” to improve human lives (UNDP, 1990: 10).  
A process of improving the quality of life and economic well-being of people 
living in rural areas—rural development—hinges on recognising multiple and diverse 




economic activities, as well as the role of the institutions in determining the use of and 
return to assets. This development inquiry and practice labeled sustainable rural 
livelihoods approach builds on Sen’s (1981) concept of entitlements. He argued that in a 
private market, an entitlement set of a person is determined by his original bundle of 
ownership (endowment) and additional bundles acquired, where in his case famine, this 
was seen through the lens of loss of endowment (land loss, loss of labour power) or loss 
of exchange entitlement (fall in wages, rise in food prices). He revealed that in many 
cases of famine, food supplies were not significantly reduced, but rather there were other 
factors (social and economic) which led to starvation—curtailed access to food supply to 
rural communities. The implication is that analysis of rural livelihoods requires a broader 
view to the land question besides production. 
The land question—that is who has what rights to land, what do they do with it 
and with what implications—is of utmost importance given that land in sub-Saharan 
Africa is more than a factor of production. This implies the need to delve further than the 
agrarian question only, that is how farming is, or ought to be, organized, and with what 
role for peasants or other small agricultural producers. For instance, many of the ways in 
which land is used—often labelled ‘social’ or ‘cultural’—are in fact best understood as 
part of processes of distribution that are a vital part of many sub-Saharan Africans’ 
livelihoods. Hence, an exclusive focus on production as the problem, and more 
productive agriculture as the solution, blinds us both to most of the things that people, in 
fact, do with land, and to many of the most important issues facing low-income rural 




A descriptive analysis portrays a complex web of activities and interactions that 
emphasises the diversity of ways rural people make a living. This may cut across the 
boundaries of more conventional approaches to looking at rural development which focus 
on defined activities including agriculture, farm labour, and small-scale enterprise. But in 
reality, rural people combine different activities with a complex range of assets. This 
diversity includes the land-based strategies of arable farming, livestock husbandry, wage 
employment, consumption and trade in natural resources, as well as land-linked 
remittances (Cousins, 2000). Outcomes of course vary, and how different strategies affect 
livelihood pathways or trajectories is an important concern for livelihoods analysis.  
However, the contribution of land-based activities to rural livelihoods is important in 
both financial and social terms, and is probably greater than previously appreciated 
within the whole range of livelihood strategies adopted by rural households, including 
transfers from urban areas, formal employment and state subsidies (Davies, 1996; 
Cousins, 1999). 
Many rural residents regard themselves primarily as agriculturalists. Those 
without land still aspire to land within the village land, and the majority of those with 
land are eager for more (IFAD, 2001), which indicates the value of land-based strategies 
to livelihoods. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Analyses captures not only the 
conventional  benefits that focus sectorally on marketing of livestock and production of 
staple arable crops, but also the direct-use value derived by most households from a large 
number of products resulting from land-based livelihood activities, including small stock, 
the full range of goods and services associated with livestock, produce from home 




resources for home consumption, sale of raw or processed natural resources, and non-
monetised reciprocal barter and exchange of goods and services (Shakelton, et al., 2001). 
Thus, land-based livelihood strategies in customary land systems make significant socio-
economic contribution to overall quality of life and economic well-being of people living 
in rural areas.  
If agriculture, then, is only one of the things that people do with land, what are 
some of the others? What else do people do with land, besides cultivate crops and graze 
livestock on it, that contributes to individual or society’s well-being? Some of the ways in 
which, under the customary ownership systems in sub-Saharan Africa, people make use 
of land and land rights includes: to live cheaply, often while retreating temporarily from 
expensive urban life to hunt or forage; to collect firewood, medicinal and other useful 
plants, and other natural resources; to bury their dead properly, and to properly respect, 
remember and tend to them; to anchor kinship and other social networks by providing a 
place of connection and return for an interrelated group of people; to establish continuity 
with the past, including, but not only, via ancestors; to bolster male control over women; 
to underpin the powers of traditional authorities; to have a place to rest and to be cared 
for when ill; and last, but certainly not least, to symbolize collective identity, belonging, 
pride and liberation (Shipton, 1994; Peter, 2009). 
The implications of land rights flexibility and ‘web of interests’ in land in 
customary ownership systems are significant in designing rural development policies. For 
instance, when we see untilled fields, let us not be so quick to say that the land is 
‘unused’, and eventually proceed into designing policies for its use and/or to redistribute 




livelihoods. But the mechanisms that turn land into livelihood are as much social as they 
are technical and may turn less on producing goods than on accessing sources of cash and 
other support from others (Ferguson, 2013). Often, that is, land leads to livelihood via 
processes not only of production, but of distribution as well.  
The link between the process of redistribution and land ownership systems in sub-
Saharan Africa has been central in rural livelihoods making for a long time. Remarkable 
mechanisms of distribution, in which sources of wealth and streams of income are 
divided into smaller and smaller slices as they work their way across social relations of 
kinship, clientele, allegiance and solidarity are rampant in the region (Bayart & Ellis, 
2000). These practices of distribution have changed in form over time, and they are 
known by a wide variety of names: remittances, kin-based sharing, political clientage, 
‘corruption’ and so on. But they are visible, and even prominent, in any micro-social 
level income analysis, where those with access to incomes inevitably encounter a wide 
range of social claims on that income, which in any case cannot be easily ignored 
(Ferguson, 2015).  
What role do rights of ownership or access to landholdings play in the wider 
economy of distribution? The most familiar regional dynamic, historically, has been a 
relation of interdependence between wage earners and their dependents. There are 
apparently rural people whose basic livelihood in fact derived from industrial 
employment or business income that are geographically located hundreds of kilometers 
away in urban centres, (Ferguson 1990). Villages of what appeared to be peasant farmers 
were in fact, a migrant labourers or traders that ‘scratches about on the land’ (Murray, 




not so much because it produced a viable agricultural income (in most cases it did not), 
but because it established the rural homestead as a viable rural base, to which labour 
migrants would plan to return. A relation of dependence, and mutual obligation, between 
migrant labourers, traders and hawkers and their rurally based wives and kin, was the 
centre of both the social and the economic system.  
A key issue for urban workers/traders and hawkers is how they would manage 
their retirement. Urban dwellers maintain a “rural strategy”, where urban workers are 
concerned with “maintaining links” with the rural areas through building a permanent 
house (Dansereau, 2002: 124).  With high and rising costs of urban living, and meagre 
income options after leaving employment or as they age, retiring to ‘home’ villages is 
very much on the agenda, even for those who did not relish the idea of rural life. But 
‘going home’ meant, first, having a rural ‘home’ and, second, being welcome to ‘return’ 
there. Relations with rural relatives are often tense and conflictual, and those who had not 
adequately attended to the needs and demands of kin ‘at home’ during their working 
years could encounter social rejection and even violence in their own time of 
vulnerability and need. The stories like “I have two children, but I pay school fees for 
six” are commonplace in the region. Some of the rejection could take a form of not being 
considered for land inheritance by their parents or family elders (Murray, 1981, 
Ferguson, 1999). 
Actually, relations of rural-urban dependence go both ways. During any particular 
period, practices of sharing and dependence between urban and rural relatives prove to be 
crucial social protection systems. Frequent fluctuations in the demand for low-skilled and 




especially for street traders (hawkers), in urban centres across the region, means a 
necessity to have alternative means of survival (Turner, 2005). It is therefore common for 
urban dwellers to get ‘free’ food supplies such as beans, pulses, grains, cereal, rice and 
live chicken —and even perishables like vegetables, eggs and milk, if the distances are 
not too far from the respective rural area. At other times the urban dweller would 
purchase of seeds or other cash transfers, educating children of the rural relatives—an 
example of norm of reciprocity at work (Bah, 2013). 
Both social transfers and most forms of land tenure are bound up very tightly with 
social networks and the reciprocities that make them work. For this reason, it is 
increasingly the case that successful livelihood strategies for the rural poor hinge 
crucially on the distributive dynamics associated with these networks. Such distributive 
claims continue to be of vital importance to day-to-day survival strategies, especially 
among the poorest, as it has been revealed that giving is more common among the poor 
than the rich’ and that not only is poverty not a deterrent to giving, but ‘giving within 
poor communities is crucial to their very survival’ (Habib & Maharaj, 2008). 
Another key issue considered under the livelihoods approach to examining rural 
development is viability, especially in the debates about land reforms in the region. 
Viability connotes ‘successful’ and ‘sustainable’ as used to inform state policies and 
planning approaches in relation to both individual projects and programmes (Eastwood, 
et al., 2010; Cotula, et al., 2004)). In sub-Saharan Africa such debates tend to focus rather 
narrowly on farm productivity and economic returns. An implicit normative model in 
much usage in the region is the large-scale commercial farm, even when policies suggest 




accommodated. However, when we see a smallholding, let us be careful about dismissing 
it as ‘not viable’ when we have not yet asked ‘viable for what?’ (Cousins & Scoones 
2010). 
The dominant framing of viability is embodied in technical recommendations 
around ‘minimum farm sizes’, ‘economic units’, and ‘carrying capacities’. Methods and 
measures for appraisal of land reform – in planning, monitoring and evaluation – are 
defined in terms of marginal returns on investment or farm profitability. Processes of 
planning and implementation are framed by standard approaches to farm management 
and business plans developed for largescale commercial farms, with the consequence that 
generalised statements indicating a role for other types of farming, such as small-scale, 
household-based systems, do not readily translate into programmatic support (Borras, 
2008; Cousins & Scoones 2010). This way of framing viability—success and failure—is 
highly restrictive, and has far-reaching consequences, since the wider benefits and costs 
of land reform are rarely examined, the social and political dimensions are often ignored, 
and important cross-scale and linkage effects are not considered.  
Addressing challenges stemming from the restrictive framing of viability, requires 
first, to enrich the debate and to clarify a central question: whose interests does reform 
serve? The implication is that an expanded and more diverse set of measures of viability 
than those used in the past is required, which in turn requires new methodologies for the 
collection and analysis of data. Assessments of viability must embrace heterogeneity, 
complexity, and competition in relation to multiple objectives (what different people 
want), multiple livelihoods (what different people do), multiple scales (including linkages 




(including the structural dimensions of political economy, as well as local project/scheme 
settings). In this approach, the politics of land is at the very centre of assessments of 
viability and arises from the changing significance of land and farming for different 
categories of people in rural sub-Saharan Africa (Bryceson, 2000; Bernstein, 2002; 
Cousins & Scoones 2010). 
The sustainable rural livelihood approach also requires consideration of the value 
of goods and services derived from the full spectrum of land-based activities, the value of 
which, in most cases, has not been captured in regional or national statistics (Shackleton, 
Shackleton & Cousins, 2001). This abates the perception of customary lands as being 
unproductive and contributing little to the national welfare and economy. This often, 
erroneous perception is fueled by a subjective impression of resource decline, and the 
relatively small amounts of animal and plant products (wild and domestic) from 
customary lands that enter the formal economy. The bulk are consumed at home or 
exchanged—albeit, often non-monetized—within the informal economy.  
  Emphasising the multidimensional aspect of land, the sustainable rural 
livelihood approach argues for the requirement to consider the value of goods and 
services derived from the full spectrum of land and land-based activities, the value of 
which, in most cases, has not been captured in regional or national statistics. The 
underreporting of rural production is contributed by the fact that bulk rural production is 
consumed at home or exchanged—albeit, often non-monetized—within the informal 
economy. 
The approach thus underlines the importance of understanding how the rural 




resources and relationships at their disposal. It requires adequate recognition of the 
complex interconnections between the multiple components of the customary systems, 
including local interconnections and the strong linkages between rural areas and the 
urban economy. It also requires recognition of the important aspect of rural livelihood 
strategies in their broad-based nature—most rural households derive livelihoods from at 
least two of the broad economic categories (natural resources, livestock or agriculture) at 
any one time. Indeed, very few rural households do not engage in some use of natural 
resources or cultivation of the home plot. Again, with the ongoing implementation of the 
neoliberal policies—of rolling back the state—leading to high rate of retrenchments and 
job losses in the formal economic sectors, it is important to understand the role that land-
based livelihoods may play in sustaining the recently unemployed. Significant numbers 
of retrenched workers are returning to seek livelihood opportunities in the local economy, 
from the relatively secure rural home base they have maintained (Bernstein, 2010; Hall, 
Hirsh & Li, 2011). 
The Sustainable Rural Livelihoods approach seeks to enhance the sustainability of 
the lives of rural people through promoting livelihood objectives, which include more 
secure access to, and better management of, natural resources; a policy and institutional 
structures that support multiple livelihood strategies; and, finally, a more supportive and 
cohesive social environment (Carney, 1998). In a tenure reform program, adopting this 
approach directs the analysis to how or how not the reform process provides livelihood 
resources (capitals) and enhances opportunities to pursue different livelihood strategies. 
In addition, it contributes to understanding how land rights ought to be organised to 




Thus, the livelihoods approach offers an important lens for a wider viewing of the 
rural development question in the sub-Saharan Africa. It encourages a deeper and critical 
reflection, specifically in analysing the significance of development effort from a local-
level perspective, which makes the links from the micro-level, and which situates 
peculiarities of rural people’s livelihoods to wider-level institutional and policy framings 
at local, national and even international levels. The approach lays bare the question as to 
who has what rights to land, what they do with it and with what implications, is of utmost 
importance in efforts to improve the quality of life and economic well-being of the rural 
people. 
The Sustainable Rural Livelihoods approach recognizes that policies, institutions, 
and processes influence access to and the use of land, which ultimately impacts rural 
livelihoods (Chambers & Conway, 1992). In that regard, the analysis provides ample 
opportunity to examine not only the new legal and regulatory framework put in place to 
guide the formalisation programmes, but also other laws and policies that have a bearing 
on land tenure—such as agricultural and investment policies. Clearly stronger local 
institutions for managing land rights, that put rural population at the forefront, would 
facilitate more effective management of local resources required for rural development. 
The need for stronger rights to local resources and the operation of the rule of law in 
supporting these rights regimes is underlined by the emerging phenomenon of plunder 
and theft of rural resources—often by outsiders, sometimes by community members 
themselves (Cotula, et al., 2004). In this context the study examines the issue of how well 




economy. This sets a stage for detailed discussion of land policies and development in 
Tanzania in Chapter 4. 
 
Agricultural transformation models 
Having explored how the various development theories conceived the role of 
agriculture in development and their critiques, we now examine in detail agricultural 
transformation—the path through which agriculture moves from one lower 
(underdeveloped) stage to a higher (developed) stage. This would help us tie together the 
knowledge gathered from the development theories in determining what ought to be the 
right path for agriculture to be able to contribution to development, that is to improve the 
quality of life and economic well-being of the rural population.  Agriculture 
transformation is described as changing how agriculture is done in order to capture and 
improve the many contributions that agriculture can make to development. These include 
a source of growth and structural transformation for the agriculture-based countries, the 
narrowing of rural-urban disparities especially in the transforming economies, poverty 
reduction given the 75% prevalence of the rural poor in world poverty, enhancing food 
security, resource saving to the benefit of sustainability in agriculture, and the provision 
of environmental services across all economies (Byerlee, Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010). 
Timmer (1988) argues that based on both historical and contemporary cross-
section perspectives, the agricultural transformation seems to evolve through at least four 
phases that are roughly definable.  First, agriculture should exhibit rising productivity. 




and in particular land productivity, has remained stagnant. Yet, we know that 
productivity has to rise if food prices 
are not to increase, poverty is to be reduced, and land degradation reversed (Bernstein, 
2010). Second, another stage of agriculture transformation is tapping surplus created by 
rising productivity to develop the non-agricultural sector. An agricultural production that 
exceeds the needs of the society for which it is being produced may be stored for future 
times or     sold/exported to generate funds for financing development of other sectors 
such as transport and industries (Diao, Hazell & Thurlo, 2010).  
Third, agriculture transformation manifests a progressive integration of the 
agricultural sector into the macro economy, via improved infrastructure, market-
equilibrium linkages, and employment growth. Successful agricultural growth fosters a 
growing rural non-farm economy (RNFE) through forward, backward, and final demand 
linkages, located in rural areas due to the advantages of proximity to agriculture 
(Himanshu, Mukhopadhyay & Murgai, 2010). In a barely noticeable fourth phase, the 
role of agriculture in industrialized economies becomes little different from the role of 
the steel, housing, or insurance sectors.  
However, most developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa particularly, have 
found it extremely difficult to successfully go up the agricultural transformation ladder, 
that is advancing their agricultural sector through these four phases for various reasons—
many identified under different schools of thought reviewed above. As a result, 
governments encounter serious problems of resource allocation within the economy and 
even problems beyond their borders because of pervasive attempts by high-income 




Sifting through the literature on agriculture and development presented above, it 
is evident that agricultural transformation requires placing emphasis on adapting new 
technologies to local conditions, as well as highlighting the positive relationship between 
investments in agricultural research, schooling and extension and the high returns of the 
new inputs. According to Schultz (1968), the returns to agricultural investment in 
research, development and extension are even higher than returns to investment in 
industry.  The agriculture model discussion highlights a critical role of government, 
because government policies influence what farmers grow, where a farm is located, how 
products are transported and processed, how a commodity is traded, and the price the 
farmer might receive. The main message drawn from this discussion is the need to invest 
more and better in agriculture in order to capture the many contributions that agriculture 
can make to development, including productive employment, enhancing food security 
and a source of growth and structural transformation for the agriculture-based countries. 
The need to invest more and better in agriculture contributed to the Green Revolution 
initiatives in the latter half of the 20th century. 
The dynamism of the Green Revolution in Asia during the late 1960s and early 
1970s invigorated the view of agriculture’s critical role in growth and development. The 
transformation of traditional agriculture into a modern sector revealed agriculture’s 
potential as a growth sector. Simultaneously, it highlighted that science-based technology 
adapted to a country’s ecological conditions is key for agricultural growth. Indeed, 
advances in mechanical and biological technology can help overcome endowment 
constraints, particularly with regard to land and labour. Based on this idea, Hayami and 




importance of technical change for agricultural growth but also stressed that technical 
change is often endogenous to a country’s economic system. In other words, successful 
agricultural innovation is a dynamic process that reflects natural endowments, the degree 
of demand and supply for agricultural inputs and outputs, and the incentive structure for 
farmers, scientists, and the public and private sectors. As both the Green Revolution and 
the “induced innovation model” revealed, agricultural productivity growth requires 
fostering the linkages between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
The importance of inter-sectoral linkages in driving the growth process had 
already been widely recognized. Hirschman (1958) was one of the first theorists to 
emphasize linkage effects in the growth process, although his analysis focused mainly on 
the backward and forward linkages created by investments in industrial sectors. By 
contrast, Johnson and Mellor (1961) emphasized the existence of production and 
consumption linkages, both within agriculture as well as between agriculture and non-
agricultural. In particular, agricultural production generates forward linkages such that 
agricultural outputs are supplied as inputs into non-agricultural production. Growth in 
agriculture contributes to rapid rises in agro-processing and processed food marketing, 
which not only provides new engines of growth but an opportunity to substitute for 
imports. Agriculture also creates backward production linkages through its demand for 
intermediate inputs such as fertilizers and marketing services. Both of these production 
linkages are likely to deepen as an economy modernizes but decline in relative 
importance alongside agriculture’s share of production (Haggblade et al. 1989). 
The consumption linkage generated by increased rural incomes is agriculture’s 




the early stages of development, provide an important market for domestically produced 
manufactures and services (Hazell and Roell 1983). Without this market, it is unlikely 
that sufficient export opportunities will allow nascent domestic industries to achieve 
competitive efficiency in foreign markets through economies-of-scale. Further, surplus 
agricultural incomes provide savings for investment in both urban and rural areas (Hart, 
1998). This savings linkage also works through forward linkages to urban areas. Lower 
food prices, stimulated by increased agricultural productivity, maintain low real wages in 
industrial sectors and thus foster investment and structural transformation.  
In an open economy, sectoral linkages are influenced by foreign trade. The 
magnitude of the linkage effects depends on the existence of non-tradable sectors and on 
imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. For example, Fei and 
Ranis’ (1961) assertion that urban growth demands agricultural growth may be less 
binding if imports can substitute for domestic agriculture. Nonetheless, agricultural 
growth has stronger links to the rest of the economy than non-agriculture (especially 
industry) because: (i) agricultural output is typically sold in domestic markets, (ii) 
intermediate inputs into agricultural production are less import-intensive than industrial 
production, and (iii) rural demand is usually met by domestically-produced goods. On the 
other hand, urban consumption patterns tend to favor imported goods that not only 
weaken industrial backward linkages but also lead to foreign exchange constraints that 
hamper capital-intensive industrialisation. Admittedly, export-oriented agriculture can 
undermine forward-linkages and agricultural production can be constrained by the lack of 




Therefore, foreign trade can dampen agriculture’s linkage-effects, especially in smaller 
and more open economies. 
The growth linkage effects stemming from agricultural growth have proven most 
powerful when agricultural growth is driven by small farms, which dominate the rural 
economy and agriculture in most sub-Saharan African countries. Scholars have 
demonstrated that small farms are highly efficient due to their greater land productivity 
and their provision of self-supervising labour (Eastwood et al. 2004, Hazell 2004). Small 
farms help contain poverty by providing an affordable platform from which poor 
households can experiment with ways to improve their livelihoods, help prevent 
premature urban migration and the explosive growth of large cities. Furthermore, small- 
to medium-sized farm households typically have more favourable expenditure patterns 
for promoting growth of the local nonfarm economy, including rural towns. They spend 
higher shares of incremental income on rural nontraded goods than large-scale farmers, 
thereby generating greater demand for labour-intensive goods and services produced 
locally (Mellor 1976; Hazell and Roell 1983). Crucially, small farms also ensure a degree 
of food security in rural areas where high transport and marketing costs can drive up food 
prices, while at the national level, the higher land productivity of small farms has the 
potential to greatly help poor countries attain self-sufficiency in staples such as cereals, 
roots and tubers, and even livestock. 
The review of the agricultural transformation reveals the importance of broad-
based agricultural growth—with both inter-sectoral and consumption linkages—in 
boosting development. Further, agriculture’s pro-growth and pro-development 




agriculture in many developing countries, and the transformation from traditional to 
modern agriculture is based on the efficiency of small farms and their transformation 
from subsistence to market activities. Furthermore, another important dimension is the 
role of state and other agents in supporting institutional development that will reduce the 
transaction costs of critical transactions, including financial, input and output, in the 
smallholder agriculture sector. The role of government is critical in providing incentive 
structure for smallholder farmers, scientists, and the private sectors in developing and 
using science-based technology adapted to a country’s ecological context. 
The foregoing discussion on agricultural transformation begs the question: what 
land tenure system is best suited for the type of agriculture required to improve the life 
and economic well-being of rural population in the sub-Saharan Africa context?  To 
better respond to the question, it is important to understand the current context of tenure 
systems in the region, that have thus far been instrumental in the livelihoods of the rural 
population. The next section presents a theoretical analysis of the customary land 
ownership systems—the prevalent landholding systems in sub-Saharan Africa—detailing 
their suitability and strength. 
 
Land tenure systems and rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa 
Since the majority of households in sub-Saharan Africa depend on land as their 
primary  and sometimes the only asset from which to draw a livelihood, then security of 
tenure and access rights are of utter importance for their existence (Cousins, 2007; FAO, 
2002). Hence, the section starts with a review of customary land ownership systems, the 




reforms in the region, specifically the theoretical debates about the pros and cons of 
cadastral system vis-à-vis customary land rights systems. In this context we present 
Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights under which the debates in favour of land 
demarcation and state registration of private titles is based. The section ends with a 
presentation of a Theory of Access which broadens the notion of access to land giving us 
additional tools to evaluate the merits of land formalisation in terms of improving the 
quality of life and economic well-being of people living in rural areas—rural 
development. 
 
The customary ownership systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
Land resources in sub-Saharan Africa are, by and large, held, managed, and used 
primarily under customary ownership systems. The systems place land at the centre of all 
activities and relationships. The importance of land in the region is implied from the high 
percentage (70%) of the population that lives in rural areas and depends on land to 
provide for their subsistence and other cash needs (URT, 2010; IFAD, 2001; FAO, 2013; 
AU, ADB, & ECA, 2010). These customary land areas are often vast land resources 
organised around tribal, clan, ethnic sections, or most usually village entities. Under these 
systems each member has a right to use land or a portion of it according to the customary 
laws—usually unwritten, traditional common rules, norms or practice that have become 
an intrinsic part of the accepted and expected conduct in a local community. The use of 
customary laws here, is thus, distinct from its use in the international context, which “has 
a more precise and technical meaning in the realm of rules governing relations between 




system, which provide access to land and social rights to qualified members of a land 
holding community.  
In this context, customary land is not only a means of production, but it also has a 
unique social organisation function that is central to how rural population construct their 
livelihoods (Berkes, 1989; Okoth-Ogendo, 2002; Cousins, 2007).  Land in sub-Saharan 
Africa is the basis of the organisation of rural life, not only because of people’s 
relationship to the land on which they live and cultivate, but it also determines significant 
elements of the administration of rural areas. For example, defending their access to land 
has always been a major motivation for rural people to mobilize locally and even 
nationally (McKeon, 2013).   
The customary lands are held as a trans-generational asset and managed at 
different levels of social organisation, while being used in function-specific ways, 
including cultivation, grazing, fishing, hunting, transit, water sources, irrigation systems, 
biodiversity, conservation, and recreation (Berkes, 1989; Cousins, 2007). Under the 
customary systems specific plots of land are assigned temporarily or permanently to 
members for family cultivation, while other areas are held in common for use by all. 
Further, individual plots may or may not be inheritable or tradable in internal rental or 
sales markets, but sales to non-members are always forbidden or subject to community 
approval (Cousins, 2000, 2007). It is primarily for this reason that the communities are 
able to hold onto land and make it permanently available across generations. People gain 
and maintain access to customary land by virtue of (a) membership (mainly ascribed at 
birth) and good standing within a group, network, or category, (b) labour, and (c) 




Thus, under customary systems, property rights to land can be thought of as a 
‘bundle of rights and duties’, which may rest in different hands. Shipton and Goheen 
(1992) identify several broad types of such rights and duties: use rights, such as the right 
to exploit a resource for economic benefit (including grazing, cultivation, and gathering 
wild foods), or to access the resource (for rituals, leisure, or to walk across a field); and 
administration, or decision-making rights, such as the right to alienate or transfer land 
(sell, rent out, or vacate for any other reasons), and exclusion (prevent unqualified 
members from using or accessing the resource). Duties or obligations may involve a 
requirement to share farm products beyond the domestic group, paying fees, tithes to 
different groups and their leaders, or labour contributions (such as paving pathways, 
cleaning ritual/recreational sites, and standing guard for a common resource). Among 
these bundles, the alienation rights often receive the greatest interest in formal legal 
systems as a defining characteristic of “ownership.” Instead of focusing on alienation 
rights, many indigenous systems of property rights regard land as inalienable—as 
belonging to more than the individual in the present, but also to the group—past and yet 
to come (Meinzen-Dick& Mwangi, 2008). 
Land tenure system in rural sub-Saharan African setting is, thus, viewed as 
complex interconnectedness of people and their physical environment and emphasises the 
“relations between people and groups in terms of their mutual rights and obligations with 
regard to land” (Middleton 1988: ix). This view pays more attention to the links between 
land rights, social processes and structures and political and economic organisation, 
leading to more of a focus on issues of access to and control of land and land use 




property rights view, which considers land rights as rights to territorial parcels of land, 
precisely measurable and definable, with property rights in general regarded as being 
primarily about the ownership of physical things (Bohannan 1963; Demsetz 1967; 
Whitehead & Tsikata 2003). The property rights’ view, which is the basis of the 
formalisation programmes, is discussed in the next section, that analyses land tenure 
reforms in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In customary tenure systems, various land rights and obligations are embedded in 
social relations and customary structures, creating a ‘web of interests’ which plays a 
critical role in connecting people. In order to highlight the functions of these multiple 
interests, scholars and practitioners have attempted to classify them. FAO (2002), for 
example, finds four categories: (i) overriding interests such as when a sovereign power 
(e.g., a state or a community) has the power to allocate or reallocate; (ii) overlapping 
interests where several parties hold different rights to the same parcel of land, for 
example one party may have tilling rights and another may have a right of way; (iii) 
complementary interests when different parties share the same interest in the same parcel 
of land, as between bee-keepers and farmers with orchards to be pollinated; and (iv) 
when different parties contest the same interests in the same parcel. However, while such 
categories are useful for thinking about different interests, they will not always be clear in 
practice as they are quite dynamic that may change for many reasons, such as seasonality. 
The customary ownership systems founded on the ‘web of interests’ (i.e. 
overlapping and interlocking claims and responsibilities) are often highly effective at 
managing resources, with lower transactions costs, and less likelihood of exclusion of the 




that communities have developed rich sets of institutions and norms, including local 
norms of cooperation (i.e. compelling norms inducing members to act or work together 
for a shared goal, such as labour, taking care of natural resources, responding to shocks & 
stress); reciprocity (that is  compelling norms evoking behaviour/practice in which 
people/groups give to each other help and advantages); and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that are seen as flexible, accessible and affordable by majority (Ostrom, 
1990; Okoth-Ogendo, 2002; Meinzen-Dick & Mwangi, 2007).    
Customary rural landholding in sub-Saharan Africa, with unique patterns of use 
and meanings attached to land itself, and the varied customs by which humans relate to 
land, has become central in protecting the livelihoods of the rural population. The 
phenomenon of absentee landlordism and landless peasantry has not appeared as in large 
parts of southern Asia, or armed conflict between latifundistas and minifundistas as in 
large parts of South America (Shipton & Goheen, 1992), mainly because rural Africans 
do not generally hold land simply as individuals.  Personal land claims always depend on 
broader social entities, or combinations of them: whether on extended homestead 
families, lineages, villages, chiefdoms, ethnic sections, or other groups or networks. The 
system is also attributed to preventing land speculation, and land-grabbing on any large 
scale, at least until recently (ibid).   
However, customary systems have been much changed by contact and 
interference by governments, both colonial and since independence. An extreme example 
is South Africa, where what is referred to as customary law is a mixture of―traditional 
and colonial and apartheid legislation, under which tribal authorities were salaried 




country in Sub-Saharan Africa many changes have been introduced, since the colonial 
period through independences, which modified the role of the chiefs and undermined the 
customary systems in general. For example, immediately after independence Tanzania 
abolished chiefs and chiefdoms, and replaced them by a system of central control of local 
administrative units (Hyden, 1980). Notwithstanding these changes, customary land 
systems have continued to be the dominant land tenure system in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 Consequently, arguments supporting the maintenance of customary land systems 
continue to surface holding that the introduction of a formalised property rights system 
may compete with, and even destroy, well-established and effective local systems, 
opening the door to opportunism and possible chaos (Baland and Platteau 1996; Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2008a; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). It is argued that supplanting 
customary tenure with official titled rights destroys local systems that have held the 
society together, the systems that have provided food, employment and homes for the 
majority of the rural people. The new system that seeks to release land to more efficient 
farmers does not provide an alternative for those who become landless, or who lose 
markets for their products, considering that there are nor booming industrial sector to 
absorb labour-force released from the agricultural sector. 
Other arguments in support of customary systems assert that land policies should 
be based on the idea of social capital—the expected collective benefits derived from the 
preferential treatment and cooperation between individuals and groups—as it safeguards 
the commons that are critical for the livelihoods of the poor (Coleman, 1988; Berkes, 
1989; Okoth-Ogendo, 2002). They assert that customary social networks/contacts can 




economy, Hyden (1980: 86), stated “the economy of affection serves as a guarantor of 
social reproduction. It offers collective security in a manner that the modern economies 
do not. … there is little doubt that to its members, particularly those who control it, there 
are many intangible and invisible benefits offered”. 
So, customary ownership systems are shown to offer key elements that have 
sustained rural life and small-scale rural production that include cooperation, reciprocity, 
and permanent availability of land across generations (past, present, and future), 
flexibility to accommodate complex rights (such as multiple, and overlapping), as well as 
being the fountain from which their spiritual life and political ideology sprung (Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2008a; Hyden, 1980). In this context, the question is how does changing the 
customary land systems affects rural production relations, their access to food, and their 
social safety nets in both short and long-term periods? In this study we are examining 
effects of changes to the customary systems brought about by the formalisation 
programmes. 
 
Land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa 
In contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, multiple and overlapping land tenure 
systems exist in rural or customary lands (Cousins, 2000; Peters, 2009). The current 
formal land tenure systems are deeply rooted in statutory principles that are part of the 
colonial legacy—the land law, received law or modern law (McAuslan, 2000; Mamdani, 
2000; Peters, 2009; Bennett, 2008; Cousins, 2008a; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Negligible 
adjustments were made on the land law to suit local circumstances (McAuslan, 2000; 




the same (Berry, 2002; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008). Thus, the diversity of land laws in 
most sub-Saharan Africa presents attempts by the states to provide regulatory 
mechanisms adoptable in all communities regardless of the diversity of customs and 
traditions in the rural contexts (Mamdani, 2000). 
Independence from colonial rule was staggered over time from the late 1950’s 
through to the 1990’s, with Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa coming last. Thus, the 
processes of nation building, such as the establishment of independent political systems 
and the design of policies and development strategies, including land reforms and land 
policy making, were staggered as well, beginning in the 1950s and continuing more 
vigorously from the 1960s onwards. The major focus of post-colonial states in sub-
Saharan Africa was to redress colonial imbalances on land distribution with a desire for 
land allocation to all citizens (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). In countries such as Tanzania, 
Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, the land tenure reform programmes took 
the form of nationalisation (collectivisation), aimed at conversion of settler and foreign 
corporate lands to state farms, and at promoting cooperative association of peasant 
producers and some form of communal labour (Qaun, 2000). Villagisation programmes 
were introduced in countries such as Mozambique and Tanzania as part of post-colonial 
effort of tenure reform (Shivji, 1976; Razavi, 2003; Hyden, 1980). The villagisation 
programmes entailed relocation of households to spaces they could access more land for 
peasant farming. In Tanzania, the villagisation programme aimed at relocation of rural 
population into concentrated rural settlement to facilitate social service delivery 




Land tenure reforms entail amending the ways which people access, use, and 
control land (Dale & McLaughlin, 1999). Cousins (2007) acknowledges that the central 
issues on land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa rests upon the recognition of land 
tenure rights distinguishable from colonial arrangements that are based on “western-
legal”4 principles on property rights to those characterized by traditional or pre-colonial 
property rights. Often, governments in the post-independence period are forced to come 
up with legislation or legal frameworks to facilitate the process of land reform to further a 
development agenda (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). In countries such as Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, the major objectives of land tenure reforms were on redistribution of land rights 
and promotion of agriculture development (Cousins, 2008b). Walker (2009:267-268) 
describes land tenure reform in South Africa as seeking to “redress past injustices, 
promote national reconciliation, support economic growth and alleviate household 
poverty”. Cousins (2008b) also views the implementation of land tenure reforms in South 
Africa as a process that aims at correcting colonial imbalances for the benefit of the 
majority of South Africans, mainly the dispossessed rural poor.  
Land tenure reforms take different forms from country to country depending on 
local commitment of nation states, for example, decentralisation of land administration to 
lower level bodies, nationalisation of state land, land-titling programmes, introducing 
formal land markets for commercial farmers, and creation of policies and institutional 
structures for management of the land reform (Cotula et al., 2004; Migot-Adholla & 
Bruce, 1994; Hall, 2011). For instance, after independence Tanzania expanded the 
 
4The term was suggested by Daley & Hobley (2005, 8) in reference to dominant notions of private property 





domain of ‘public land’ by abolishing all freeholds extant in 1962 and converting all 
existing government leases into ‘rights of occupancy’. The effect of these changes was to 
reduce interest in land from being perpetual to a definite period with a maximum term of 
99 years (Lugoe, 2008). In Botswana, the District Land Boards were created to 
administer land issues (Peters, 2007). In Uganda, the 1975 land decree abolished all 
Mailo (freehold) land. It also declared all occupants of State land that did not have lease 
contracts as customary tenants on State land (Kanyamgareng, 2005).  
Land tenure reform programmes are often criticized for failure to secure the rights 
of the intended beneficiaries. For example, in Cote d’Ivoire the process of formalising 
land rights led to increased conflict and contributed to the state of civil war because of the 
heightened interest in land boundaries, the monetization of land lending, and solidifying 
one’s land claims on the eve of the land law’s implementation, indeed “the conflict 
between Katiali and Tiébila vilages was typical of the land disputes provoked by 
boundary clarification schemes” (Bassett, 2009: 764).  
In many countries land tenure reform has resulted in increased State control over 
land, promoting individual titling, suppressing traditional land management systems, and 
weakening customary tenure systems (Claassens, 2005; Peters, 2009; Kanyamgareng, 
2005). Efforts at the reform of land use on territories held by indigenous communities 
through a variety of measures including individual titling or appropriation for cash crop 
production in a number of African countries however, have been met with limited success 
as a result of the persistence of social and cultural attachment to land and, in some cases, 
contestation and conflict, as has been apparent in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, 




2009; Cotula et al., 2004; IFAD, 2008). These efforts have not, in consequence, 
adequately restructured the dualistic land holding systems resulting from colonisation, 
nor have they improved government support for the development of the disadvantaged 
indigenous land tenure systems (Peters, 2009; FAO, 2002). 
Land rights formalisation attempts declined through the decades of structural 
adjustment and market liberalisation, then resurged in the past two decades.  Reasons for 
the renewed interest in these reforms across sub-Saharan Africa include intensifying 
competition and conflict over land; the role of contestation over land and land-based 
resources in national politics and in numerous civil conflicts and wars; and the need to 
attract more investments and raise productivity of land, as a strategy for economic 
development and poverty reduction, as well as a possibility to expand governments’ tax 
base (African Union, 2010; FAO, 2011; IFAD, 2008).  
This recent surge of land formalisation programmes is also considered a 
continuation, albeit with somewhat changed rationales, of the goals of earlier adjustment 
and market liberalisation programmes. These were first directed at privatizing state 
enterprises and parastatals (like marketing boards), rolling back the state (such as 
abandoning agricultural subsidies), and opening borders—removing barriers to 
international trade. Now the aim is to free land from social constraints, opening it more 
fully to markets and to investment, led by foreign capital, largely linked to the Bretton 
Woods Institutions’ dual concerns of governance and market promotion (McAuslan, 
2013). A difference from the adjustment and liberalisation era, however, is that while that 
was marked by reluctance or opposition by most African governments, the recent efforts 




pressures within African countries as from those of international donors and corporations 
(Peters, 2015). 
Thus, understanding the ramification of the ongoing land tenure reforms requires 
rigorous analysis of the social relations of land use and rural livelihood in interaction with 
the uneven processes of ‘neoliberal agrarian restructuring’, and the intersection of rural 
social relations with the development of capitalism in national and global spheres 
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010).  
 
Customary lands and agriculture transformation in sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s development remains dependent on agriculture and 
exploitation of natural resources, yet agriculture and livestock production are largely 
carried out by smallholder farmers under increasing pressure of scarce land resources 
managed under customary land ownership. According to the African Union’s perspective 
agriculture and land are central in the social and economic development of the continent, 
and that rights to land is fundamental to the participation of all people including women 
and disadvantaged sections of society in the development process (African Union, 2011). 
This perspective is evident in the 2003 African heads of states’ declaration on 
agriculture and food security in Africa, at African Union summit held in Maputo 
Mozambique, in which a commitment was made to reverse the underinvestment that had 
held the agriculture sector back for so long. Through the Maputo Declaration, African 
heads of state vowed to allocate at least 10% of national budgets to agriculture 
development; and to achieve at least 6% annual agricultural growth. Following the 




was launched, which has been the main coordinating organisation in the implementation 
process of the Declaration by member countries (African Union, 2003a).The summit 
declared CAADP an integral part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), with overarching goals that include “agricultural transformation, wealth 
creation, food security and nutrition, economic growth and prosperity for all” (African 
Union, 2003b).  
 While meeting the pledged budgetary commitment has been challenging to most 
countries, the emerging land issues associated with CAADP initiatives has been even 
more challenging. An assessment conducted in 2013 noted that “just nine of the 54 AU 
member states have met the Maputo target of spending 10% of budgetary resources on 
agricultural and rural development” (ONE, 2013: 5). In an effort to meet the required 
agricultural investment and attain the set target for agricultural growth, countries have 
resorted to aggressively attracting FDIs in agriculture, often neglecting land tenure 
security and the livelihood of majority of customary landowners (HLPE, 2011a; Cotula et 
al., 2009; FAO, 2002). For example, from the latter half of 2000s many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa witnessed “widespread leasing or sale of public lands to foreign 
companies and governments for food production, for tourism developments, for biofuel 
production, and for other commercial agricultural uses”5 (Hall, 2011: 193). Mounting 
evidence shows that leases or concessions have been granted on customary land that is 
 
5 In most SSA countries all land is considered ‘public land’, meaning that the president holds radical title 
or the allodium of all land—one of inherited colonial features: “colonial authorities routinely appropriated 
radical title to their respective sovereigns …These laws were not changed after independence” (Africa 
union, 2011: 2). For the case of Tanzania, the Land Policy clearly defines that ‘“Public land” means all land 
in Tanzania whether granted, customary or unoccupied’, referring to the ultimate powers for allocation, 




already claimed, occupied and used by local people (Cotula et al. 2009, Sulle and Nelson 
2009; World Bank 2010).  
Realising the escalating land grabbing resulting from member countries’ 
implementation of the CAADP, a summit of the heads of states of the African Union, 
meeting in Sirte Libya in 2009, issued a declaration on land issues and challenges in 
Africa, in which they declared that they recognise “the centrality of land to sustainable 
socio-economic growth, development and the security of the social, economic and 
cultural livelihoods of our people” (African Union, 2009: 1). The declaration commits 
member states to “ensure that land laws provide for equitable access to land and related 
resources among all land users including the youth and other landless and vulnerable 
groups such as displaced persons” and “strengthen security of land tenure for women 
which requires special attention” (Ibid. p.3). Consequently, African Union in 
collaboration with African Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Africa 
issued guidelines on land policy formulation titled ‘Framework and guidelines on land 
policy in Africa: A framework to strengthen land rights, enhance productivity and secure 
livelihoods’ (African Union, 2010). This implies that sub-Saharan African governments 
are seeking to address tenure insecurities to promote sustainable rural and urban 
development, and to address inequalities in land ownership between different social 
groups. 
At the same time that the land rights agenda is bearing fruit, sub-Saharan African 
states are being called on to commercialise their farming sectors, to speed up agricultural 
growth, and attract external investment. The Malabo declaration on accelerated 




of June 2014, includes the re-commitment “to uphold the earlier commitment to allocate 
at least 10% of public expenditure to agriculture”, and “to create and enhance necessary 
appropriate policy and institutional conditions and support systems for facilitation of 
private investment in agriculture” (African Union, 2014: 3). It has been shown that most 
countries have struggled in meeting the agricultural budgetary commitments causing 
governments to resort to aggressively attracting FDIs in agriculture. For example, in 2012 
CAADP embraced the G8 initiative known as the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition (henceforth New Alliance)—a multi-pronged, multi-year effort to improve 
agricultural productivity and food production in Africa6. Key priority for the initiative is 
attracting private investment into agriculture while inadequate land tenure law is 
identified as the greatest impediment. Currently, the G8 under the New Alliance has 
signed ten Cooperation Frameworks with Burkina Faso, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Benin & Tanzania (NAFSN, 2015). Each 
framework contains a commitment to design policies that make it easier for private 
companies to identify, negotiate and acquire lands in key agricultural areas of the 
respective countries. 
While the frameworks have arisen from consultations between governments and 
the G8, there appears to be a very central role being played by the World Economic 
Forum’s African Partnership with a heavy influence of large agro-processing or agro 
supply corporations like Monsanto, DuPont, General Mills, Unilever, Yara and Syngenta 
(Grain, 2013). The overwhelming focal point of these agreements is to increase large 
 
6 The New Alliance is a successor of the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative—a coordinated response to the 





scale private investment in agricultural land and input markets, which was not a core 
element of the CAADP which rests on four pillars: land and water management; market 
access; food supply and hunger and agricultural research (Grain, 2013; Cooksey, 2013). 
The New Alliance programs are supposed to align their efforts with the priorities set out 
in the CAADP, however, this does not seem to be what has occurred. In Tanzania, 
SAGCOT (Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania) announced in January 
2011 plan to allocate large tracts of land to investors who would set up contract farming 
with local producers in return for seeds, fertilizer and credit, opening up a one third of 
most productive part of country (Milder et al., 2012). Parallel developments in other 
countries, such as the creation of the Bagre Growth Pole in Burkina Faso and Beira 
Agricultural Growth Corridor in Mozambique, where the model is to allocate large land 
holdings to big investors and employ contract farming via smallholders, with the 
objectives said to include: capturing economies of scale for greater productivity, and 
helping poor famers7 (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013; Kaarhus, 2011; Grain, 2013). 
 Contemporary land and agricultural development policies/laws and programs in 
sub-Saharan Africa draw much from the goals of earlier adjustment and market 
liberalisation programmes. Loosening land from its ‘customary’ and other social 
constraints and prioritising agriculture commercialisation have become the centrepiece of 
development strategies in the region. Land policy guidelines issued by the African Union 
urges countries to intervene in rural land rights, arguing “it is important that policy 
development should seek to strengthen land tenure security so as to ensure a favourable 
climate for investors (both local and foreign). This will in turn lead to high levels of 
 
7 Most of the large-scale farms are involved in producing food for export, or other crops not locally 




economic growth and poverty reduction” (Africa Union, 2011: 5). The guidelines further 
contend that customary land ownership systems impede investment, arguing “in many 
countries investing in capital-intensive activities is frustrated by a lack of clearly defined 
land rights” (ibdi.). The guidelines seem to believe in the trickle-down effect in which the 
poorest gradually benefit as a result of the increasing wealth of the richest. It does not 
address the negative effect of loosening the customary land systems, such as landless 
rural population that is likely to result from the programs. 
Most countries in the region have incorporated these neo-liberal ideas in their 
grand or long-term development agenda. For example, the Tanzania’s Development 
Vision 2025 aspires that by 2025 Tanzania has become a middle-income country 
characterised by, among other things, a strong and competitive economy and peace and 
security. The vehicle for realising the Vision is the National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The current Strategy, which is NSGRP II is orientated 
towards growth and enhancement of productivity—its interventions focus on wealth 
creation to reduce poverty—and agriculture has been identified as one of the growth 
drivers (GoT, 2010). Thus, a strategy articulated in Agricultural Sector Development 
Program (ASDP) focuses on the modernisation and commercialisation of private sector 
based small, medium and large-scale agriculture and a reduction of dependence on rain‐
fed agriculture. 
The strategy states that in the medium term, emphasis will continue to be on small 
scale agriculture, with a gradual shift to medium and large scale farming, and observes 
that “the shift away from small-scale farming, thus releasing agricultural labour to non‐




“strategies to ensure the economy absorb labour released from farming, especially the 
rural non‐farm activities, become an integral part of rural development strategies” (GoT, 
2001). This statement implies that large‐scale mechanized commercial enterprises will 
takeover smallholder farmers and that their labour will be released into a labour market. 
Whether there will be non-agricultural sectors big enough to absorb all the labour said to 
be released from smallholder farmers is uncertain, and this poses a serious question about 
means of livelihood for the rural population. Further, the problem is compounded by the 
fact that land has multiple use—its more than a factor of production—under the 
customary ownership systems.  
Below we look at the theoretical perspectives that are applied to analyse and to 
substantiate research evidence on the larger economic and political forces driving land 
formalisation programmes.  I present Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights and the 
Theory of Access. These two theories help reveal the myth and reality associated with the 
current formalisation programmes in as far as improving rural livelihoods is concerned.   
 
Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights 
The debates in favour of land demarcation and state registration of private titles is 
based on the Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, whose main premise is that 
individual property rights would solve problems of overexploitation of resources and also 
act as an incentive to further develop the property. Using the pastures as an example, and 
in much the same way that Gordon (1954) approached the fishery commons a decade 
earlier, Hardin (1968) in his seminal exposition of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ argues 




dissipated if restrictions were placed on total extraction. Harold Demsetz (1967:350) 
argues that property rights were a means for managing externalities, as he notes that 
“property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization 
become larger than the costs of internalization”. Similarly, as a solution to externalities, 
Coase (1960) argues that a clear assignment of rights would lead to Pareto-optimal 
outcomes, regardless of to whom the rights were assigned. Others argue that rising 
populations will drive land values up, which leads to increased demand and disputes over 
land, that can only be solved through government coordinated land rights (Boserup, 1965; 
Alchian and Demsetz (1973). 
Drawing from private property rights theory, contemporary advocates for the 
formalisation agenda believe that private land rights systems raise a sense of land tenure 
security; increases incentive to attract investment; provides opportunities for loans 
borrowing; and facilitates functioning land markets. Consequently, they claim that a formal 
land tenure system is more effective and desirable than the customary system as it has 
higher capabilities of unleashing economic and non-economic benefits to large parts of the 
population. The World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral development agencies, as 
well as institutional economists argue that farmers who have only insecure land rights are 
unlikely to invest their full effort to make long-term improvements attached to the land or 
to exchange it with others who may be able to make better use of it. The result is a reduction 
in productivity and possibly hindering the emergence of a vibrant non-farm economy 
(Binswanger et al., 1995; De Soto, 2000; World Bank, 1996 & 2004; Deininger, 2005; 
Cooter & Schaefer, 2009; Macours, et al. 2010). From this logic a clear paradigm has come 




creation of clear, modern, inalienable property rights similar to those existing in the West 
(Wily, 2000).   
A central argument advanced in support of full-fledged private property rights is 
that its sense of tenure security and possible use to access finance can enhance 
agricultural investment incentives and productivity; thereby stimulating economic 
growth, with the expected outcome to reduce poverty. However, Lawry (2014) argues 
that formalisation may improve productivity under two situations: first, where title is the 
dominant means for securing land rights, which is the case in much of Latin America and 
Asia; and second under wealthier settings. In fact, studies have found that through 
formalisation productivity gains were in the ranges of 50 – 100 percent in Latin America 
and Asia, while they were less than 10 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.  Investment and 
income effects were also weak in sub-Saharan Africa (Lawry, 2010, Byamugisha, 2013).  
Advocates of customary land tenure systems argue that the introduction of a 
formalized property rights system may compete with, and even destroy, well-established 
and effective local systems, opening the door to opportunism and possible chaos (Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Sjaastad and Cousin, 2008; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009). Others, 
in support of customary law, argue that land policies should be based on the idea of social 
capital, as it safeguards the commons that are critical for the livelihoods of the poor 
(Berkes, 1989; Okoth-Ogendo, 2002; Bernstein, 2010). Elinor Ostrom (1990), winner of 
the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, has dedicated a large part of her 
career demonstrating that common resource regimes can be more successful than private 
and state property regime, particularly with regard to non-excludable resources. She argues 




group. This calls to mind the emphasis in the Access theory (discussed below), about the 
importance of the ability to derive benefits from land over the right to benefit from land. 
Ostrom’s work has formed a central critique of the private property rights 
arguments. She argues that local social arrangements in African communities have 
developed a variety of a rich set of institutions to manage the commons. She emphasizes 
the multifaceted nature of the human-ecosystem interaction and argues against any 
singular panacea for individual social-ecological system problems (ibid, 1990). Other 
scholars have cited examples, including large pasture areas in Africa and the offshore 
fisheries in Sri Lanka and Turkey, where exclusion by fencing or other methods is too 
costly, making the possibility of private ownership untenable (Araral, 2014; Cox et al. 
2010). 
 
Theory of Access  
Theory of access hinges on broadening the notion of access to things—such as 
land. Access is defined as “a bundle of powers”, which refers to “the ability to derive 
benefits from things”, instead of a narrower sense of “a bundle of rights”, which refers to 
“the right to benefit from things” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In the broaden sense actors 
are enabled to gain, control, and maintain access to things in which they have or perceive 
a stake and derive benefits from them. The theory further expounds that, the ability to 
benefit from things is not only about rights, but also about all different forms of obtaining 
access, including patron-client relationships and other means of holding power that may 




embeds ‘bundle of powers’ also includes a wider range of social relationships that may 
facilitate or constrain deriving benefits from land than through property relations alone.   
To this extent, rights are just one of many forms of power that enable access to 
resources. The concept of access, used in access theory, facilitates grounded analyses of 
whom actually benefits from tenure reforms and through what processes are they able to 
do so. In the context of this study, access in the land sector relates to instances where 
powerful individuals are able to assert their authority in the land market so that others 
with rights find their ability to derive benefits from the land severely constricted. Ribot 
and Peluso (2003: 154) see access to be constituted of material, cultural, political, and 
economic strands within “bundles” and “webs” of powers. Property and access, thus, are 
about relations among people concerning benefits or values—their appropriation, 
accumulation, transfer, and distribution. Therefore, access is framed within dynamic 
social and political-economic relations that help identify the circumstances by which 
some people are able to benefit from particular resources while others are not. The theory 
has identified “technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, and social 
organisations” as mechanisms that can shape or influence access. 
In the context of this study, the ways various access mechanisms fit into the 
formalisation program must be determined empirically. Access analysis facilitates 
mapping dynamic processes and relationships of access to resources. For example, access 
to technology can determine who benefits from a resource—access to tube-wells, pumps, 
and electricity can determine who can benefit from groundwater. Access to capital can be 
used for resource access control through the purchase of rights or to buy influence over 




or control over land resources is the “effective control over the nature, pace, extent and 
direction of surplus production, distribution and disposition”. Using this approach, it is 
possible to go beyond the concept of property and “detect actually existing land-based 
social relations regardless of what official documents claim, whether these are in private 
or public hands” (Borras and Franco, 2010: 24). Thus, this framework will be handy for 
analysing communal farmers’ experience of formalisation beyond a declaration of rights 
presented on a title.   
In this contest livelihood is defined as being made up of a series of capabilities, 
assets and activities required for a means of living. Assets in this framework include: 
human capital (e.g. the education, skills and health of household members); physical 
capital (e.g. farm equipment or a storage facility); social capital (e.g. cooperation and 
reciprocity, norms in social affiliations such as eschewing selfishness, the social networks 
and associations to which people belong); financial capital and its substitutes (savings, 
credit, cattle, crop deposit); and natural capital (the natural resource base—fertile land, 
forests, water, wildlife). In pursuing livelihood strategies composed of a range of 
activities, both the access to assets and the use to which they can be put are mediated by 
social factors (social relations, policies and institutions) and by exogenous trends (e.g. 
economic trends) and shocks (drought, disease, floods, pests). How individuals and the 
society at large are equipped to successfully navigate these factors is an important 
determinant of their ability to efficiently access land and land-based resources. 
Thus, the theory of access analysis expands beyond the “bundle of rights” notion 
of property to a “bundle of powers” approach to access and has advocated for locating 




abilities to benefit from resources. It offers empirical bases for analysing how the 
formalisation programmes fit or do not fit into various access mechanisms. For example, 
access to technology can determine who benefits from a resource—access to tube-wells, 
pumps, and electricity can determine who can benefit from groundwater; access to capital 
can be used for resource access control through the purchase of rights or to buy influence 
over people who control resources; and so forth. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the role of agriculture in rural development. The central 
idea emerging from the literature is that for agriculture to contribute to development it 
should emphasize on domestic needs of food security and food sovereignty, and on 
producing domestically other agricultural products used as inputs into other economic 
sectors, as well as on taking care of the environment in the production process. It also 
reveals that supporting smallholder farmers will go a long way in improving rural lives 
and economic wellbeing of the rural population, as they will getting more income, local 
food, and employment.    
The chapter has revealed the centrality of the customary ownership systems on 
how rural population construct their livelihoods. For instance, it shows how the systems 
enable communities to hold onto land and make it permanently available across 
generations. Further it shows how the unique social organisation that is embedded in the 
customary systems functions to enhance custom and norms of cooperation and 




A synthesis of the literatures on how formalisation is affecting rural livelihoods is 
presented in the conceptual framework below, Figure 2. It maps out how various 
components and variables of the study are connected.  
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework on Land Rights Formalisation Dissertation 




The analysis shows how, in different contexts (land tenure, agricultural systems), 
sustainable livelihoods are achieved through access to a range of livelihood resources 
(natural, economic, human and social capitals) that are combined in the pursuit of 
different livelihood strategies—such as agricultural modernization, livelihood 
diversification, or migration, which in the end determines what rural livelihood outcomes 
are achieved.  
In pursuing livelihood strategies composed of a range of activities, both the access 
to assets and the use to which they can be put into are mediated by social factors (social 
relations, policies and institutions) and by exogenous trends (e.g. economic trends) and 
shocks (drought, disease, floods, pests). Thus, government policies and institutions play a 
central role through the new formalisation programmes and the accompanying 
agricultural strategies in determining and influencing rural livelihood outcomes.  
We argue that even these new wave programmes will not protect rural livelihoods 
in the communal areas because they emphasise instead market fundamentalism which 
sees rural organisation and agricultural policy as driven by competition, profit motive, 
privatisation, and commodification of land. They neglect to take into account the key 
elements present in communal area that make rural livelihoods possible. These include 
custom and norms of cooperation and reciprocity between and among individuals and 
groups, flexibility in the use of land, making land permanently available across 
generations (past, present, and future), and land acting as a social safety net. The absence 
of these in villages that have gone through the process of a new wave land formalisation 





3. THESIS STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
Thesis statement 
The thesis hypothesise that the new-wave land formalisation programmes, as 
currently formulated and implemented, are unlikely to contribute to improve rural life 
and are prone worsen their situation because the attempt to develop a universal land 
administration system destroys social organisation that is embedded in the customary 
land ownership systems. The customary social organisation is central in facilitating uses 
of land and a range of land-based resources to construct rural livelihoods for the well-
being of individual members and the community at large. Further, the formalisation 
programmes may not improve rural livelihoods because the agricultural models 
associated with the programmes favour large-scale mechanised systems and market 
production, which leads to adoption of agricultural policies that emphasize growth rather 
than development.    
Acknowledging the legitimacy of indigenous land rights and the inclusion of 
some elements of customary ownership system—such as group titling—in the new 
programmes is insufficient to maintaining customary social organisation since a 
customary ownership system works as a whole, and individual groups may not possess all 
necessary qualities for effective social organisation required to construct their 
livelihoods.  For example, titling of pastures which gives exclusive ownership rights of 
the pastures to a group of pastoralists, restricts the inherently multifunctional aspect of 
land in communities of mixed crop growers and pastoralist. In these communities, people 




rights to the same parcel of land, such as crop farming and grazing, during different 
seasons of the year. 
  The customary social organisation is a particular pattern of dynamic 
relationships between and among individuals and groups, based on a land ownership 
system, that has evolved in the country over a long period of time, to facilitate how a 
society construct their livelihoods. A disruption of any element of the system sets off a 
domino effect of other important elements of the system being crippled and hence the 
entire system failing to work. For example, imposition of new land management 
system—supplanting customary leaders/elders’ roles—leads into the demise of local 
conflicts resolution mechanisms, failure to enforce protection of common resources, poor 
spatiotemporal cohesion, and so forth.  
The new wave formalisation programmes have been conceived within the market 
fundamentalism ideals of neoliberalism, which are driven by competition, profit motive, 
privatisation, and commoditisation of land, hence contradicting the very nature of 
customary ownership systems in region The compromised elements of customary 
ownership systems include flexibility in the use of land and its permanent availability 
across generations (past, present, and future); custom and norms of cooperation and 
reciprocity; and land acting as a social safety net. These social organisation elements are 
essential for the functioning of the customary land systems, and therefore the ability to 
use land and land-based resources for the well-being of individual members and the 
community at large. 
Further, the agricultural models associated with the formalisation programmes 




agricultural policies that emphasize growth rather than development. This includes 
policies which encourage land to change hands from less to more ‘efficient producers, 
and which favours production of cash crops at the expense of food production for local 
consumption. The implications may include fueling land-grabbing and creating landless 
people and/or pushing small-scale farmers to the marginal lands. Other implications may 
include escalating land and land-related conflicts, rampant hunger and creation of 
agricultural proletariat. 
The new wave formalisation programmes in today’s conditions of the hegemony 
of neoliberalism, lead to agrarian change that prioritises market production (both 
domestic and export) while stifling local food production and in the process leading to the 
deepening of semi-proletarianisation. The urge to produce for the market inspires 
agricultural modernisation, involving use of advance technology, mechanisation, more 
investments, and large-scale farms, hence contributing to large scale land acquisition.  
Further, driven only by profit, the emerging agrarian system is closely linked to two other 
processes typical of capitalism: the failure to take into account social and environmental 
externalities, and the rapid exploitation of limited natural resources, leading to growing 
social inequalities and an unprecedented ecological crisis—a recipe for diminishing rural 
livelihoods. The neoliberal emphasis on the need to enhance the functioning of land 
markets, adds to the possibility of dispossession and creation of landless population.  
While both rural and urban households in developing countries face substantial 
idiosyncratic and common risks—resulting in high income variability, availability and 
access to land resources is an important social safety net for most households given a 




in urban areas. Customary ownership systems make it possible for the members to access 
and use natural resources such as wild spinaches, fuelwood, edible fruits, grass hand-
brushes, and twig hand-brushes, edible insects, wood for construction and for making of 
utensils, thatching grass, bush-meat, wild honey and reeds for weaving. Individual 
households may also exploit dozens of animal and plant species. Access to these natural 
resources has proved to be critical for sustainable livelihoods since farming on its own is 
unable to provide a sufficient means of survival for many rural families. Further, often in 
developing countries urban workers keep close ties with their rural communities making 
it possible to help each other in times of need, but most importantly these urban workers 
have returned to the customary areas on retirement or when they lost their jobs. Land 
titling, in most cases, eliminates this important attribute of customary ownership systems.   
Based on the sustainable livelihoods approach, for the land formalisation 
programmes to secure livelihoods of peasants they need to incorporate key elements, 
including: first, making land permanently available to all and across generations. This is 
critical since land is the basic resource upon which rural livelihoods hinge in terms of 
food and employment. In this context, ‘market allocation’ of resources, in which land 
moves from less to more ‘efficient producers’ may not be an appropriate option as it can 
render others landless. Under customary ownership systems, land is made permanently 
available across generations, based on norms that forbid sale of land to non-community 
members.  
 Second, maintaining cooperation and reciprocity have proved to be useful not 
only in beefing up resilience but also protecting the common resources. Often customary 




strategies to maintain resilience—the quality of being able to return quickly to a previous 
good condition after problems. Under the customary ownership system, access to the land 
resources is open to individuals and groups of the community under defined criteria 
reinforced, internally, by obligations which are assumed on the basis of the norm of 
reciprocity by and to each member. In the context of the sustainable livelihoods 
approach, cooperation and reciprocity falls under social/cultural capital, which includes 
functioning social affiliations such as kinship networks, associations, membership 
organisations and peer-group networks, among others, that people can use in difficulties 
or turn to in order to gain advantage. The use of social/cultural capital brings benefits to 
individuals belonging to social networks as well as the entire community. Social capital 
usually arises from collective expectations, obligations and trust among a group of 
people. It may include norms in social affiliations such as eschewing selfishness in favour 
of actions that benefit all the members of the group.  
Third, flexibility to accommodate multiple rights to different land resources. For 
example, a farmer may have the right to plant a crop on a piece of land, but anyone can 
cross that land to get water, and pastoralists may have the right to graze their herds on 
that land in the fallow season. This flexibility is becoming more important now given the 
increasing scarcity of land due to population growth. This flexibility is an important 
attribute that enables community members to access and enjoy the use of various natural 
resources, which contributes to diversify their means livelihoods—an important risk-
coping strategy, not feasible under the individualised land titling programmes.  
Fourth, sustainable livelihoods need to promote an agriculture sector in which 




foreigners. This is because, often, in small scale farming production of food for domestic 
consumption takes priority over production of other commodities, including food for 
export. Furthermore, domestic small-scale farmers are better positioned to produce 
agricultural commodities for use in other domestic sectors than foreign owned large-scale 
farms. Producing for other domestic sectors is aimed at not only reducing dependency on 
volatile foreign commodity markets, but also fostering domestic inter-industry linkages.  
The thesis argues that customary ownership systems have played important role in 
terms of making local food available, maintaining peace and security, and acting as social 
safety net that is crucial for the wellbeing of the rural population in general. The 
functioning of the social organisation elements, including cooperation, reciprocity, 
flexible land rights, and permanent availability of land to members, embedded in 
customary ownership systems has been pivotal in securing the rural livelihoods. I argued 
that a ‘new wave’ of land formalisation programmes weakens these social organisations 
thereby putting in jeopardy the safety and sustainability of the rural livelihoods. 
 
Methodology 
In support of the argument made, the research sought to find out how rural social 
organisation has been altered since the implementation of the formalisation programmes. 
This analysis is crucial in demonstrating how the programmes have affected customary 
ownership system, which is essential in how rural population construct their livelihoods.  
Further, the research sought information on agricultural production in order to 
demonstrate how both small scale farmers’ sources of income and rural population’s food 




programme offices in order to obtain data on the overall implementation and outcomes of 
the programmes. The research also used secondary data, including from household 
budget surveys to establish basic characteristics of rural households, and from the 
agricultural sector development strategies and programs to establish the general status of 
agriculture and the overall government direction in the development of the sector.  
 
Research design 
The thesis undertakes a qualitative case study of the implementation of ‘new 
wave’ land formalisation programmes in three villages in Tanzania, which are Mbagwi, 
Mzeri, and Sindeni, all located in Handeni district, Tanga region. Mzeri and Sindeni are 
chosen as they were among the very first to implement the formalization programmes 
when the programmes were first introduced in the early years of 2000s. The two villages 
differ substantially in characteristics, including: land use patterns, soil fertility, and local 
cultures related to land such as inheritance, role of women and division of labour. Mzeri 
village is predominantly occupied by pastoralists, while Sindeni is a predominantly crop 
farmers village.  Mbagwi village has similar characteristics with Mzeri, but it did not 
implement the formalisation programmes. It serves as a base case in the study. 
impromptu 
The formalisation program in Handeni district was carried out in seven villages 
from September 2006 through 20078, hence the district has had enough gestation period 
to be able to reveal the impact the programmes may have on rural livelihoods . The 
 
8 There is no clearly defined date for when the programme was completed because the Handeni District 
land office carried on some of the activities (such as completion of the village land registries, issuing of the 
CCROs) as part of their routine work. However, MKURABITA officials are reported to  have left Handeni by 




Handeni district was also of particular interest because it includes both crop farmers and 
pastoralists whose access and use of land differs significantly, which often results in 
conflicts and disputes between the two groups. The district has also experienced large-
scale land acquisition for cattle ranches and biofuel (jatropha) and other agricultural 
production, by non-villagers elites including civil servants and businesspeople. 
It borders with districts of Pangani and Muheza to the East, Korogwe and 
Simanjiro to the North, Kilindi to the West and Bagamoyo to the South. It has an area of 
7,080 square kilometers, and in 2012 the population was 355,702 in 71,140 households at 
an average of 5.0 persons per household (NBS, 2014). Agriculture—subsistence 
farming—remains the mainstay economic activity for the most people in the district. The 
district, however, claim to have diverse natural resources that remain largely 
undeveloped, including fruit and vegetable growing, dairying, rubber production, beef 
cattle and sheep ranching, beekeeping, honey and beeswax processing, mining, tourism, 
tourist hotel development and cotton farming and ginning. Implementation of the 
formalisation programmes in the district is said to be a strategy to unlock the agricultural 
potential in the district (Handeni, 2015). 
The qualitative research approach is preferred because it allows the study to ‘dig 
deep for impressions, words, sentences’, or any other form of information from the 
participants in their own environment and natural flow of social life (Newman, 2006; 
Mikkelsen, 2011). In this regard, the researcher could see, feel or touch what is being 
described, and so be able to make reasonable conclusions about the participant’s 




is particularly appropriate as it allows a process of reflection during data collection 
(Mayoux, 2006).  
 
Data collection procedures 
In this section I explain the instruments and data gathering approaches I used to 
conduct the study. The objective was to gather data to enable me to analyse how the land 
formalisation program is affecting rural livelihoods in Handeni. My focus was to generate 
as many original and interesting stories from each of the categories of my respondents in 
situ. Although I used interview guides in the data collection process, the process still 
allowed the respondents to provide detailed accounts in each case. 
My primary data collection method was in-depth, semi-structured interviews, 
aided by an interview guide. A semi-structured interview is preferred as it allows new 
ideas to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says, 
which can result in "the production of rich data” (Bjomholt & Farstad, 2012: 7).  The 
interview guide, which was thought-out well in advance, comprised of an informal 
grouping of topics and open-ended questions that I asked in different ways for different 
participants. The open-ended questions allow me to access the interviewee's opinion and 
thereby often more negative and untransformed responses to their experiences about the 
programmes. 
The study uses purposive sampling procedure to select individual participants 
among the inhabitants of the three villages identified above, where 71 (ordinary villagers) 
were interviewed, including 25 participants from Mzeri village, 19 participants from 




purposeful sampling was to capture specific elements (age, sex, leadership status, 
occupation mix) of a population that are believed to represent the range of variation 
expected in a population, which ushers in conceptual generalisability (Patton, 2002), and 
ensures that participants have the necessary knowledge about the subject. The sample 
comprised heads of households (both men and women), youths, clan leaders, as well as 
village/local government leaders. In addition, the sample covered a mix of different land 
uses including crop farming and pastures.  
Further, I conducted interviews with two focus groups of demographically diverse 
ordinary villagers—a 6-member group in Mzeri and an 8-member group in Sindeni. 
Furthermore, I conducted interviews with various officials including village officials 
(particularly the VEOs); programme (MKURABITA) officials; Handeni District 
Councils officials (DED, DLO, and DAO); Ministry of Lands officials; two NGOs 
(HakiArdhi and TAPHGO); and a loan officer at a local bank branch in Handeni town, 
see Appendix 1. The field study is crucial in gauging the rural dwellers’ experiences 
regarding the new-wave formalisation programmes, that is learning what has changed and 
how it is impacting the quality of life and economic well-being of the rural population. I 
also did an observation of Village Assemblies, especially the ones dealing with Land Use 
Planning (LUP). General notes were taken, but none that specifically identifies speakers, 
in a bid to observe confidentiality that I had promised. 
 
Data Analysis 
The process of analysis started with the identification of main themes including, 




Implications of the program on rural social organisation, and 3) Effects of the program on 
agriculture. Each of these three broad themes is further subdivided into sub-themes for 
easy and clarity of the analysis of the field research findings.  This process did not take 
place at specific and particular points in time but during the whole period of the study. 
 Throughout this process, a review of the literature and relevant theoretical 
perspectives that formed the basis of the study helped to generate relevant themes. As 
Matthews and Ross (2010) state, working with qualitative data is a process that moves 
between gathering, working with and reflecting on social data throughout the research. 
During the data collection process as well as the transcription, new key themes such as 
maintenance of peace and security (land and land related conflicts) and opportunities for 
livelihoods diversification, emerged and it was ensured that these themes were always 
written down as soon as they emerged. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Before I embarked on the field research, I sought ethical clearance from the Saint 
Mary’s University Research Ethics Board (SMU REB). Research ethics are codes of 
conduct that provide guidance and define what is or is not legitimate to do when carrying 
out a research (Maxwell, 2005; Neuman, 2011). Ethical considerations were therefore 
part of every aspect of my research (Maxwell, 1996; 2005). Obtaining ethical clearance is 
a basic requirement for every researcher at Saint Mary’s University as outlined in the Tri-
Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS 2, 
2010). Subsequently my application was approved and was granted a Certificate of 




requires that any person (citizen or non-citizen) planning to carry out social or scientific 
research must apply to the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH) for a research permit. On arrival in Tanzania, I applied for a research permit 
which was granted (Appendix B).  
Observing research ethics is an integral component of any research (Creswell, 
2009; Neuman, 2011). One particular ethical consideration was to make the research 
goals clear to the study participants. I gained informed consent from individual 
interviewees before the interview and offered to send the results of the research study to 
any interviewee who expressed interest. Throughout the research process, substantial 
recognition was given to confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants, as 
well as their responses. During data collection, I requested consent from each of the 
respondents before their participation in this research. Confidentiality was assured in each 
case. However, I feel that all stories were told because participants entrusted me with 
their most valued and guarded secrets. All respondents who participated in my research 
were fully aware of the nature and purpose of this research.  
I made it clear to the participants that the study would not accrue any direct 
benefits to them as interviewees, and that their perspectives on influential factors in 
household choice of individual private land tenure would contribute to the development 
of a report which could benefit the community and development agencies working in the 
community. I also informed the interviewees that there were no foreseeable risks, as I 
would keep all the information confidential. I endeavoured to remind them that they 
could withdraw from the interview before, during or after. All interviews were conducted 




4.  LAND POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA 
Introduction 
Although we live in a period of rapid change, past policies and practices 
(including those of the colonial era) continue to have profound effects on the current 
conditions of peasants’ control and use of land. Hence, I situate land policy historically 
and in the wider development context, as a basis for understanding the current context 
within which new wave land formalisation programmes are taking place, and their 
possible ramifications for rural livelihoods.  
In Tanzania most households have relied and continue to rely on traditional 
customary ownership of land as a mechanism by which to construct a livelihood (Okoth-
Ogendo, 2002). It is estimated that nearly 90 percent of all arable land in the country is 
under customary systems, while the remaining 10 percent is held under statutory (state 
registered rights) system, mostly as large farms (URT, 2001; Byamugisha, 2013). As 
such any modifications to the customary land ownership systems, the dominant systems 
in the country have had far reaching consequences as they give rise to new agricultural 
models and new social relations that affect rural livelihoods. The new agricultural models 
and social relations produces winners and losers, and therefore policies and programmes 
that reforms land tenure systems need to be carefully analysed. 
Land in rural Tanzania is not only important as a means of production, but also its 
ownership systems is an indispensable means of social organisation for rural dwellers. As 
the primary resource, land affects other sectors which are of paramount importance to the 
existence of the nation-state. For instance, in Tanzania land is still inextricably tied to 




activities which employs about 82% of the total rural population (URT, 2001; NBS, 
2014). As such land ensures food security and national security in general. The country 
has a total area of about 947,000 square kilometres 97 million hectares) of which 
approximately 44 million hectares are classified as suitable for agriculture, see Map 2.  
Map 2: Tanzania - Regional Map and Location Map on the Africa Continent 
 
Map prepared by author showing location of Tanzania and regions within Tanzania. 




It is estimated that about 88% of this arable land is part of village land, most of 
which is under customary ownership systems. However, of the total arable land, it is 
estimated that only 23% (about 10 million ha.) is currently under cultivation (URT, 2001; 
IFAD & UNEP, 2013; FAO 2014). This status, to the government and development 
partners, has implied that Tanzania has vast tracks of unused ‘virgin land’ potential for 
large-scale agricultural investments.  
Thus, from the late 1990s there has been an increasing urge to attract huge local 
and foreign direct investments in village lands in sectors such as agriculture, mining, 
tourism and biofuel production. The government stated in its Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy that the “Government will work towards creating an enabling 
environment for medium and large-scale investors to make use of the abundant land 
resource in the country” (URT, 2001: 4). This, in turn, increasingly alienates peasants’ 
land through accumulation in the hands of big national and multinational companies and 
individuals, limiting land control and use by majority of the peasant farmers. It is against 
this background that this study analyses how land policies and laws have facilitated land 
tenure transformation in relation to its effects on small-scale farmers.  
This chapter examines how land tenure systems in Tanzania have evolved through 
time and over the array of imperial authorities and their corresponding ruling apparatus—
including bureaucrats, institutions, policies and laws. To understand current land issues in 
Tanzania—especially the centrality of the customary land systems to the rural 
livelihoods—it is critical to comprehend how land ownership systems and land laws and 
policies have evolved under different administrations over time, that is before and during 




development agenda), and afterward with the advent of neoliberal socio-economic 
policies as advocated by international financial institutions and other development 
partners. This is important in helping to gauge the argument being made in this thesis 
about the significance of the customary ownership systems of maintaining social 
organisations and securing livelihoods of the rural dwellers in the country. It also helps to 
shed light at the national impact of the formalisation programmes and their impact on 
livelihoods in general.  
The chapter starts with examining the influence of colonial regimes (both 
Germany and British) on land tenure systems and land management generally in the 
country, before independence and its lingering legacy to date. Then we analyse post-
independence development strategies—including ujamaa policy (socialist ideology) and 
villagisation campaign—and how they shaped the country’s land ownership systems and 
their effects on rural livelihoods. This is followed by examining how the advent of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s through 2000s has affected the issue 
of land tenure systems in the country. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
current effort to overhaul land tenure systems in the country—the new wave land 
formalisation programs—conceived under the neoliberal agenda of transforming the 
customary land systems into a more private property rights that is more aligned with free-
market capitalism. Here we focus on a specific formalisation project—Property and 
Business Formalisation Programme—one of the most renown land tenure reforms project 
in the country, which has received quiet a lot of attention and funding from both the 





Influence of colonial policies on land tenure systems in Tanzania 
Prior to colonialism in Tanzania, landholding was based on customary laws of the 
different tribes in the country (in all 120). Title to the land was based on traditions and 
customs of respective tribes. Ownership of land was communal, owned by family, clan or 
tribe. Chiefs, headmen and elders had the powers of land administration in trust for the 
community.  
These powers continued through the colonial era though they were limited by the 
newly introduced Germany and later British land tenure system under which all lands 
were declared to be crown and public lands respectively (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996). The 
onset of colonialism in the country fundamentally altered the communal land systems to 
allow smooth operation of the colonial economy. The communal areas were set up to 
allow Africans to retain their traditional way of life but were modified in important ways 
that turned them into labour reserves. The colonial system ensured that people were 
available for work when needed and returned to the communal areas when not needed. 
Wages in the colonial economic sectors were extremely low because family reproduction 
costs were assumed by subsistence activities in the communal areas.  
The imposition of colonial rule in Tanzania, similar to many other African states, 
institutionalized changes on land tenure systems with regards to control and use of land 
and other resources, where indigenous Africans were forced to move to marginal lands 
(Cousins, 2000; Okoth-Ogendo, 2002; Chimhowu, & Woodhouse, 2006). European 
settlers gained control over land through agreements, conquests and appropriation. The 
consolidation of such control and subsequent regulation of acquired lands was effected 




administrative and economic management systems, which were grafted onto a diverse 
range of indigenous economic and cultural practices thus leading to dualistic land tenure 
and land administration regimes (Mamdani, 1996; Berry, 1992; Peters, 2009; Cousins, 
2008). The western laws would apply to the areas which had been set apart for white 
settlers. Africans were considered incapable of owning land in the sense in which the 
concept of ownership is understood in European jurisprudences. Customary law was not 
only regarded as inferior to European laws, but also as lacking the juridical attributes to 
put land ownership into operation. A dual system of land law thus introduced in the 
colony was to legitimise this unequal development (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996 & 1999; 
Wanjala, 2000).  
 
Germans colonial era (1885 to 1916) 
The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, convened to regulate European colonization 
and trade in Africa, is considered as the formalisation of the Scramble for Africa. The 
Conference contributed to ushering in a period of heightened colonial activity by 
European powers, which eliminated or overrode most existing forms of African 
autonomy and self-governance. As a result of the Conference Tanzania was owned by 
Germany. Using the Principle of Effective Occupation introduced by the Conference, 
Germany wasted no time in making treaties with local leaders and establishing an 
administration in the territory to govern it, with a police force to keep order.  
Consequently, in Tanzania the Germany imperial authorities had no difficulty in 
promulgating a series of decrees intended to convert all land in the territory into ‘crown 




simply considered that all land to which private ownership could not be established by 
documentary evidence, was ownerless (Okoth-Ogendo, 1996). They then proceeded to 
make a series of freehold grants to settlers along the coast, the coastal townships and in 
the northern hinterland, in the brief period of about 30 years (1885 to 1916) that they 
colonised the area (Okoth-Ogendo, 1999). As the Germans colonized, they engaged in 
plantation-grown crops such as rubber, sisal and coffee, but they also forced indigenous 
Africans to produce other crops including cotton, copra, sesame, and peanuts. In the late 
1890s, the Germany colonial administration imposed an “annual head tax of three rupees 
on all adult males” (Spear 1997:84). This was equivalent to more than a month’s wages 
and was designed to force Africans out of the domestic economy to work for wages for 
the government and private Germany settlers (Fjeldstad & Therkildsen, 2008). 
Germany’s aggressive actions, including forced labour, caused resistance by the 
Africans. For example, a Hehe9 ruler named Mkwawa was strongly opposed to Germany 
policy designed to force the indigenous population to grow cotton for export, who helped 
to mobilize that lead to the Maji Maji revolt in 1905 to 1907. Mkwawa lead his people to 
war, he was so devoted to serve his people that he sacrificed his own life to the Germans 
while fighting for his people’s rights (Iliffe, 1967). 
By the end of the Germany colonial rule in the then Tanganyika some of the best 
lands in the highlands and farms amounting to 1,300,000 acres had been alienated to 
foreigners (Hayuma, 2005). The disruption of the communal system by the Germany 
colonialists was not limited to the land alienation and forced cultivation of export crops, 
but also included other forced labour especially for building two railroads from Dar es 
 




salaam, one to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika to the west of the country, and the other one 
to Moshi in the north. In addition, many new Christian missions, which included 
rudimentary schools for the Africans, were established. Tanzania was under Germany 
colonial rule from 1880 to 1918 and British rule from 1919 until attaining its 
Independence in 1961. 
 
The British colonial era (1919 to 1961) 
The defeat of Germany by the Allied Powers in the First World War led to the 
assumption of jurisdiction by British over Tanzania, but this came with somewhat limited 
authority over land. The League of Nations mandate under which the jurisdiction was 
assumed now required the mandatory to protect the land rights of the indigenous 
inhabitants of the territory. For example, the mandate stipulated that no land occupied by 
an indigene could be transferred to a non-indigene without the prior consent of the public 
authorities. It was this requirement which led the British government in 1923 to declare 
“the whole of the lands in Tanganyika whether occupied or unoccupied to be public 
lands” (Chidzero, 1961). Further the British took over all the plantations established by 
Germans and continued their operations.  Thus, the essential nature of imperial authority 
over land did not change, but the juridical infrastructure accompanying it was 
considerably overhauled. 
Historically, all land in Britain and its colonies was Crown Land, vested in the 
Crown, with royal subjects having usufruct over their customary land. The League of 
Nations Permanent Mandates Commission criticized Tanganyika’s Land Ordinance of 




ordinance was amended to rectify this, but customary rights were not defined, and the 
colonial administration continued to “confiscate natives land” and lease it to white 
settlers (ibid., 44-45).  
British colonial land tenure “was the foundation of native rule” or indirect rule, 
that is colonial government introduced and imposed new forms of authority and 
economic organisation through the installation of chiefs who were instrumental in the 
collection of a land-tax (Berry, 1992: 342). British colonialists installed chiefs even in 
places where traditional chiefdoms were non-existent. Chiefs as traditional leaders were 
accorded significant power over the allocation of land as a means of policing and 
controlling their tribesmen on behalf of the state. Traditional leaders commonly referred 
to as the native authorities took charge of “managing the local state apparatus … the 
source of the law was the very authority that administered it” (Mamdani, 2000:102). 
Traditional leaders such as chiefs became an integral component of the “administrative 
convenience” of the state (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994:7), which means the colonial 
government used traditional authority and adapted it to suit their own needs as it became 
part of the colonial rule and ceased to be part of a traditional society.  
It follows that the customary law or customary land tenure systems were “the 
joint creation of colonial officials and African leaders ... a reflection of the [then] 
contemporary situation” (Colson, 1971: 196, 197), which means the making of customary 
tenure systems was a transformation of previous modes of land control, use, and transfer. 
Analyses has shown that customary land tenure systems were profoundly shaped—
though not determined—by the colonial situation, often serving state, private European, 




chunks of fertile land, the Africans were squeezed into areas that were not immediately 
required for European settlement and plantations. Hence, the colonial rule used the 
system of land tenure to create a bifurcated state of citizens and subjects, and the linkages 
were rather coercive. With the introduction of cash crops (such as coffee, sisal and 
rubber), the colonial land system in Tanzania also forced indigenes to grow what they did 
not eat and eat what they did not grow. These conditions were adopted and adapted to 
suit the “colonial agenda amid the local dynamics of survival” and interaction of the 
indigenous populations (Mamdani, 1996). In this context African reserves were created 
by the colonial settlers as forms of authority, and as a way of consolidating colonial 
interests on land.  
Despite the differences of formation and practice between the European colonial 
powers, the “phenomenon of colonialism is united to a large extent by its legacies” (Dirks 
2004: 2), that is the impact of colonialism has been transformative rather than transitory. 
So, in post-colonial Tanzania, there have been lasting geographical, trade, and cultural 
legacies, including the way in which “the minds of many Africans continued to work on 
colonial assumptions” (Birmingham, 1995: 6–8). As well as reshaping cultural and 
political development, the vagaries of colonialism led to class differentiation and social 
formations that profoundly define land rights and tenure in Tanzania today. Colonial land 
tenure and taxation policies created an impoverished class of wage workers leading to 
lower living standards, high inequality, and stunted economic development.  
The British continued Germany colonial policies regarding labour and taxes by 
issuing The Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance in 1923. Officially, taxes were justified in terms 




1993:211). But the poll (or head) tax was also used quite actively to create regions of 
‘labour reserves’ (ibid, 1993), and ‘to flush out’ labour when most needed by employers 
(Shivji 1979:4). Taxes were also important in contributing to the financing of British war 
efforts, especially during World War II, and in forcing subsistence-based peasantries to 
produce cash crops for export (Fjeldstad & Therkildsen, 2008). The undemocratic and 
exploitative nature of the colonial state informed the policies, laws, and institutions that 
were to characterise the independent Tanganyika, as in most cases, the colonial legal 
system was adopted wholesale.   
 
Post-independence development strategies  
Tanganyika gained its independence in 1961, and joined with Zanzibar island in 
1964, to become the United Republic of Tanzania. The independent Tanzania 
Government maintained more or less the same colonial land policy and practices with 
some minor reforms till 1994. For instance, white Europeans still held Freehold Titles for 
most of the prime agricultural land, including much of the Southern Highlands (famous 
for their coffee and tea plantations), the rich soils around Mt. Kilimanjaro in the north 
(famous for coffee plantations) and the warm coastal and hinterlands (famous for sisal 
production). However, “in order to avoid the creation of a small landed class” the newly 
formed independent government converted all Freehold Titles into Leasehold under the “ 
Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Lease Act (Cap. 523) of 1963 and were 
later changed into Rights of Occupancy under the Government Leaseholds (Conversion 




In further effort to create a classless society, TANU (the ruling party)10 under the 
leadership of Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania from 1961 to 
1985, published its development manifesto in 1967, which was titled the Arusha 
Declaration. The declaration summarized Tanzania’s commitment to socialism (Ujamaa) 
and the significant role that it was to play in the country’s development (Hyden, 1999; 
1980). It emphasized self-reliance, frugality, and self-denial.  The policy stated that 
everyone in the state, whatever his or her actual occupation, was a worker and that all 
means of production would be nationalized for the people. The concept of Ujamaa was 
the centrepiece of the social and economic development program.  Here groups of village 
families worked together on communal farms for the common good (Scott, 1998).  
The Arusha Declaration as a whole sought to reduce the income inequality among 
all citizens and shift development efforts towards rural areas. In implementing the 
Ujamaa policy, banks, plantations and important commercial companies had to be 
nationalized, though compensation would be given to owners. Agriculture, however, was 
singled out as the key to development, and only its greater productivity could hold at bay 
the spectre of poverty. To give a fillip to this argument, people were to be moved into 
cooperative villages where they could work together for their mutual benefit (Coldham, 
1995; Collier, 1986). 
TANU’s development ideas were also enshrined in Five-Year Development Pans. 
The First Five-Year Development Plan (1964-1969) sought to achieve rural 
transformation through village settlement schemes under the so-called Transformation 
 
10 TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) from the mainland Tanzania merged with the ASP (Afro-
Shirazi Party), from the semi-autonomous Zanzibar archipelago to form CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 




Approach recommended by the World Bank Mission in 1960 (Fimbo, 2004). The view of 
the government was that there were two intertwined cardinal problems of peasant 
production, namely, land tenure and agricultural underdevelopment. The tenure problem 
was associated with a long held believe, also a legacy of colonial systems, that the 
customary ownership systems were a cause of land conflicts and poor investment in 
agriculture. Though agricultural underdevelopment was also blamed on the customary 
ownership system, it was more associated with the highly dispersed population that 
hindered government service delivery. The policy makers held that solution to these 
problems lay in the transformation approach whose stated goal was “the introduction of 
technical, social and legal systems which allow the exercise of modern agricultural 
techniques based on relatively high productivity and which consequently justify 
considerable investment in capital” (ibid.: 21) The focus of this approach was towards 
regrouping or resettling of peasants in new lands through capital-intensive new 
settlements, which were supervised by government officials. 
The country’ development plans, thus, articulated the notion of Ujamaa as the 
central theme to the development project. The Ujamaa concept was translated into a 
socio-economic and political management model including the notion of villagization of 
production, which sought to collectivize all forms of local productive capacity where 
rural people were forced to move to centralized villages (Coldham 1995, 229). The 
Ujamaa Villages campaign in Tanzania lasting from 1973 to 1976 was a massive attempt 
to permanently settle most of the country’s population in villages, of which the layouts, 
housing designs, and local economies were planned, partly or wholly, by officials of the 




voluntary process, mainly in areas of flooding and famine, around 1969. However, the 
TANU viewed the process as too slow, so compulsory villagization commenced in 1973, 
with an eye to having the entire rural population in planned villages by the end of 1976. 
Operesheni Sogea (literally translated from Swahili as ―the Move Operation) utilized 
militias to ensure that people moved.  
According to many rural residents, their houses and farms were burned to force 
their compliance in moving to the assigned villages. Three different approaches to 
villagization were employed. In some areas, traditional villages, with their original 
boundaries, more or less survived the villagization campaign and were registered as such. 
In other areas, villagization involved re-location of villages (including re-drawing of 
village boundaries) or re-location of families within villages or both. In the third type of 
situation, villagization was interpreted and effected as a program of land re-distribution 
(creating new villages). In the latter category “the exercise had been arbitrary, and many 
abuses were committed by officials entrusted with re-distribution” (URT 1994, 51). This 
exercise saw many rural residents land being arbitrarily redistributed to other people, and 
this would be one source of lingering land conflicts to this day when people tried to go 
back to their original lands after the collapse of the campaign.  
Ujamaa villages campaign was intended to enable people to farm collectively, 
allowing for the possibility of large-scale farming and preventing inequalities and 
exploitation in rural areas (Coldham 1995, 228). Villagization was also expected to make 
provision of services via health stations, schools and agricultural extension workers more 
efficient. During villagization, each household was assigned a farm plot and an acre of 




land. The villagisation process started slowly and was voluntary, at the end of the 1960s 
there were only about 800 collective settlements, but by the end of the 1970s, there were 
over 3,000 of these villages. The campaign was by most accounts the largest forced 
resettlement scheme undertaken in independent Africa up to that time; at least 5 million 
Tanzanians were relocated (Benschop, 2002). The campaign was undertaken largely as a 
development and welfare project and not, as has often been the case, as part of a plan of 
punitive appropriation, ethnic cleansing, or military security (as in South Africa’s forced 
removals and homeland schemes under apartheid), but still things weren't going well in 
the Ujamaa Villages (Scott,1998).  
Nyerere's government claimed that the idea for collective rural agriculture, 
through Ujamaa villages, was a means through which the government could afford to 
provide equipment, facilities, and material to a rural population if they were brought 
together in "nucleated" settlements, each of around 250 families (Pratt, 1999). Nyerere’s 
exhortations did not arouse the enthusiasm for which he had hoped. Individuals resisted 
his plans for collectivization, and not even the majority of his government officials 
wholeheartedly adopted his moral stand. “Peasant farmers were resistant to communal 
farming” on other than a token basis, and the movement of rural peoples from their 
scattered holdings into villages “alienated a great many”, causing much discontent among 
the people (Pratt, 1999: 148).  Thus, the socialist initiatives and cooperative village 
scheme failed— bringing additional pressure to bear upon an already desperately weak 
economy. For instance, the sisal industry, one of those nationalized, was badly run down 





The Ujamaa village campaign was an exercise in social engineering, which 
however, had little proper planning done, so many new villages were located badly. 
Further, the campaign’s disregard for customary tenure was rampant, with villages 
registered without the consent of those who already farmed there, and rights to land in the 
newly created villages were not secured in law (Scott,1998). The Ujamaa doctrine created 
a new social order, but by the 1980s it was becoming clear villagization had failed to 
contribute to economic development. Forced displacement of large segments of the rural 
population together with the ensuing economic hardship “left in its wake a legacy of 
bitterness and distrust” (Coldham 1995, 229).  
Worsening economic hardship in the 1980s coupled with Nyerere stepping down 
as president in 1985 led to the government abandoning enforcement of the ujamaa policy.  
Nyerere was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, as the second president of Tanzania, who 
immediately accepted an offer of assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
hitherto refused to Nyerere who disagreed with their conditionalities. Thus, starting in 
1986, the IMF and the World Bank imposed structural adjustment programs on the 
economy of Tanzania, as it did in many other low-income countries, as a condition for 
renegotiating loans or for securing new aid (Campbell & Stein 1992). With the 
breakdown of socialism (ujamaa) and a return to market economy, countless land 
disputes erupted between customary holders of land (in the pre-ujamaa era) and those 
assigned land under villagization (Coldham 1995).  
Until passage of the Land Act 1999 and the Village Land Act 1999, no legal 
framework existed for resolving these land disputes. Administrative procedures were in 




had been created in 1975 to see to day-to-day administrative tasks, but chains of 
command, recourse to appeal, and so forth were murky. Courts ruled in favour of 
“traditional” land holders in some cases and ujamaa settlers in others, with no 
consistency. In Mbulu District, for example, hundreds of cases resulted from former 
landholders suing to regain land assigned to someone else during villagization. Most of 
the “respondents” were small farmers who had been allocated plots of less than four acres 
(URT 1994; Coldham 1995; Odgaard 2003).  
Other disputes arose from villages established on previously large holdings (for 
example, land leased to foreigners during the colonial period) or in peri-urban areas. 
Large holdings had often been allocated to former plantation workers during villagization 
or to neighbouring farmers. In many instances, villagers were forcibly evicted in the 
1980s and ‘90s, when former lessees returned to their land, the bank foreclosed land and 
sold it to another entity, or an area was declared a planning area for creation of an urban 
centre or expansion of an existing one. Even during Nyerere’s administration, leases for 
large holdings were often revoked and the land then re-allocated to well-connected 
individuals or foreign investors (URT 1994). This is particularly true for Arumeru and 
Kilimanjaro, where the dominant prime agricultural land was much in demand.  
Ujamaa was intended to recreate extended families and engage the small 
communities in an ‘economy of affection’ by tapping into what was said to be the 
traditional African attitudes, while at the same time introducing essential services and 
modern technological innovations for the rural population that was now the majority 
(Waters, 1992; Hyden, 1983).  But the existing economic activity and physical movement 




and pliable set of adaptations to their diverse social and material environment. As in the 
customary land-tenure arrangements examined in Chapter 2, these adaptations defy 
administrative codification because of their endless local variability, their elaboration, 
and their plasticity in the face of new conditions. If land tenure defies codification, then, 
it stands to reason that the connections structuring the entire material and social life of 
each particular group of peasants would remain largely blurred to both specialists and 
administrators.  
Therefore, the failure of ujamaa villages was almost guaranteed by the audacity of 
politicians and specialists who believed that they alone knew how to organize a more 
satisfactory, rational, and productive life for their citizens. It should be noted that they did 
have something to contribute to what could have been a more fruitful development of the 
Tanzanian countryside. But their insistence that they had a monopoly on useful 
knowledge and that they impose this knowledge, set the stage for disaster. However, the 
failure of Ujamaa—a social engineering which tried to alter the customary systems 
through the introduction of collectivization of farming and other economic activities—did 
not seem to lend any lesson to development practitioners in Tanzania as further efforts to 
transform the customary systems ensued in subsequent years. It is of some interest, 
however, to consider whether the economic difficulties that engulfed the Tanzanian 
economy demonstrated the fundamental unsoundness of the Arusha vision—its 
impracticality despite its utopian attractions—or whether the problem lay in the faulty 
implementation of basically sound ideas. In the contemporary Tanzanian political debate, 





Advent of structural adjustment programs and land tenure in Tanzania 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, there were problems in the Tanzania economy, 
making her one of the poorest countries in the world. During and after colonialism, the 
main exports from Tanzania were raw materials such as sisal, cotton, coffee and tea. 
About 80% of the population were employed in the agricultural sector and agricultural 
products provided about 60% of the GDP. There was a severe drought in Tanzania in 
1973/1974 and 1978/1979 leading to a fall in cash crops and food crops production, in 
1977 the East African Community collapse and in 1978/1979 Tanzania fought a 
devastating war against the dictatorial regime of Iddi Amin of Uganda. The drought, the 
war, the collapse of the EAC and two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 had a devastating 
consequence to the national economy and wellbeing of its citizens. In addition to this, 
was the collapse of world market commodity prices, and dwindling donor aid.  
While these problems were brewing, causing severe economic crisis (high 
inflation, foreign currency shortage, budgetary deficits,  and scarcity of essential 
consumer goods), national model of development—the Ujamaa ideology—that had been 
adopted since independence had been failing to yield anticipated results. To tackle these 
problems, Tanzania turned to two of the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and World 
Bank for assistance; the institutions seized on this opportunity and attempted to transform 
Tanzania economy into basically a laissez-faire economy.  
The Bretton Woods institutions’ structural adjustment programs (SAPs) consist of 
loans provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to 
countries that experienced economic crises. The two Bretton Woods Institutions require 




lower interest rates on existing ones). The economic reform process, as it came to be 
understood in the Tanzanian context in the 1980s, had four main elements: (1) 
stabilization, through the use of orthodox macroeconomic policy instruments to restore 
macroeconomic balance, both domestic and external; (2) liberalization, aimed at reducing 
bureaucratic controls and government allocation of resources, and opening areas of the 
economy to private business that had been public sector monopolies; (3) reform of state 
enterprise and privatization; and (4) reform of the government itself to enhance 
government capacity. Failure to enact these programmes may be subject to severe fiscal 
discipline. So, the financial threats to the country amount to blackmail, such that the 
nation has no choice but to comply. 
Since the late 1990s, the architects of the structural reform—the Bretton Woods 
institutions—have spoken of “poverty reduction” as a goal. SAPs were often criticized 
for implementing generic free-market policy and for their lack of involvement in their 
design from the borrowing country. To increase the borrowing country's involvement, 
developing countries are now encouraged to draw up Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs), which essentially take the place of SAPs. The Bank-Fund claim that the 
increase of the local government's participation in creating the policy will lead to greater 
ownership of the loan programs and thus better fiscal policy. The content of PRSPs has 
turned out to be similar to the original content of Bank/Fund-authored SAPs. The critique 
is that these similarities show that the Bank-Fund and the countries that fund them are 
still overly involved in the policy-making process, and probably with intent of furthering 
their own other agenda. Despite the rhetoric of “nationally driven” development, the 




poverty, fostering domestically meaningful economic development, promoting equality 
and equity, and encouraging popular participation in the design of national development 
policies. 
Linking the structural reforms to poverty reductions has given the Bank-Fund 
opportunity to link the programs to land tenure reforms, claiming that it is a strategy to 
attract more investments and raise productivity of land, as a strategy for economic 
development and poverty reduction. It is claimed that the proposed reforms aim to free 
land from its customary and social constraints, opening it more fully to markets and to 
investment, led by both local and foreign capital. Given that over 82 percent of rural 
population is reportedly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, we need to analyse 
the consequence of the land tenure reforms on their access and control of land in terms of 
their wellbeing and the national development in general. Tanzania government wittingly 
or unwittingly has embraced the land tenure reforms, starting with enacting new land 
policy in 1995, its corresponding acts in 1999, and implementation programs—the land 
formalisation programs. 
 
New wave land formalisation programmes 
In the 1980s, as the number of land disputes skyrocketed and economic hardship 
intensified, many poor rural households were forced from their land and livelihood to 
make way for ‘development’ projects, national agencies often worked at cross purposes, 
and increasing corruption resulted in lack of trust in documents produced by the national 
Ministry of Lands (Shivji, 1997). Escalating land conflicts and lack of clear resolution 




the Bank-Fund assistance, ignited the need for a new land policy. So, in 1991, Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi (Nyerere’s successor) appointed a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters (henceforth referred to as the Lands Commission), which submitted its final 
report in November 1992. In 1995, the Tanzanian Parliament passed a National Land 
Policy that incorporated some of the Land Commission’s recommendations. This new 
policy became the foundation of the Land Act 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, 
which in turn led to the Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the Land Laws in 2005, 
and Property and Business Formalisation Programme in 2004. A description of these five 
documents, which are key to the land tenure reforms in the country follows. 
 
The Lands Commission Report (1991-1992) 
The chair of Mwinyi‘s Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, 
established in January 1991, was Professor Issa G. Shivji11. Eleven other members signed 
the final report submitted in November 1992. This report comprised two volumes. The 
first, dealing with land policy and tenure structure, was later published in Sweden and is 
easily available; the second, addressing specific land disputes, was never published and is 
unavailable because of privacy concerns. During its inquiry, the Commissioners held 277 
public meetings in 145 villages and 132 urban centres in all twenty regions of mainland 
Tanzania and all but two of the 108 districts12. They also interviewed over 150 
government officers, as well as district and regional leaders and expert witnesses. 
 
11 Shivji is currently the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Research Chair in Pan-African Studies at the University of 
Dar es Salaam. He has had a distinguished career of scholarship on land, democracy, and political 
economy in Tanzania and emerged as a leading critic of government land policies. 




Furthermore, they travelled to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Korea to learn 
about land reform experiences in those countries (URT 1994, 2-3).  
  In summary, the Commission found that the land tenure regime in Tanzania was 
in a mess. They reported that the last major review had been the East African Royal 
Commission in 1953-55, done by and to fulfil the interests of the British colonial regime. 
Under the review all lands were then declared ‘public lands’ vested in the Governor, and 
indigenous land users continued to be governed by their customary law so long as it was 
in the interest of the state. This regime continued after independence which, in fact, the 
control of land by the executive led to enormous abuses, contrary to the interest of rural 
land users and the long run interest of the nation, the Commission observed. It also 
revealed that some major changes in the structure of the government, such as 
decentralisation (1972), villagization (1972- 74) and reintroduction of local governments 
in 1982 led to total disruption of land administration. The Commission’s reports delve in 
detail on these issues while giving recommendations on the way forward. 
Volume 1 has five parts: (1) historical context and existing legal position, (2) 
recommendations for a new land tenure structure, (3) broad suggestions regarding 
amendment and repeal of existing law and enactment of new statutes, (4) gender 
inequality for inheritance, the report notes that gender (in)equality for inheritance was 
added late during the inquiry and therefore was not exhaustively researched, and (5) 
conservation of environment and habitat that should be built into the tenure structure. The 
first part is by far the lengthiest, with chapters reporting detailed findings on current land 
allocation, demarcation, villagization, settlements on alienated land, urbanization, 




capital development authority, and individual titling and registration. The final report 
states that the proposed land reform would ensure “democratization of land control and 
land tenure systems on the one hand, and protection of rural lands from outside interests 
… on the other” (ibid., 1994:158). The Land Commission recommended that the new 
national land policy uphold multiple land tenure systems, with none superior to another. 
The policy should develop from the basic tenet that land belongs to the community and 
that tenure security be based on use (thus curbing land speculation).  
The Land commission recommended that land administration should be 
participatory, with adjudication of disputes including a Baraza la Wazee la Ardhi (Land 
Council of Elders). This was to take care of land dispute resolution mechanism vacuum 
that had existed since independence with the abolition of chiefs and chiefdoms. The 
vacuum in this sense refers to a lack of institutions with individuals knowledgeable with 
local customs and land ownership systems in all communities in the country.  
The Lands Commission in its recommendations advocated “security and safety of 
land rights first” (ibid., 1994:122). It called for modification of customary tenure in light 
of modern institutions already accepted by or acceptable to the people (modernization of 
tradition and democratization of land tenure control and administration at the level of 
village assemblies, elected local committees, and national parliament) rather than 
imposition of modernization. The Commission intended the reforms to be built on 
already established institutions that are familiar to the people. For example, they 
recommended the Land Council of Elders to be drawn from the existing Village Council, 
who are familiar to villagers. Village councils have between 15 and 25 members, made 




(hamlets) within its area, and other members elected by the village assembly, and there is 
a legal requirement that women must occupy at least 25% of village council seats. Local 
government elections are held every 5 years all over the country (CLGF, 2007). The Land 
Commission might have been sceptical of introducing new structures and drastic changes, 
lest they were met with resistance from the people as had been experienced in past 
reforms.  
Thus, the Land Commission’s recommendations aimed to strengthen tenure 
security for village residents and to increase village autonomy. One of its chief 
recommendations, which was ignored, was to vest all land in Village Assemblies rather 
than the President. In a nutshell, the Land Commission’s recommendation on the tenurial 
status was that all lands would be declared constitutionally to be either national lands—
including urban and reserved lands—or village lands; in urban areas and reserved lands 
the present system of allocation through rights of occupancy would continue. Further, it 
recommended that the national lands would be vested in a National Land Commission 
independent of the Executive, accountable to the Legislature and overseen by a 
reconstructed Judiciary, while village lands would be vested in Village Assemblies. 
The Land Commission’s recommendations seem to be based on at least three 
underlying principles: First, to encourage agrarian accumulation from below based on a 
vision of an autonomous national development as opposed to the current practice of 
incautious opening up of the country to predatory merchant and compradorial capital, 
both foreign and domestic. Second, to break up the monopoly of radical title in the 
executive arm of the state and diversify it in a way which would permit control and 




monopolistic state organs. Third, to devise procedures which would be legitimate, 
accessible, open and transparent. The Commission had concluded that the vigour of their 
recommendations was that Land would be placed squarely in the public domain under the 
broad regime of public law (constitution, basic law etc.). They also conceded that their 
proposals assume a strong political will on the part of government to implement them. 
Further they were highly convinced that if the government were to implement them, it 
would garner strong support from the people, but it would also face strong opposition 
from vested interests. 
 
National Land Policy (1995) 
 The National Land Policy passed by the Tanzanian Parliament in 1995 was based 
on “the position of the Government on the report of the Presidential Commission of 
Inquiry into Land Matters,” several studies by consultants, recommendations and 
observations from a national workshop on land policy, and comments and suggestions 
from the public and mass media. Notably, clauses on gender dynamics were added in 
response to critical assessments by high-profile activists. Gender activist NGOs were 
among the most active lobbyists in national debates concerning the land acts. They 
successfully lobbied for inclusion of “provisions to ensure equality before the law for 
women in both statutory and customary tenure” (Sundet 2005, 5). The National Land 
Policy paved the way for the Land Act and Village Land Act both of 1999.  
 The National Land Policy is a 42-page document comprising nine chapters. After 
providing a historical perspective on land tenure and laying out the objectives of a new 




document addresses five main topics : 1) land tenure and administration, 2) surveys and 
mapping, 3) urban and rural land use planning, 4) land use management, and 5) the 
institutional framework. It also lays out the rationale for creating a national land policy. 
Of the thirteen reasons given for the necessity of new policy, seven concern increased 
pressures and competition for land (including three specific points about pastoralism). 
The remaining six pertain to confusion over land rights after the villagisation campaign, 
the evolution towards individualized ownership, and the development of land markets. 
Through nationalization and villagization, areas previously leased (often to 
foreigners during the colonial period) were frequently resettled by villagers; yet legal 
rights to the land remained with the entities that held leases before independence. The 
National Land Policy does not comment on what should be done with the many court 
cases already due to such occurrences, but it seeks to avoid such legal quagmire in the 
future by extinguishing any existing land rights (through revocation or acquisition) prior 
to resettlement of unused areas. However, this portion of National Land Policy appears to 
be unenforceable, since settlements spring up informally and spontaneously.  
The National Land Policy, while repealing much previous land legislation, upheld 
four central tenets from the past that have been fiercely debated by scholars, politicians, 
and others: (1) all land in Tanzania is publicly owned, and is vested in the President on 
behalf of the citizens, (2) speculation in land will continue to be controlled, (3) rights of 
occupancy constitute the only recognized type of land tenure, and (4) rights to land under 
new land laws must continue to be based primarily on use and occupation.  
 The overall rationale for the new land policy is that “land as an investment 




therefore, land should be used effectively and efficiently, “not hoarded for speculative 
motives” (URT 1997b, article 9). The procedures for obtaining title to land should be 
simplified, and land administration should be transparent. Finally, land tenure plays a 
large role in promoting peace and national unity, since equitable access to land by all 
citizens ensures that the small farmers and pastoralists who constitute the majority of the 
country’s population are not landless. How these objectives play out in implementation 
projects is discussed later in this chapter and in the following one.  
 
The Village Land Act of 1999 
Parliament hired legal historian Patrick McAuslan to draft the Land Act. He was 
instructed not to deviate from the National Land Policy13. As the act became increasingly 
bulky, it was split into two pieces of legislation, the Land Act and the Village Land Act 
(hereafter referred to as VLA), both of which were finally (after failed attempts) passed 
by the Parliament in 1999. After defining some terms, the 79-page VLA highlights the 
guiding principles of the National Land Policy. It then provides details regarding 
institutions and procedures for administration of village lands. The parts of this act most 
relevant to this dissertation are: 1) Part III: Transfers and Hazard Land; 2) Part IV: 
Village Lands, including A) Management and Administration, B) Grant and Management 
of Customary Rights of Occupancy, and C) Adjudications of interest in land; and 3) Part 
V: Dispute Settlements. Part IV, “Village Lands”, by far the lengthiest, is the most 
pertinent to tenure security for village lands. 
 
13 Professor Patrick McAuslan, a faculty member at the University of London, specializes in land law and 
policy. He is one of seven founding faculty of the first law training institution in East Africa in the 1960-




 Article 7 in Part IV defines and lays out procedures for village land identification. 
It identifies three categories of land: village land (administered according to the VLA), 
general land (administered according to the Land Act 1999), and reserve land, which 
includes national parks and reserves (also covered in the Land Act 1999 and other, 
previous legislation). The VLA makes the Village Council responsible for making all 
decisions about land. It requires the Village Council to consult the Village Assembly (a 
meeting of all adult residents) before making major decisions, including any change in a 
village’s land use plan.  
The Village Land Act concurs with the Land Commission’s recommendation to 
validate land allocated during Operation Vijiji and to void any rights to and obligations 
concerning that land that were recognized prior to villagization. It provided for 
compensation to farmers whose customary rights had been thus extinguished. This had 
been specifically aimed at resolving long standing conflicts caused by villagisation 
campaign and the aftermath of its breakdown, as explained above.  
 The VLA became enforceable in May 2001, after its translation from English to 
Swahili. In 2004, Parliament enacted amendments to the VLA for which international and 
domestic financial institutions had lobbied. These effected major changes denounced by 
some scholars, and NGOs. In February 2004, in what can be described as a hasty and 
undemocratic process that caught activists off guard, the government introduced two 
major changes to the Land Act: First, the sale of undeveloped land, and second is the 
possibility to mortgage land thereby threatening the property interests of the poor. Banks 




holders of certificates of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs). However, to date very 
few loans have been obtained by small-holder farmers, despite the VLA amendments. 
 The year 2016 marks 15 years since the new wave land reforms—the Land Act, 
No. 4 and the Village Land Act, No. 5—became operational in Tanzania. Despite its 
ambitious goals—encouraging land registration and titling, and empowering women and 
other vulnerable groups, as well as halting the escalating land conflicts—the results have 
been disillusioning (Pedersen, 2013; 2015). To effectively implement the law, it requires 
a village to develop a land use plan. However, only about 1,640 villages out of a 
registered total of 12,788 had undergone land use planning as of April 2016. Small 
budget allocation, land use conflicts, few skilled staff and the practice of subdivision of 
villages are some of the reasons for this snail-pace implementation of village land use 
plans.  
 Another hurdle in the growing scepticism from financial institutions over the 
security and acceptability of the CCROs for a mortgage. Reasons noted by banks is that 
CCROs are only registered at the district level and not at the Commissioner of Lands—
central government—office and can hence easily be transferred to other villagers, thus 
complicating foreclosures in the event of default in repaying the loan. Thus, as of April 
2015, about 258,134 CCROs were issued to individual villagers—a small number in a 
country of over 55 million people of which about 75 are rural dwellers (Pederson, 2015). 
 The VLA set customary land dispute settlement mechanism. The institutions 
responsible for land dispute settlement have been established from village to national 
level. However, those at the lower level do not function effectively and have a backlog of 




pending cases and an average of 11,542 cases instituted each year (Pedersen, 2015). The 
whole system is fragmented and is governed by three different ministries (the ministry of 
lands, the ministry responsible for local government and the ministry responsible for 
justice), which is making accountability an uphill task. The call has been made to 
streamline the whole system in the Judiciary for accountability. In the last ten years, land 
dispute between farmers and pastoralists has increased exponentially, and so have the 
conflicts between communities and investors. For example, the conflicts between 
villagers and investors in the Kilombero, Kisarawe, Kilwa, Bagamoyo, Babati, Arumeru 
and Ngorongoro districts are publicised and well-known throughout the country (Kweka, 
2012; Katundu et. al, 2014; Curtis 2015). With most of the disputes occurring in village 
lands, institutions established by the VLA are severely overstretched.  
 Although there are about 14 provisions in the VLA that aimed at safeguarding 
rights of women and vulnerable groups, in practice, empirical evidence on the protection 
of women and vulnerable groups is insufficient. Women participation in investment deals 
has been very limited by traditional practices favouring patriarchy and the absence of 
legal requirements demanding women’s participation in the decision-making bodies at 
village level. In the recent past, there have been evictions of pastoralists and indigenous 
people by powerful investment groups in Loliondo, Kilombero and Bagamoyo districts. 
Although some women have been given land title in their own names and others jointly 
own land with their spouses, the available data are only project-based. The practice may 
not be country-wide yet since cultures take long to change. 
 Land matters are crosscutting in nature, which is why in 2005 the government 




ordination between and among sector ministries as the key factor for implementation. 
However, ironically SPILL (2005) became ineffective precisely because of a lack of co-
ordination. Key ministries—including ministry of Lands, ministry of Regional 
Administration and Local Government, ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
and ministry of Agriculture—did  not seem to be in line for a successful implementation 
of SPILL, and this is also seen in the land dispute settlement mechanism and land use 
planning process. These have significantly affected the implementation of the Village 
Land Act, causing the government to develop SPILL (2013) by addressing some of the 
challenges that had hindered SPILL (2005) (Pallot,2008; Massay, 2017). 
 Funding has been another hurdle reported to hold back the implementation: The 
Ministry of Lands is not one of the priority ministries. It thus receives very limited 
budget, which contrasts with the large number of developments in the land sector that 
would warrant it to be the priority sector. In the last five financial years, the actual budget 
allocation for development projects of the Ministry of Lands has been sporadically 
decreasing, hitting zero allocation in 2014/2015. The total costs of the activity set out in 
SPILL (2005) was established at TZS 300 billion (US$ 260 million), which was to come 
out of the standard Government Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) process. 
The SPILL (2005) proposed that part of the funding should be obtained through a Land 
Administration Infrastructure Fund (LAIF) that was to be established as a levy on land. 
However, the LAIF was never implemented, which contributed to its ineffectiveness 
(Bassi et. al, 2018; Pedersen, 2015). 
 So far, the implementation of the Village Land Act has been mainly based on 




high-value agricultural production. In 2016 a total of 21,256 CCROs had been issued 
there, 2,338 (11 %) of which were in the name of women and 4,888 (23 %) were joint 
titles. Projects in other districts selected under various programmes followed, most 
recently the Land Tenure Support Programme (LTSP). Other stakeholders, such as 
international and local NGOs, have also contributed to the implementation work. Some 
best practices around land use planning of community grazing lands and the joint 
resource sharing plan in the rangelands have been developed and spearheaded by civil 
society organisations (CSOs). For example, the Ujamaa Community Resource Team 
(UCRT) and Tanzania Land Alliance (TALA) have managed to secure the first ever title 
deed of the community land owned by Hadzabe indigenous ethnic group in Northern 
Tanzania. Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) and the International Land 
Coalition (ILC) are among the pioneers of conducting joint resource land use planning in 
the rangelands (.  
 While these are laudable efforts, there are other threats to tenure security in 
village lands. The country’s development strategy drives toward large-scale commercial 
agriculture, and mining sector expansion, by attracting big foreign and local investments, 
often with minimal consideration of the interests of the small-scale farmers. For example, 
implementation of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), is 
one of such threats. The SAGCOT corridor foresees an expansion of over 350,000 
hectares (ha) of agriculture land to increase production and processing of agricultural 
goods—it is marketed as large-scale agribusiness initiative—aimed at sparking an 
agricultural revolution in the county. The SAGCOT plan will also significantly increase 




expansion is planned (Kweka, 2012; Curtis, 2015; Bassi, 2018). While this may be a 
good decision economically, it is likely to cause land pressure and evictions of small-
scale farmers.  There is need to increase awareness of communities on their rights, and 
strengthen the institutions established by the Village Land Act. But most importantly is 
the need to give priority to small-scale famers—the majority of Tanzanians—in the 
development strategies, especially the agriculture development plans.  
 
Property and Business Formalisation Programme 
After the formulation of the new land policy and its corresponding Acts, the 
Tanzania government, with the backing and financial support from the World Bank, 
engaged a Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto and his Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy (ILD) to advice and lead the exercise of formalisation of property rights in 
the country14. De Soto’s ideas have had a profound impact on the World Bank and 
current land policy in scores of low-income countries. De Soto argues that universal 
individual titling is the only route for the world’s poor to escape the cycle of poverty. He 
believes that failure to formalize property rights explains the nearly universal lack of 
success of development projects intended to improve national economies. In practice, the 
World Bank continues to fund projects aimed at universal titling as a key element in 
poverty reduction strategies, as advocated by de Soto (ILD, 2004; PBFP, 2006).  
In 2004 a team of experts from ILD visited the country to plan national land 
reform (ILD, 2005: 1). A major result was the creation of a new government agency—
 
14 Hernando de Soto is the Peruvian Economist whose book, “The Mystery of Capital: 
Why Capitalism Triumph in the West  and Fails Everywhere Else”, provides theoretical 




Property and Business Formalisation Programme—popularly known by its Swahili 
acronym, MKURABITA. The programme is conceived within the National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), (URT, 2007). MKURABITA targets 
property and business owners in the informal sector, whose entry into the formal market 
economy is assumed to enhance their opportunity of using their assets to access capital, 
and thus reduce individual household poverty and improve national economic growth in 
general (Claussen et al., 2008:12). The programme held that once these marginalised 
majorities are engaged fully in the formal sector of the economy, it will be possible for 
them to create wealth and hence contribute effectively to the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDGs).  
MKURABITA builds on Hernando de Soto’s hypothesis that the most effective 
way to empower the poor is to provide them with formalised rights to their property 
(Sundet, 2008:2). MKURABITA is a four phased programme customised on a specific 
model developed by the ILD. The phases are (1) Diagnosis, (2) Reform Design, (3) 
Implementation, and (4) Capital Formation and Good Governance (ILD, 2004; PBFP, 
2004; 2008). 
MKURABITA began with a “Diagnosis Phase”, which focused on a complete 
examination of the size and nature of the country’s extralegal sectors, as well as a 
preliminary overview of the reasons why the informal sector continues to thrive. The 
term extralegal is used to refer to anything—property or business—not governed by laws, 
or not within the scope of the law of land, and it included land under customary 
ownership system since it was deemed to lack government issued documentation. So, the 




framework and the informal framework with its unwritten norms for how land 
administration is actually carried out on the ground. The phase also aimed to identify the 
main institutional constraints that create legal, administrative, and economic obstacles to 
the integration of the poor into the legal economy. Finally, the diagnosis phase aimed to 
lay the groundwork for re-engineering of the current legal system to achieve the 
objectives of the programme.  
The second stage, “Design Phase,” delineated how the two systems could be 
merged and how formal structures and protocols could be simplified. The general 
objective of this phase is to provide the government with detailed policy and institutional 
proposals, as well as an implementation strategy to integrate extralegal real estate and 
businesses into legal system in order to boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and 
eventually expand the tax base. Two pilot projects tested some innovations in the titling 
process, in Handeni District in 2006 and Bagamoyo District in 2008. The lessons of the 
Handeni project are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
MKURABITA has since moved into the “Implementation Phase” initiating small 
projects in some 31 districts by 2019. It envisions working with key personnel in a 
handful of villages in each district, teaching them how to adjudicate parcel boundaries by 
doing this work together for a few parcels, and then leaving district and village personnel 
to carry out the bulk of the work on their own. However, activities in this phase are much 
more modest than was anticipated in when the program was conceived, in which the 
objective of the implementation phase was to progressively bring the extralegal real 
estate and businesses into the new legal order through a proactive national formalisation 




systems to stay in touch with the evolving needs of the poor and remain relevant is hardly 
seen to be achieved. Furthermore, the objective of establishing a National Database and 
Record Keeping Organization, thus re-engineering record keeping and registration 
processes so that the country can pull together all the economically useful descriptions 
about extralegal assets into one database and keep it up to date has not been achieved. 
The final phase, “Capital Formation”, involves formulation and implementation 
of recommendation for connecting the newly legalized property to larger national and 
international markets, and allow the property to be leveraged to create capital and 
generate more wealth. This is the phase yet to be reached. However, with the shaky 
implementation phase, the hopes of realising successful capita formation phase down the 
line are uncertain. 
The emerging bleak picture about MKURABITA is partly attributed to dwindling 
of finances to run the projects. For instance, despite international support for 
MKURABITA, in around 2008 it lost much of its funding due to the Norwegian 
government’s disillusionment with de Soto’s theories causing it to withdraw support for 
land tenure formalization projects in the country. Its reasoning is that no evidence 
indicates the poor are benefitting from these programs (Author’s interview with NPA 
director, September 2016). Consequently, MKURABITA is scrambling to redefine itself, 
but its future is shaky despite its continued funding by the Tanzanian government. One 
offshoot of this situation may be the increase in financing of the implementation of the 
VLA, especially the land use pans, by foreign and local private investors, in order to 




Further, empirical evidence on the nexus between land formalisation and 
investment needed to boost agricultural growth has been weak (Fenske, 2011; 
Benjaminsen et al., 2009). Several reasons have been identified for this, including: first, 
the programmes being overly state-centric, and lack community participation in planning 
and execution. Second, ignoring the customary systems that are widely known and used 
by majority of people. Third, that customary tenure systems may provide sufficient 
security to still facilitate investments for agricultural production. Fourth, underdeveloped 
credit markets hinder the set of investment choices. Fifth, productivity and investment 
effects are hampered by poor enabling conditions, such as efficient product market, and 
input supplies (Fenske, 2011, Lawry et al., 2014). 
It will be interesting to find out how these new tenure systems play out in terms of 
what agricultural model they support. Will it be an agricultural model based on 
domestically oriented development strategy, which emphasises on the linkages between 
economic sectors and a lesser dependence on the external sector, and based on small-
scale farming? Or will it be an agricultural sector based on large–scale farms, and that 
focusses on enhancing export earnings within an economic model based on comparative 
advantage? How has the food security, nutrition and physical well-being of the rural 
farmers been changed? At the end of day, however, it will be a question of whether the 
new tenure would be able to sustain communal livelihoods over and above what was 
being afforded by the communal systems alone. 
In this chapter I have shown how external forces have played a key role in 
changing the nature of land ownership systems in Tanzania. These changes have been 




analysis of recent changes in tenure reforms—through land formalisation programmes—
is of particular interest as it reveals clear indications of a wide gap between programmes’ 
expectations and the reality unfolding to the rural dwellers’ economic opportunities and 
their general well-being. The next chapter takes up this issue by doing a case study 
analysis of land formalisation in Handeni. This will shed light on the effects of land 
formalisation programmes on the livelihoods of peasants. It will evaluate how and who 
are the losers and beneficiaries of the programmes, and the trajectories of the long-term 






5:  LAND FORMALISATION IN HANDENI DISTRICT 
Introduction 
The implementation of the formalisation programmes in Tanzania, that are 
transforming the customary land ownership systems into a formalised universal land 
administration system, has been touted as a means to boost agriculture production that 
would improve the life and economic wellbeing of the rural population. This thesis 
hypothesises that the programs are unlikely to contribute to improve rural life because 
the attempt to develop a universal land administration system destroys customary 
social organisation and leads to the adoption of agricultural policies that emphasize 
growth rather than development. 
This chapter presents a field research undertaken in Handeni District to 
evaluate the thesis hypothesis. The field research explores the process of formulation 
and implementation of the formalisation programmes to understand what was changed 
and how, in order determine their possible effects on rural development. Further, the 
field research sought to find out how rural social organisation has been altered since 
the implementation of the formalisation programmes. This analysis is crucial in 
demonstrating how the programmes have affected customary ownership systems, 
which are essential to how rural populations construct their livelihood.  Further, the 
research sought information on agricultural production in order to demonstrate how 
both small-scale farmers’ sources of income, rural population’s food security and 
employment are affected.  
Thus, in this chapter, I discuss and interpret the study findings by describing 
emerging patterns, themes, and relationships, and link the findings to literature and to 
the theoretical perspectives that guided my study. The aim is to answer the research 




uphold customary land rights can provide some protection against the negative 
outcomes of land rights’ interventions. That is, are these programmes more successful 
than the earlier models of formalisation—those implemented between 1960s and 
1980s as described above—in improving the quality of life and economic well-being 
of the rural population?  
The presentation of the field research findings is organised under three broad 
sections: 1) Formulation and implementation of the formalisation program in 
Handeni, 2) Implications of the program on rural social organisation, and 3) Effects of 
the program on agriculture. Each of these three broad sections is further subdivided 
into sub-sections for clarity of the analysis of the field research findings.  I begin with 
a background of Handeni and how the program was formulated. 
 
Geography, social, economic and cultural background of Handeni  
The district lies within the latitudes 40 55’ and 60 04’ South and within 
longitudes 370 47’ and 380 46’ East. Handeni District is best accessed from the south 
by Chalinze – Segera tarmac highway, and by another tarmac road from Korogwe in 
the north.  Handeni town is the districts headquarter. The completions of the 
construction of the two tarmac roads to the south and to the north in 2008 and 2009 
consecutively has contributed to opening up the district to outside investors (Handeni, 
2015).  
The district economy and livelihood are based on natural resources.  
“Agriculture is the main source of livelihood” and employs about 98% of the 
population (ibid. 2015: 15). The main agricultural activities are crop farming and 
livestock keeping.  Out of the total area of 708,000 hectares, arable land comprises of 




only 30%, thus, smallholder cultivation predominates.  There are also large-scale 
farms amounting to a total of 3,124 hectares with title deeds and 1,620 hectares have 
not been surveyed. Sisal is the main crop raised in the estates.  The crops grown 
include maize, beans, cassava, millet, cotton, sunflower, pigeon peas, oranges, 
mangoes, coconuts, bananas and vegetables. Some of these crops are sold to markets 
in Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Moshi and Arusha.  Most agriculture is rain fed. Crop 
cultivation in the District is characterized by low yield e.g. a hectare of maize 
produces 1.5 tonnes instead of 2.0 tones expected under the prevailing ecological 
conditions.  This seems to be mainly caused by the use of poor farming methods, plus 
use of hand hoes (ibdi, 2015). 
There are two livestock ranches, Mzeri and Nkale, both owned by National 
Ranching Company (NARCO). NARCO is a parastatal organisation responsible for 
large-scale commercial ranching spread throughout the country, however it is under a 
process of divestiture.. The Mzeri ranch has a capacity of holding 14,000 head of 
cattle but currently only 6,475 cattle are raised (ibid., 2015). There is no clear 
(understanding of the) boundary between the neighbouring villages and the ranch. 
This has been a rampant problem all over the country where government institutions 
claim to own land. The unfortunate part is that when it comes to contestation in courts 
the villagers lose because they have no papers show, so they are called “invaders”. 
This has been one source of many land conflicts in the country (Katundu et. al, 2014; 
Curtis 2015). 
Other significant economic sectors in Handeni include forests which cover 
about 7% of the total district area. This has been used by residents as source of their 
various needs, including building materials, hunting and collecting wild foods, as well 




important source of income in the district”, mainly using traditional hives (ibdi. 2015: 
17). 
The Handeni district, which is mainly inhabited by the Zigua ethnic people, is 
one of the areas in the country where Ujamaa villages were established. That means 
Handeni is an area of diverse ethnic groups, which among them and majority are the 
Zigua people. Given the expansive land area of Handeni, most people moving to 
Handeni were able to establish themselves without much interference with the Zigua 
people, and this was a common phenomenon in most areas where villagisation 
campaign was implemented (Ergas, 1980; Hyden, (1980).  
The Zigua people are known for their close-knit relationships. The Zigua 
people are described to have a network of interactions, communications and support 
within their community (Hyeden, 1983). For example, they have maintained 
cooperation in performing economic activities such as during hunting and harvesting. 
During harvesting, the owner of a farm may prepare food or and/or local brew for the 
people who came to work. The expectation is that there will be a reciprocity when 
another farm owner organises such labour sharing activity. Or the reciprocity may be 
in form of sharing farm produce (especially for food) if one of the participants in 
labour sharing happen to have bad crop year/season.  
These relationships have, however been changing to adapt to new social, 
political and economic environments. For example, during the Ujamaa period, the 
government tried to tap into these local norms and cultures, by establishing 
cooperative farms. However, they miserably failed because they did not understand or 
incorporate the intricacy of social relations that has been built among the people for 




knew best, that is cooperating and reciprocating among themselves in parallel to the 
‘forced’ cooperation in the Ujamaa farms.   
    
Formulation and implementation of the formalisation programmes 
The Property and Business Formalization Programme (PBFP), also commonly 
referred to by the Kiswahili acronym MKURABITA, is an initiative of the 
government of Tanzania with financial and technical support from various 
development partners, lead by the World Bank. The aim of the initiative is stated to be 
“economically empowering the poor majority in the country, by increasing their 
access to property and business opportunities, towards development of a strong 
expanded market economy” (URT, 2007: 3; World Bank, 2007). The programme 
started by carring out a pilot project in Handeni district with the aim of testing the 
implementation of the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999. The MKURABITA 
Programme Management Unit, located within the President’s Office, chose Handeni 
district for the pilot project in order to test innovations in land use planning and 
registration, that might improve and fast track the implementation of the Village Land 
Act No 5 of 1999, as well as to gain practical field experience in the property 
formalisation processes in accordance to the same law, see Map 3.  
The Handeni pilot project began on the 18th September 2006 and lasted 
through the end of 2007. The original duration of the project was planned to last only 
until the end of December 2016, however due to several hurdles, that will become 
clear shortly, the project implementation lasted for about a year longer, specifically to 







Map 3: Handeni District in Tanga Region 
 
Map showing Handeni District, where the field research for this thesis was conducted. 
 
 
The choice of Handeni district for the pilot project was greatly influenced by 
its experience, in which it had carried out a similar programme with assistance from 
GTZ (Germany government) between 2002 and 2005. The fact that the district had 
prior opportunity to establish a programme to implement village land use planning, 




Occupancy weighed heavily in the decision to choose it for a pilot project. As a result 
of the GTZ programme, Handeni district had built some capacity in this area of work, 
having formed a GIS unit with adequate hardware and software. The district wanted 
to continue with this process in other villages, however this was not possible due to 
both financial and human resource limitations. The district felt that some intervention 
was necessary that would look for a different approach that makes land titling more 
easily carried out, for many villagers and at low cost. 
Therefore, the advent of MKURABITA Program could not have been at a 
more opportune moment for the district plans. The program intended to make a pilot 
project that would test basic changes necessary for efficient (fast, extensive, less 
expensive) land titling. The lessons from the pilot project would also serve as an input 
to the proposed reforms to be applied countrywide. 
 
Implementation of the formalisation program in Handeni 
The Handeni project involved seven villages, namely Sindeni, Kweisasu, 
Mbuyuni, Bongi and Kwamkono, Mzeri, and Nkale. The seven villages were mostly 
randomly selected; however, consideration was given to villagers’ readiness (learned 
during reconnaissance) and those without boundary conflicts (a requirement in the 
law).  Village proximity to each other was also considered for efficiency of the 
project. Therefore, in essence, the project was expected to run quite smoothly and 
faster given the choice of villages of villages. Village’s statistics at the time of the 











Table 1: Handeni Pilot Project: Villages Statistics in 2006 





Men Women Total 
1 Sindeni 10 657 2,704 2,702 5,406 
2 Kweisasu 9 355 797 802 1,600 
3 Kwamkono 9 562 1,892 2,244 4,136 
4 Mzeri 10 1,044 2,003 2,110 4,113 
5 Mbuyuni 5 504 1,305 1,392 2,697 
6 Nkale 5 314 500 587 1,087 
7 Bongi 6 220 559 564 1,123 
 Total 54 3,656 9,760 10,402 20,162 
Source: PBFP, 2008. 
The field research for this thesis is done in three villages - Mzeri, Sindeni and 
Mbagwi. Two of the villages (Mzeri and Sindeni) had already implemented the 
formalisation programme and the third one (Mbagwi) has not. Comparative 
demographic figures from the three villages are presented in Table 2 below. The 
villages are typical of Tanzanian villages in terms of population size. However, Mzeri 
and Sindeni exhibit a rather unusual demographic change between 2006 and 2018, 
where the number of women increased at a faster rate than men. Mbagwi village, 
which has not undergone land formalisation does not exhibit such a drastic change. 
The unusual demographic change in the two formalised villages may be an indication 
of decreasing economic opportunities, which is forcing men to move to other places in 








Table 2: Mzeri, Sindeni and Mbagwi Villages’ Statistics in 2006 and 2018 
 
Source: PBFP, 2008, respective VEOs and author computation. 
 
As per the national Land Policy and the Village Land Act No. 5, the 
formalisation of village land rights is accompanied by a number of necessary 
activities and steps, depending on the situation of a particular village or district. In 
Handeni district the exercise began with surveying and adjudicating village 
boundaries and issuance of Certificate of Village Land (CVL). Summary of the land 
rights formalisation process in Handeni is presented in Figure 3. Knowing how the 
program was implemented is necessary to understand its ramification in the 
livelihoods of the rural population. The processes that have significant impact on the 
rural livelihoods include: 1) the demarcation of village boundary, 2) the creation of 
land use plans; 3) the issuance of Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy 
(CCRO); 4) the creation and administration of a land registry; and 5) the resources 





Figure 3: Summary of the process for land rights formalisation in Handeni  
 
Diagram prepared by author based on the Land Policy, Village Land Act, and 










Surveying and demarcation of village boundary 
The surveying of village boundaries and the subsequent issuance of the 
Certificate of Village Land (CVL), firmly establish the extent of each village’s lands, 
and are a prerequisite for all other VLA implementation activities, see Image 1.  
Image 1: Sindeni Village Land Certificate 
 
Left: Cover. Right: Map showing surveyed village boundary.  
Source: Sindeni Village Office 
 
According to the information I obtained from the Handeni District Officer 
(DLO), the surveying of the village boundaries for the project took longer (up to 
twice) than the time earmarked, mainly due to the size of the villages, the terrain and 
weather. While the VLA provides for sensitive handling of inter-village disputes, 
including allowing for joint village management of shared resources, in practice land 
is divided between villages with no overlap. This process is paradoxically 
strengthening village tenure and mitigating some inter-village boundary conflicts in 




For example, formalisation is accused of fomenting boundary conflicts 
between three formalised villages, first is Mzeri village and the Mzeri National 
Ranching Company Limited (Mzeri NARCO); second is between Bongi and Nkale 
Ranch; the third is between Nkale and Nkale Ranch, see Map 4 and Map 5.  
Map 4: Mzeri Village: Land Use Plan 
 
Mzeri Village’s land use plan, showing Mzeri ranch occupying about three times the size of 
the village, and yet there could not be a concession of few square meters of land for the 
villagers.  











Map 5: Bongi Village: Land Use Plan 
 
Map 5: Bongi Village’s land use plan, showing a disputed land between the village and Nkale 
ranch.  
Source: Bongi’s Certificate of Village Land. 
 
NARCO has been undergoing divestiture since the dawn of the privatisation 
policies, where many of its farms are being sub-divided and sold to individuals or 
private entities. When these conflicts emerged, the government decided in favour of 
NARCO, citing the Certificate of Right of Occupancy that the company possess. This 
is despite the villagers having been using the land for many years uninterrupted. One 
villager in her late 60s said “mimi nimezaliwa hapa kijijini, nimekuwa na kuoelwa, 
nimepata watoto na wajukuu, na muda wote tumekuwa tukitumia hilo shamba, iweje 
leo tufukuzwe?” (I was born and grew up in this village, got married, have children 
and grandchildren in this same village while using the farm; where was the 




Many Mzeri villagers interviewed have deep reservations on the issue, some 
commenting in a sense of desperation “mwenye nguvu mpishe” (let the strong man 
pass), meaning that the villagers cannot win the land case against the ranch, because 
of the ranch’s financial power. Others said “tumeshikwa na mshangao serikali kuuzia 
matajiri kijiji chetu” (we are simply stunned for the government to sell our village), or 
“siku hizi serikali inajali wenye pesa tu” (the government only cares for rich people). 
This development is not only surprising, but it is actually against the Village Land Act 
No. 5 of 1999, Section 57, which states the principles of adjudication to include if “a 
person is and has been or his predecessor in title was in peaceable, open and 
uninterrupted occupation of village land under customary law for not less than twelve 
years, shall determine that person to be entitled to a customary right of occupancy” 
(VLA, 1999: 69).  
 
The Village Land Use Plan 
Once a village has been issued its Certificate of Village Land (CVL), but 
before individual parcels can be titled, land that falls within the village boundary is 
catalogued by land use, and land use plans are created, see Image 2. In each village, 
people from each hamlet within the village participate in planning, including village 
council members and other selected villagers. According to DLO, this took 
considerable time and resources due to contestation over land allocation for different 
activities. He contends that “urging people to change some practices they have done 








Image 2: Sindeni Village Land Use Plan 
 
Image of Sindeni Village Land Use Plan (draft) displayed on the wall of the village office. It 
was locally created by the VLUM team with assistance from the project officers, then adopted 






The purpose of this exercise, which takes anywhere from three days to a 
couple of weeks, is to create a map showing the current land use patterns and to create 
a second map delineating an ideal land use plan, with reserve lands (such as forest 
reserves), grazing lands, agricultural areas, village communal lands (including village 
institutions upon village lands, such as schools, market places and clinics), and the 
village centre all clearly mapped. Sometimes the land use plan is a mirror of the 
current land use map; other times they are very different.  
Box  1: Vignette of the focus group interview in Mzeri village 
 
Vignette: The Focus Group in Mzeri Village 
 
During the field research I interviewed a 6-member Focus Group in Mzeri 
Village, Image 3. The group demonstrated a good understanding of the need to 
have a Land Use Plan, saying “Mpango wa matumizi ya ardhi siyo kwaajili ya 
kuwapatia watu cheti tu, hapana. Inasaidia Kijiji kuweka mipango ya maendeleo, 
yaani ni wapi waweke shule au malisho” (Land use plans are not supposed to be 
simply a means to the end of issuing CCROs. Instead, they are supposed to be a tool 
to assist the Village Council in planning development of the village, for example, in 
determining where to place new services such as schools, or where new grazing 
lands could be located).  
However, the group had reservations on how the villagers were involved, 
especially on educating them about the need for the LUP. They said “elimu ya huu 
mpango haijawafikia watu wengi, hivyo wengi hawatilii maanani hili jambo”, 
(knowledge about the land use plan has not trickled down for the most part making 
others to pay lip-service only to these concepts). Further, the group added that 
“wananchi wengine hawakufurahia huu mgawanyo mpya wa ardhi, hivyo hawajali 
kutunza misitu au mamlisho” (other villagers, especially those who did not feel 
satisfied with the new plan do not care to protect the forest reserve, and to ensure 
that communal lands for grazing are maintained). 
 Furthermore, the group went on to claim that “mipango yetu ya kimila ina 
mapungufu kidogo, lakini inasaidia kwani watu wanailewea vizuri, na njia za 
kushughulikia wakosaji ni rahisi”(the old—customary—arrangements, though not 
perfect, worked better, as all villagers new them well, and the enforcement 




Image 3: The author with a 6-member focus group in Mzeri village
 
Note: All ethical procedures for confidentiality were followed for publishing this picture. 
Source: Author. 
 
I find that land use plans are being created as a necessary means to an end—
individual parcel registration cannot be done until a land use plan is created. Further 
examination through interviews and visual observation reveals that neither of the two 
villages is actively engaged in applying the land use map for their village planning, 
which was the intended outcome. The recurring response from most individual 
interviews was that “land use plans were used to show compliance with national 
regulations but are not effectively being used”. Others went on to explain that, 
“people prefer to abide by the customary land use plans because they are familiar with 
and they are less restrictive”. Land systems therefore continues to follow pre-
formalisation customary ownership patterns, predominantly. This situation is 
contributing to havoc in resource use when some villagers use the old system while 




and resolution mechanism section, has been a recipe for new conflicts, especially 
between pastoralists and crop growers.   
 
The granting of customary right of occupancy (CCRO) 
After a successful creation of land use plan, accepted by Village Assembly 
and approved by the District Council, then it follows a process of granting the CCRO. 
Previously—before the new land policy came into force, village lands were not 
registered. Land users who wished to register their land applied through the Ministry of 
Lands, and their land reverted to ‘general land’ and out of the village domain if they were 
successful in the registration process. However, according to various interviews 
conducted, it is certain that almost no village residents attempted or at least succeeded to 
register their land through this process. Therefore, all village land was held under 
customary ownership systems.  
Using the Village Land Act provisions, the Village Council granted to the 
user(s) through the issuance of a CCRO, land which is occupied or used by an 
individual, family or group under customary law, and land which may be made 
available for communal or individual occupation. However, before individuals can 
receive land titles, the rights to land within the village must be ascertained. This is 
done through a process of adjudication, which is the means of determining the 
existing rights and claims of people to the land. The Act provides for two forms of 
adjudication, systematic and spot adjudications15.  
 
15 Spot adjudication is where, upon application by an individual village resident, the boundaries of just 




Box  2: Vignette of the Adjudication of interest in land in Sindeni 
 
Vignette: Adjudication of Interest in Land 
Halima (not her real name), who lives in Sindeni village was very helpful in 
describing to me what real happened during the adjudication process. She has 
sharp memories—her account of events was corroborated with response from 
other interviewees; she is quite knowledgeable about the new land policy and the 
VLA; and she was involved—in different roles and capacities—in the formalisation 
process from the beginning to the end. For the sake of confidentiality, I will not 
give any further description or information about her.  
Halima explained that “ingawa hiyo Sheria in maelezo mengi, haina 
manufaa hapa, kwani wananchi hawaijui” (despite having quite detailed 
regulations regarding land adjudication in the Village Land Act is not of much use 
because most villagers do not understand its content). She went on to explain that 
“hata wakisomewa wanancnhi, nani ana uwezo wa kukumbuka vitu mia 
anavyoambiwa kwa mdomo mara moja?” (who would ever remember a hundred 
thing being told by mouth at the same time?). Further, she explained that there 
are few Swahili copies of the Act, leaflets or booklets that were prepared by NGOs 
to help villagers understand the new policy and the act, but they were so few that 
they were supposed to be left in the Village Office to be accessible by any villager 
who want to read. However, she continued to say that “hatukuwa na ofisi ya 
kuweza kutunza chochote ndani” (the village had no office that could be used to 
keep any material, so the VEO kept everything at their home).  
Furthermore, Halima explained in detail how the adjudication process was 
marred by disputes. She contends that “urasimishaji ardhi umeibua migogoro 
mipya ya mipya kila mahali” (with formalisation new boundary disputes have 
become rampant). Further she explained how the definition of land user (based 
upon length of land use) was purposefully misunderstood so as to exclude people 
of non-indigenous ethnic groups, even when such people might have been 
resident for more than a generation, “hasa kwa ndugu zetu Wamasai” (especially 
for the people of Maasai ethnic group). Additionally, “customary” was taken to 
mean “where your fore-fathers lived”, and thus some people were claiming land 
they had not used for generations, and which was being used by others, because 
their ancestors had once lived there or were buried there. She concluded that 
there are incidences of “watu kutengeneza makaburi ya uwongo” (people trying to 






The Handeni project deployed the systematic adjudication, where each farm 
plot in the village was painstakingly visited, with the boundaries of each plot being 
drawn (usually upon an aerial photograph or satellite image) until the entire village 
was complete. The District Land Officer told me that “the systematic adjudication 
was feasible because the project was awash with resources (personnel, equipment and 
funds). Resources required and used are discussed in the Project Resources section 
below.  
Following successful adjudication process, the landowner submits a signed 
application to the Village Council, who must determine whether to grant the CCRO 
within 90 days. When the Village Council determines to grant a CCRO, it delivers to 
the applicant an offer in writing, called Letter of Offer16; the applicant has 90 days to 
accept or refuse the offer in writing. However, in my interview with a senior 
MKURABITA official, he told me that letter of offer requirement is one of things 
they have recommended to the government to be removed from the Act, because “it is 
an unjustified bureaucratic step that accomplishes nothing”.  
Acceptance of the offer is conditional upon payment of the required fee17. For 
the Handeni project, no fees were charged because the project was full funded by the 
government and donors. Section 28 of the VLA states in part that “The village council 
may require the payment of an annual rent”.  However, according to Mzeri and 
Sindeni VEOs, General Assembly in both villages “voted unanimously to reject 
introduction of land rent payment”. Finally, the Village Council issues a CCRO to the 
applicant, signed by the chairman and secretary of the Village Council, by the 
 
16 Pursuant to Section 24 of the Village Land Act. 




applicant/grantee, and signed, sealed and registered by the District Land Officer. The 
VEOs explained that three copies of the CCRO are made, the “original” for the 
grantee, one to the village land registry and the other one to the district land registry. 
Statistics of the applications and surveyed land parcels for the village in Handeni 
project is contained in Table 3 below. 
 






Passed Objected Farms 
Surveyed 
1 Bongi         198 191 4 144 
2 Kwamkono 386 334 11 145 
3 Kweisasu 255 227 4 160 
4 Mbuyuni 408 373 15 168 
5 Mzeri         559 506 12 385 
6 Nkale 302 283 4 119 




 Source: PBFP, 2007 (The highlight is author’s addition) 
 
During the field research I interviewed an 8-member Focus Group in Sindeni 
Village, who seemed quite knowledgeable about the land formalisation process, and 
were also good at reciting advantages of program. Surprisingly, only five of them had 
actually gotten the Certificates of Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCRO). The 
other three, had completed the entire procedure (including their land parcels being 
surveyed, their photos taken, signing documents), but had not followed up to obtain 
their certificates. They claimed that “hata hao waliokwishapata hivyo vyeti 
hawajapata faida yeyote, hivyo sioni sababu za kuingia gharama kufatilia” (they did 




that it will cost them time and money to make follow up). Others said that “hiyo ni 
janja ya serikali, wote tukishachukua wataanza kudai kodi ya ardhi” (there is trick, 
when all have been issued with the certificates, the government will start demanding 
land rents).  
 
The Village Land Registry 
Prior to the VLA, only land in the “general land” classification was registered, 
upon application to do so, and a registry was kept at the national level. A senior 
official at the Ministry of Lands explained to me the rationale to establish village land 
registry, saying “the national land registry was centralized, difficult and costly to 
access”. Under the VLA, land registration is decentralized to local authorities, with 
the district land registry as the primary land registry and first point of entry, with 
duplication at the village level, with a village land registry managed by the Village 
Executive Officer on behalf of the Village Council. A MKURABITA senior official 
informed me that all villages in the Handeni project had to construct new buildings to 
house the Village Land Registry, since none of them had a building that could even be 
modified to become a registry, see Image 4. He went on to say that “according to our 










Image 4: Sindeni Village Office building 
 
Image of Sindeni Village Office building constructed during MKURABITA project. It has a 




According to MKURABITA senior official, construction of the VLR was 
planned to be a tripartite (District Council, Village, and MKURABITA) effort. The 
responsible village contributed by providing sand, stones, pay the mason, and the 
villagers participate in doing the works like digging the foundation trench, toilet pit, 
fetching water, and so forth. MKURABITA provided building materials like cement, 
iron bars, timber, iron sheets, nails, doors/windows frames & shutters, and fuel for 
transporting the building materials. The District Council provided a truck for 
transporting the building materials, and the District Engineer would be the main 




The officer explained some problems that delayed the construction exercise, 
including failure of the District Council to provide truck to transport building materials, 
necessitating the project to seek authorisation to hire trucks. However, the work still 
continued at a low speed due to construction activities coinciding with the farming 
season. As such villagers were busy preparing their farms for sowing and therefore had 
little time for the construction activities. Another problem experienced was bad 
weather. When construction activity resumed it collided with heavy rains season, which 
contributed in hampered progress. These are good lessons if VLR construction in other 
villages is to be successful.  
 
Project Resources 
A senior MKURABITA officer informed me that the project to formalise land 
rights in Handeni was funded by Norway (via Norwegian People’s Aid, NPA) and the 
World Bank, though he did not reveal the exact amount of money spent.  However, 
examining what was done and how, one could easily categorise the project as being 
quiet well funded. This sentiment is echoed by the District Land Officer who said, 
“since I started working about 20 years ago, MKURABITA in Handeni is one of few 
very well funded projects I have ever seen”. 
Human resources: Interviews and examination of project implementation 
documents reveal that quite a sizable number of people were fully engaged in 
facilitating the activities of the pilot project, including: A) MKURABITA: 2 
Programme Officers who coordinated the project, occasionally alternating; 10 
UCLAS18 graduates hired by MKURABITA; 2 drivers. B) Handeni District Council: 9 
members of staff (6 from the lands Department, 1 each from the Forestry, Bee Keeping 
 




and Community Development Departments); C) Civil Society: 1 from TAPHGO, 1 
from Legal and Human Rights Centre, and 1 driver form NPA; D) Village and Ward 
Executive Officers and other ward level extension staff were also involved. 
Equipment resources: A) 3 cars (2 from MKURABITA and 1 from NPA 
supported the team); 2 laptops with GIS software; and 20 hand-held GPS units; areal 
maps; concrete beacons for marking village boundaries.  
Fund resources: The exact amount of cash spend is not available, however the 
project financed building 7 new building in the seven villages where the project was 
implemented; paid per diem allowances for about 25 people for almost three months; 
and met the running costs of the vehicles. 
I contend that this is a huge amount of resources for a project in only 7 
villages. The question is what would be the price tag for extending the project to 
about 11,000 villages around the country?  
 
Implications of the program on rural social organisation 
The research sought to explore how customary social organisation—a 
particular pattern of relationships between and among individuals and groups, based 
on a land ownership system, has been altered and their possible effects on rural 
livelihoods. I first present part of a brief evocative focus group interview in Sindeni 











Vignette: The Focus Group in Sindeni Village 
 
During the field research I interviewed an 8-member Focus Group in 
Sindeni Village, Image 5. The group seemed quite knowledgeable about what 
went on during the formalisation process, as some of them took part in the 
implementation of different activities of the program. This includes two of them 
who were part of Participatory Land Use Management (PLUM) teams at both 
ward and village levels, one was trained in the use of hand-held GPS for survey of 
land parcels. All of them were involved in the construction of their village’s land 
registry at different capacities. They also have a good grasp of the customary land 
systems. 
  The group discussed how villagers’ access to, and use of land, have 
changed, saying “kwa hii sheria ya sasa kila familia inabaki kwenye kisehemu 
chake tu, ukikanyaga kwingine unafungwa” (with the new law, every household 
must only use small allocated parcels, stepping in any other land leads to a jail 
time). They explained how this is totally different from the customary system 
where people shared land in many different ways, saying “zamani wafugaji 
waliweza kuchunga mifugo kwenye mashamba baada ya mavuno, sasa hata 
ng’ombe akiingia shambani kwa bahati mbaya, unapigwa faini” (previously 
pastoralists could feed their cattle in the farms after harvesting is over, but now if 
a cow enters someone’s farm, even accidentally the owner will be heavily fined). 
Further, they explained that this new type of relationship has led to less 
collaboration in many other areas for example “food sharing habit is almost 
gone”.  They said that now people have prioritised selling any excess food even if 
they know their neighbour is starving (“watu wanauza chakula chote hata kama 
anaona jirani yake ana njaa”). 
They went on to explain that this individualistic habit that is taking root in 
their village is even eliminating how people used to share labour in performing 
different production and even social activities. “A farm owner would invite 
people to come work in his field while sharing local brew and food that he has 





Image 5: Author with a focus group in Sindeni village 
 
 Note: All ethical procedures for confidentiality were followed, as a result 2 members (ladies) 
opted to be out of the picture, saying they were not well dressed. 
Source: Author 
 
Cooperation and reciprocity 
The account presented in the vignette of the focus group interview in Sindeni 
village is echoed by almost all other individual interviewees in both Mzeri and 
Sindeni villages. The interviewees in both villages explained that under customary 
system people cooperated on many issues and for various reasons. For example, 
cooperating on farm labour gave them opportunity to also cooperate on hunting which 
maximises their hunting success, increased the hunters security in the bush, and it was 
also economical to share when they hunted a big animal (“wakilima pamoja, 
wanawinda pamoja na hiyo in faida kwani wakiwa wengi kuna uwezekano mkubwa 




wanagawana”). They lamented that nowadays each household is individually working 
on their own land parcels with the aim of selling the produce to make money, because 
they were convinced that that is how to acquire wealth, (“siku hizi kila mtu analima 
kivyake ili akauze, ajipatie hela, maana tuliambiwa ndiyo njia ya kupata utajiri”). 
The individualistic behavior that is reported to be taking root in the two 
villages is also reflected in how the norm of reciprocity among villagers is vanishing. 
The tendency of households in the village helping each other during disaster or times 
of need through various forms is reported to be declining. For example, Asha (not her 
real name) of Mzeri village said she had to go to a far village to ask for food from a 
relative when she had a bad crop last year (2017). She argued that, had it been before 
land formalisation, other villagers or neighbours would have shared with her their 
produce, but they all rushed to sell all of it (“kabla ya huu urasimishaji watu 
tulisaidiana wakati wa shida, lakini sasa hakuna mtu anamjali mwenye shida”).  
According to the sustainable livelihoods approach, cooperation and reciprocity which 
are part of social capital arises from collective expectations, obligations and trust 
among a group of people. When the collective bond is broken, the expectations are 
not met, or trust is lost the social capital weakens or breaks down. 
  Social capital is central in how rural population construct their livelihoods 
and it includes norms in social affiliations such as eschewing selfishness in favour of 
actions that benefit all the members of the group. However, with the formalisation 
assigning exclusive rights to land parcels, most interviewees reported declining sense 
of social affiliation among villagers, saying people care only about their individual 
parcels, and much less about any common resource left after the adopting the new 
land use plan (“watu wanahangaikia kulinda mashamba yao binafsi, hawajali tena 




to land parcels has eliminated another important element of social organisation, that is 
the flexibility to accommodate multiple rights to different land resources. Both Mzeri 
and Sindeni interviewees expressed inability of land to have multiple use or users 
following strict land use plans and issuance of exclusive land titles.  
 
Access to and use of land  
Introduction of formal titling in the rural areas was described in the land 
policy and programme documents as the key to providing small-scale farmers with 
security of tenure. Prior to the introduction of the formalisation programme in the 
villages of Mzeri and Sindeni, access and use of land was based on customary 
systems by which villagers owned land that they were able to use. Given prevalent 
use of the hand hoe and poor access to agricultural inputs, most households cultivated 
an average of 3 acres according to the Village Executive Officers (VEO) of the three 
villages covered in the field research. Vast majority of land remained uncultivated and 
were in the auspices of the Village Council. This reserve land could be allocated by 
the Village Council to any villager who requires land but also fulfills village 
requirements. One of the common requirements is not to sell the land. 
Handeni is hailed as one of areas with fertile land and is also one of sparsely 
populated districts in the country, with the average population density of about 30 
people per square kilometer (NBS, 2012). Hence the formalisation exercise envisaged 
the possibility of unlocking the land potential for boosting economic growth, and 






Box  4: The vignette of the focus group interview in Sindeni village, continued… 
 
However, the implementation of the formalisation programmes in these 
villages in effect mobilized and inculcated the spirit of individualism that had never 
been experienced before, especially with regard to land ownership. From the focus 
Vignette: The Focus Group in Sindeni Village … continued 
 
A continuation of my interview with an 8-member Focus Group in Sindeni Village, see 
Figure 9 above, is presented here, with a focus on changes in the access and use of land.  
The group explained that during mobilisation phase of the project they were told 
that one important advantage of land formalisation is security of tenure. However, they feel 
that that process was taken advantage of by few local elites who managed to grab big pieces 
of land that should have been left under the auspices of the Village Council (“wajanja 
wachache walijichukulia ardhi kubwa wakati wa upimaji, ardhi ambayo ingetakiwa itunzwe 
na Kijiji kwa matumizi ya baadaye”).   
The group lamented that most villagers have developed too much appetite for land, 
whether they are able to use it or not. They associate this to the formalisation “motto”, that 
said “land is wealth” (ardhi ni mali), which they claim was being used during the mobilisation 
phase. We were told that, “land would get us out of poverty as long as we can prove that we 
have exclusive ownership rights”, and now everyone is interested in having as much of it as 
they can. 
Further, they explained that there are orders coming from the central government 
requiring land to be set aside (Land Bank) for big investments. This requirement seems to 
bother all group members because they claim they are not informed how they will benefit 
from such investment and whether that land would ever come back to be used by the 
villagers. 
Although the group still has some glimpse of hope that titling of their land might 
actually lead to increased tenure security, they were still bothered by the strictness of land 
use plans. They claim that the restriction associated with these LUP, limits possibility of 
diversifying rural livelihoods. For example, “we are not allowed to use the forest for their 
regular needs as we used to do” (haturuhusiwi kupata mahitaji yetu ya kawaida kama 






group interviews in Sindeni and Mzeri Villages, it was explained that villagers 
decided to subdivide and obtained private titles for almost all uncultivated land that 
was under the village domain. There was no formal arrangement on how to subdivide 
the land, giving room to few elites including few villagers who were quick to grab the 
uncultivated land and claim to be legal owners. Other elites included non-villagers 
such as businesspeople and civil servants. Many villagers who were not quick to act 
or learn about the exercise were left with small pieces of land. Thus, land ownership 
in these villages has become highly unequal where some households are reported to 
having less than 3 acres while few have over 20 acres, regardless of the household 
size19, see Table 4 below.  This concentration of land ownership is being aggravated 
by increasing sale of land as formalisation has invigorated land market in these 
villages.  


















less than 3 acres 7 10 8 13 10 9 
 3 to 5 acres 6 2 7 3 7 8 
 6 to 10 acres 3 2 5 3 5 4 
 11 to 20 acres 2 2 3 2 2 3 
More than 20 acres 1 3 2 4 3 3 
No. of h/holds 19 19 25 25 27 27 
Source: Compiled by author based on field interviews 
 




Alongside land concentration, new actors have arrived to grab land. 
Specifically, the new actors are of two types: first is a group of pastoralists from other 
parts of the country who have invaded these villages in thousands. According to the 
VEO of these villages these pastoralists use various techniques to get access to land in 
the villages, some buy few acres of land and then keep expanding the areas in dubious 
ways including violence. Mzeri village with a population of about 5,000 people 
estimates that about 200 pastoralists with over 3,000 cattle have entered their village. 
There are no accurate figures of the newcomers because they do not follow proper 
procedure of moving to a new village, which includes first reporting and seeking 
permission from the village authority. Further, the nature of these pastoralists is not to 
establish a permanent residence, hence compounding the difficulty of knowing their 
exact number.  This migration phenomenon has created tension in the village between 
the newcomers and original villagers at times reaching a level of fighting. In my 
interviews with the District Land Officer and District Agriculture Officer, they both 
admitted knowing the problem, saying a Task Force has been created to work on the 
issue.  
A second group of actors are commercial farmers who also easily buy land 
from villagers who acquired huge amounts of land during the initial stages of 
formalisation. There are also some villagers with small pieces of land who sell due to 
economic stress or other reasons, as witnessed by Hassan (not his real name) of 
Mzeri, who decided to sell his 3 acres farm to get capital for establishing a business. 
The story of Hassan is heartbreaking because he only had those 3 acres and 
another almost an acre located a few meters away, where he lives with his family of 5 
people. He used the money from selling the farm to start a maize business. He would 




Hassan says “business was good only in the first year, after that I lost all the money 
because my maize consignment got rotten. There was a problem transporting it to the 
markets because roads had been destroyed by heavy rain, and I did not have a good 
storage, so the rain damaged the maize. As I speak, I still owe some farmers money 
for the maize that I had not paid”. Hassan declares himself now a landless, because 
the less than an acre plot that his family lives on is not enough to feed his family. 
“Sasa nimebaki kutafuta vibarua tu hapa na pale ili kulisha familia” (I now work in 
other people’s farms to earn a living), see Image 5.    
Image 5: Lands for sale in Handeni
 
Images showing that land sell is rife in Mzeri and Sindeni villages. None was found in 
Mbagwi village. Top frame translates to “THIS FARM IS ON SALE, 3.5 ACRES”. 
Bottom left: “BIG LAND FOR SALE SINDENI [VILLAGE]”. Bottom right: Farm on 
sale, the owner did not want his sale sign photographed.  Source: The author took 
these pictures while in the field. 
   
Hassan’s case is not a common occurrence in these villages yet, but it is an 
indication of a looming problem, as the VEO of Mzeri village explained to me that 




their land parcel and that will cause serious poverty issues, (“kuuza ardhi kumekuwa 
rahisi sana sasa, hivyo kuna hatari watu wengi watadanganyika na kuuza mashamba 
yao na hiyo italeta umaskini mkubwa hapa kijijini”). So, the argument that formal title 
ensures security of tenure, must necessarily be met with a question ‘security for 
whom?’ Formalisation advocates celebrate the promise of ‘lifting the bell jar’ to 
enable inclusion of poor people into formal property systems so much that they fail to 
acknowledge that there are negative distributional consequences involved. Any 
redefinition of property rights produces winners and losers (Hunt 2004: 188; Manders 
2004). Apart from people who lose their lands permanently through selling or other 
ways, the villagers in general have permanently lost the land that was reserved for 
use, especially by expanding population or to expand the cultivated land, and also for 
fallow use, because most of the village reserve land has been titled to individuals.  
There are clear indications in these villages that there is increasingly less land 
to cultivate per household because most of the village reserve land has been awarded 
to individuals, thus expanding families have no other option except to subdivide the 
small land parcels that they own. The motto of the Land Policy, Land Act and the 
formalisation programmes is that “land has value” which is encouraging few villagers 
to hoard land—a very different scenario from the land ownership under customary 
system. Therefore, the harsh reality about land formalisation in Mzeri and Sindeni 
villages is that it has resulted into unprecedented dynamics of subtle land grab and 
land concentration. The customary system that ensured villagers had permanent 





Effects of the program on agriculture 
The research sought information on changes in agriculture in order to 
demonstrate how both small scale farmers’ sources of income and rural population’s 
food security have been affected. Small-scale farming is an indispensable economic 
activity for the majority of rural population in Handeni. The Handeni District Council 
reports in their Investment Profile that “The district economy and livelihood are based 
on natural resources. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and employs about 
98% of the population” (Handeni, 2015:15). Therefore, any changes in agriculture for 
any reason must have a profound effect on rural livelihoods. In this section I discuss 
field research findings of effects on agriculture associated with formalisation program 
in Mzeri and Sindeni villages.  
 
Capacity to earn revenue 
Households in Sindeni and Mzeri are involved in a variety of economic 
activities, as part of complex livelihood strategies. Income generating activities 
include both agriculture and non-agricultural activities. Nevertheless, agricultural 
sources of income remain critically important for almost all households in these 
villages, as the district authority admits this saying, “agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood and employs about 98% of the population” (Handeni, 2015:15). Therefore, 
availability of land for agriculture is crucial for sustainable livelihoods in the rural 
areas. 
To understand how land formalization is affecting revenue earning capacity, 
the research identified seven basic categories of income in the rural space upon which 
to probe, these include: (1) crop production; (2) livestock production; (3) agricultural 




employment; (6) transfer; and (7) other. As found out above under the section titled 
Access to and use of land, that land formalisation in Mzeri and Sindeni villages has 
resulted into increasingly less land to cultivate per household. Crop production per 
household has decreased because the families have expanded while the cultivation 
area has decreased or at best remained the same, see Table 5. Mbagwi village which 
has not undergone land formalisation process, reveals a different scenario, where the 
land under cash crop cultivation has been increasing with population growth, 
implying that expanding households have access to ‘new’ land. 
 
Table 5: Estimated Population & Land Area (Acres) under Cultivation: 2010-2018 
 
Source: Handeni District Council, Agriculture Department. Note: area under 
cultivation is for a seasonal year (starting at 2000/2001), while population is for a 






Further lack of reserve land to enable practice of fallowing has resulted in 
rapid loss of soil fertility and therefore low crop yield. Majority (23/44), that is about 
52% of households who I interviewed in Mzeri and Sindeni villages, reported that 
under customary systems they were able to practice natural fallow20, but after 
formalisation, they are longer able to practice fallowing. Fallowing is a practice of 
resting land from cultivation, usually used for grazing or left to natural vegetation for 
a long period to restore soil fertility lost from growing crops. Interviews with villagers 
of Mbagwi, the third village included in the research, which has not implemented land 
formalization reveal that natural fallow is still being practiced. The VEO of Mbagwi 
village told me in the interview that “ardhi ya mwananchi ikichoka Halmashauri 
inamkatia sehemu ingine alime kwa muda kabla ya kurudi kwenye ardhi yake” 
(Village Council uses its reserve land to allocates parcels to new households or 
temporarily to villagers who want to fallow their land).   
Livestock production increased tremendously in the two villages of Mzeri and 
Sindeni. There are no official data on how the livestock subsector is changing, but 
many interviewees in Sindeni and Mzeri villages told anecdotes about how 
pastoralists of the Maasai ethnic group has been in flowing into their villages, see 
Image 6. The VEO of Mzeri Village showed me areas with hundreds of cattle grazing, 
however the owners refused to talk to me. 
 
20 This is different from improved fallow, which is also land resting from cultivation, but the vegetation 








The villagers explained that the sudden increase in livestock in these villages 
is a result of influx of people and cattle from other parts of the country, due to 
easiness of obtaining land in these formalised villages. The downside of the increased 
livestock production is that is does not benefit the original people of these villages as 
the cattle are own by immigrant pastoralist communities. Not only has this taken up 
land used by these villagers, but also the newcomers are taking up cattle market that 
used to benefit these villagers. During my interviews many villagers have said to me 
that “kumekuwa na mapambano mengi kati ya hawa wafugaji na wenyeji” (there has 
been several confrontations between these newcomers and villagers). The Director of 
Handeni District Council confirmed to me that they are aware of the problems 
between pastoralists and crop growers, though he would not admit that they were 





 Commercial agriculture is still quite limited in Handeni, and so is the 
agricultural wage employment. Despite undertaking the formalisation programme in 
anticipation of boosting agriculture investment and production, there is hardly any 
noticeable agricultural investment so far. In many instances land hoarding practices 
have emerged in Mzeri and Sindeni villages, which limits the possibility of 
smallholder farmers expanding their farming land. As land resources and agricultural 
opportunities become limited there seem to be an increasing trend of villagers seeking 
non-agricultural wage employment. However, most of these types of employment are 
available outside the villages, and so there has been massive movement of family 
members—mostly youths—to town centres, mining areas, and construction sites for 
employment. Recent improvement in road transport—tarmac roads—connecting 
Handeni to Dar es Salaam (major commercial city), and Tanga (port city) is reported 
to facilitate the movement of employment seeking people, see Image 7. 
The increased pace of non-agricultural wage employment among villagers is 
also reflected in the reported private transfers by a good number of respondents. They 
assert that monetisation of the economy coupled with decreasing agricultural income 
has made transfers one of central sources of income. There are also public transfers in 
various form—such as subsidised foods, subsidised agriculture inputs, and various fee 
waivers—which seems to be government effort to abate the ills of formalisation 
programmes. Few opportunities for non-agricultural self-employment are reported to 









Image 7: Tarmac road connecting Handeni to a major highway 
 
Source: Picture taken by the author, while in the field 2018. The tarmac road built 
immediately after the formalisation program, connects Handeni to the cities of Dar es 
Salaam, Tanga, Moshi and Arusha. 
 
I aggregated the seven categories of income sources identified in the field 
research into two higher level groupings in my analysis: I distinguish between 
agricultural activities (1-crop, 2-livestock, and 3-agricultural wage income) and non-
agricultural activities (4-non-agricultural wage, 5-non-agricultural self-employment, 
6-transfer, and 7-other income). Capacity to earn revenue from agricultural activities 
is reported to be in constant decline due to shrinking land size per capita, and also due 
to immigrant pastoralists crowding out local livestock producers. Majority (31/44), 
that is 70% of all interviewees in Mzeri and Sindeni villages reported to feel poorer 
now than before formalisation was implemented, while only 9% said they felt richer 
after that before the formalisation. They explained that now they are not able to afford 
same amount of goods (including food and clothes) as they used to before the 




formalization programmes is much better than Mzeri and Sindeni villages. Mbagwi 
still has reserve land that households can use to expand their agricultural activities, 
and also to a great extent they have managed to fend off immigrant pastoralists. In this 
village only a few interviewees (4/27), that is about 15% felt poorer, while over a half 
(15/27), that is 55% felt economically well-off after than before the formalisation 
implementation. Villagers in all the three villages reported to have much less control 
over capacity to earn revenues from non-agricultural activities, mainly citing lack of 
capital, distance from employment sites, lack of skills, and stiff competition as the 
stumbling blocks.  
 
 
Agricultural (local food) production 
Land under customary ownership systems is used, first and foremost, for food 
production for local consumption. This includes producing maize, beans, cassava, 
millet, coconuts, and vegetables, which form staple foods in all the three villages. 
Under the customary system priority was not only on production of food for local 
consumption but also on various food sharing schemes, which for example did not let 
a household suffer critical food shortage while others had excess. With the 
implementation of the formalisation programmes in Mzeri and Sindeni villages there 
are indications of creeping market-oriented production, and destruction of customary 
food sharing systems.  
Majority (37/44), that is 84% of all interviewees in Mzeri and Sindeni villages 
reported they prefer to sell all produce and keep money, while in Mbagwi village only 
44% (12/27) of the interviewees said they prefer to sell all produce and keep money. 




ideas, which do not encourage food production for local consumption, let alone the 
customary food produce sharing tenet.  
The formalisation programmes in the country were advertised as a strategy for 
reducing poverty by integrating customary land ownership systems into the modern 
market economy. It was declared that the programmes “mainly target [customary 
landowners] whose entry into the formal market economy will enhance their 
opportunities in using their assets to access capital and thus improve national 
economic growth and reduce individual household poverty” (MKURABITA, n. d.). 
Buying into this idea villagers in Mzeri and Sindeni reported focusing on producing 
agricultural products for selling. Table 6 shows that from 2007/2008 (when Handeni 
project was completed) to 2014/2015, the population percentage change is 20 for both 
Mzeri and Sindeni and 15 for Mbagwi. In that same period, the interesting change 
happened in the two formalised villages, where area under cash crops production 
increased by 57 and 63 percentage changes respectively, while area under food crops 
production remained almost the same. In Mbagwi, areas for both cash and food crops 
production increase by the same size, 15 percentage increase.  
 
Table 6: Estimated Population & Land Area (Acres) under Cultivation: 2010-2018 
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This researcher witnessed several trucks lined up in the villages ready to ferry 
agricultural products to markets outside these two villages. I had impromptu 
interviews with the truck drivers (middlemen) who admitted that produce business in 
Handeni has increased, citing the willingness of the villagers to sell their products. 
Another truck driver told me that business is booming because of the recently 
constructed tarmac roads joining the main north trunk road, linking Handeni to the 
cities of Dar es salaam, Tanga and Moshi, (“biashara imeimarika kwa sababu ya hizi 
barabara za lami”). Village leaders admitted that increased business for agricultural 
products has in many instances caused food shortages in the villages because villagers 
are switching to producing products with high demand, and also selling food products 
without leaving enough for family consumption till next harvest. 
The few big farms that have been established (or expanded) are engaged in the 
production of non-food products (timber, cotton), or food products (cattle ranch, 
mangoes, vegetables) for sale outside the villages. Further inquiry reveals that big 
farms do not sell any of their produce to the villagers because they do not consider 
them as viable market due to their low purchasing power. Villagers interviewed gave 
more or less the same explanation, saying that “big farms’ produce are expensive”, 
others said that “they have not been welcomed to buy”, yet others said, “they grow 
similar crops for their consumption”. I could not get interviews with the big farms, 
mainly because the owners do not live in the village and the workers who I met there 











Maintenance of peace and security (land and land related conflicts) 
The most striking common factor among war-prone countries is their 
poverty— “the poorest one-sixth of humanity endures four-fifths of the world’s civil 
wars” (Randall, 2004: 43). The strong correlation between conflict and poverty 
includes deep inequality, unequal growth and the unequal distribution of resources. 
Inequality between groups is one of the foremost causes of violent conflict. 
Structurally, these may be related directly back to the allocation and distribution of 
resources, including the scarcity of land and the compromising of land tenure rights. 
Access to or distribution of properly managed, protected and controlled natural 
resources can augment livelihood strategies. While it is empirically difficult to 
demonstrate that either poverty or environmental factors, in and by themselves, are 
strong determinants of conflict, the ‘loss of livelihoods’ constitutes a missing link in 
explanations of current conflict patterns.  
In Mzeri and Sindeni there are new and increasing conflicts between 
individuals and groups (mostly pastoralists and crop farmers) as a result of 
formalisation programme which gave exclusive land rights to individuals, eliminating 
various land sharing systems used under the customary system. Sindeni has 
experienced the worst violence, including torching of property, and killing of people 
as a result of fighting over rights to use land. This is in sharp contrast with what the 
formalisation programme envisioned and promised, that giving people government 
recognised title deeds would end any conflicts over land. Conflicts over land is also 
compounded by the influx of migrants who acquired huge pieces of land for 
investment thereby reducing land available for the villagers. One particular group of 
newcomers who have been reported to cause big trouble in these villages are 




Sindeni village has estimated that about 3,000 cattle have entered their village 
accompanied by their owners (pastoralists move as family), about 200 people.  
 
Opportunities for livelihoods diversification 
Livelihood diversification describes the process by which an individual or 
household takes on multiple income-generating activities. In other words, it occurs 
when people have more than one job or way of making money. Often, people 
diversify their incomes or livelihoods in order to make more money and gain stability 
in the face of unpredictable or reduced economies. Customary land ownership 
systems are reported to offer a wider latitude for the rural people to engage in multiple 
income-generating activities than the individualized property rights system 
established by the formalization programmes.   
In the interview with a focus group in Sindeni Village, it was explained that 
“the formalization programme has eliminated the possibility of overlapping and 
interlocking claims and responsibilities over land” (urasimishaji umeondoa 
uwezekano wa kushirikiana katika matumizi ya ardhi). In Mzeri and Sindeni villages, 
30%  (13/44) households interviewed informed me that they used to practice mixed 
farming before formalisation but are no longer able to do that because of the exclusive 
rights given to people over land (“huwezi ukachunga ngo’mbe hapa kwenye maeneo 
ya mashamba tena”). Even pastoralists in these villages accused the formalisation 
programmes for inculcating individualistic spirit among villagers, making it harder for 
them to graze their flock in the farms during offseason (“haturuhusiwi kabisa kulisha 
mifugo yetu kwenye mashamba hata baada ya uvunaji kukamilika”). Bushes and 
forests that had hitherto been used by villagers for different activities—such as 
gathering wild foods, traditional medicines, etc.—have been subdivided and given 




Again, the increasing concentration of land and subsequently economic power 
into the hands of few wealth individuals in these villages is denying many peasants 
opportunities for diversification of income sources. Mzeri village interviewees told 
me that (at the beginning of the program few people who were well informed took 
advantage of the misinformed villagers and register most of the unused (reserve land) 
“wajanja wachache walijinyakulia ardhi iliyokuwa ya ziada hapa kijijini”.  Thus, 
formalisation is facilitating crowding out of local peasants by enabling elites 
including some villagers, non-villagers (businesspeople and civil servants) and 
foreigners to own huge pieces of lands and using them to produce and sell similar 
products.  
The hope of these large-scale farms to offer employment has not been realised 
as they are, to a large extent, mechanised. Any few jobs offered by these new large-
scale farms are poorly remunerated. A worker in one of the orange farms in Sindeni 
village, who refused to identify himself to me, said “wages here are very small” 
(mshahara hapa ni midogo sana). The District Agricultural Officer (DAO) explained 
to me, saying that “most villagers do not have much skills and knowledge required in 
these entities; hence they end up not making good money”. That means they end up in 
in casual, part-time and unskilled work, mainly because of their poor asset status (e.g. 
low human capital) and barriers to entry resulting from low assets (need for skills, 
ability to navigate bureaucratic hurdles, etc.). “Most of the skilled and semi-skilled 
jobs (such as tractor operators) have been outsourced from outside these villages”, 
DAO said. 
“The much-touted possibility of accessing credit using the formalised land (the 
title deeds) has not been realised by any of my villagers”, the VEOs of both villages 




have been able to secure credit form any financial institution by using land (CCRO) as 
a collateral. Some villagers, although very few among those I interviewed, had 
actually tried to access loans from a bank, but all of them were unsuccessful. Some 
said, “bank conditions were too strict” (masharti ya benki ni magumu mno), another 
one said, “they didn’t listen to me, banks don’t care about small-scale farmers” 
(hawakunijali, benki hazitaki wakulima wadogo). With this background, I visited a 
local bank branch in Handeni, where I interviewed a Loan Officer. The officer 
informed me that most small-scale farmers were misinformed about how to access a 
bank loan. He said, “most of the villagers once they receive their CCROs they rush to 
the bank with the certificate in hand asking for a loan, and that is not how loan 
application process goes”. A sample of general loan conditions by banks in Tanzania 
is given in Figure 9. Unfortunately, Image 8 is in Kiswahili, however it shows that out 
of 5 conditions listed, the one on mortgage is No. 4. Having worked in a bank myself, 
I know that in a loan application, collateral (such as the CCRO) would be in the fourth 












The formalisation programmes have as one of their central idea that universal 
private titling is the only route for the world’s poor to escape the cycle of poverty by 
being able to access credit that would be invested to improve their economic 
wellbeing. In my interviews, however, very few people reported that they were not 
able to engage or expand their economic activities because of lack of credit. The 
biggest hurdle observed through further interrogation was lack of ideas or 




agriculture infrastructure (such as irrigation systems, transport or reliable markets) 
that would make it viable for small-scale farmers to borrow and invest in agriculture. 
Therefore, the idea of peasants being able to expand or diversify their livelihoods 
through formalisation does not seem to work in the current environment as witnessed 
in my field research. Land formalisation in Handeni is, thus in effect posing a double 
jeopardy in terms of livelihood diversification as it supplants the customary 
systems—with their diversification opportunities—by the property rights system that 
has no practical alternative economic activities for the peasants.  
Based on these field findings, I conclude that, land formalisation in Handeni 
is, therefore in effect posing a double jeopardy, it destroys the customary land 
ownership system, which thus far has been instrumental in how the villagers have 
constructed their livelihoods; and is introducing economic systems that do not suit the 
current situation of the Handeni population. The emerging agricultural models and the 
marketing systems (of both agricultural inputs and outputs) put small-scale farmers at 






6: CONCLUSION  
Formalisation programmes look simple and straightforward, but they ignore 
the role of traditional institutions on land rights that embody local social capital 
(including norms of cooperation, reciprocity). Social capital is important for 
community organizations and land use and management. Discussions concerning the 
status of land property rights framework are everywhere and in the last thirty years, in 
terms of development, many governments in Africa started (re)formulating land 
policies to introduce privatization and commodification of customary lands. 
Formalising individual property rights through land titles was believed to reduce 
poverty. Unfortunately, privatization of property rights is causing un/intended 
outcomes of not eliminating poverty but “spreading poverty” to many rural 
communities and specifically to smallholder farmers. 
 Agricultural models associated with formalisation programmes favour large-
scale mechanised systems and market production. As a result, policies and economic 
strategies of both central and local governments have focused mainly on how to 
increase production, disregarding the implications to the environment and on rural 
dwellers.  Prime lands in villages have been set aside for allocation to prospective 
investors. In Tanzania, the national investment policy requires local government 
authorities to set aside prime lands that would attract foreign investors—the land is 
included in the “land bank” managed by the Tanzania Investment Centre (Bluwstein, 
et. al. 2018). Further the agricultural policies and strategies have been geared toward 
market production (mainly for export).  
In Handeni we have established a consistent decreasing of land under food 
crop production relative to cash crops production and population growth.  The 




Further, the findings in Handeni field research have revealed the escalating land-
grabbing activities and rising trend of distress land sales all a recipe for creating 
landless people and/or pushing small-scale farmers to marginal lands. Further, the 
research found escalating land and land-related conflicts in the formalised villages. 
With much of development literature focused on land reform, land policy, and 
titling, one might reasonably conclude that a causal relationship has been established 
between property rights, titling, and economic development. However, a closer 
examination of empirical literature exposes the generalizations, misconceptions, and 
myths associated with property rights and land titling. While titling of property can 
have positive effects, the real world reveals a complex and nuanced reality with 
conditional or contingent impacts on economic growth. That is to say titling may have 
positive economic benefits contingent upon other conditions also being met. In sub-
Saharan Africa though, most empirical evidence has shown that land tenure 
formalization has had negative or weak impacts at best. 
Arguments favouring land formalisation are popular among variety of 
development agencies including USAID and World Bank, and even the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. The notion of ‘property rights for poor people’ or ‘pro-poor 
property rights’ sugarcoats an issue that is otherwise more closely associated with the  
‘trickle down’ economics. It keeps the intractable question of substantive 
redistribution off the agenda. Further, the idea of unlocking poor people’s own assets 
to alleviate poverty is consistent with a lean state that merely facilitates market 
interaction by putting in place the necessary legal and institutional framework, rather 







 By disregarding discussions and evidence of the failure of tenure reform 
experiments of the last four decades, the World Bank and its partners re-popularise 
previously discredited theories of property rights and reproduce their shortcomings. 
The evidence presented in this research is yet another addition to how unsuitable the 
formalisation programmes are to sub-Saharan Africa. The findings in this research, 
however, go onto show  how, even with the (claimed) modifications in the 
programmes, the negative effects on rural livelihoods are still mounting.  
This research has revealed that the new approach to formalisation, that uses 
catchphrases like upholding customary land system, or creating hybrid land systems, 
did not amount to any meaningful difference from the previous programs since both 
ended up destroying the customary land systems and their embedded social 
organisations According to the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods approach, social capital 
is one of the assets (the others are human, physical, financial, and natural capitals)  
required for the achievement of sustainable rural livelihoods. In pursuing livelihood 
strategies composed of a range of activities, both the access to assets and the use to 
which they can be put are mediated by social factors including social relations, 
institutions, organisations. However, the evolving new social factors supplanting the 
customary ones are a stumbling block to improving rural livelihoods as they are 
inaccessible due to such things as distance, cost, bureaucracy, skills and wage rates. 
Promising inclusion into the formal legal framework as the solution to poverty 
and marginality keeps substantive discussion of inequality off the agenda. The 
solution is deceptively simple, hence its appeal to international aid circles. Such 
contemporary arguments linking formal title to productivity and poverty reduction 




Saharan African context examined in light of empirical evidence, as this paper does. 
The bottom-line question should always be “for whose interest is the increased 
agricultural production being sought? That is, are the processes of increasing 
agricultural production having positive impact on rural peoples’ lives?” 
Given that compulsory and systematic individual titling has been found to be 
not appropriate policy in sub-Saharan African contexts, the central issue in tenure 
reform in many parts of the region is how to recognize and secure land rights that are 
clearly distinct from ‘Western-legal’ forms of private property while also ensuring 
security of tenure for the millions of smallholder farmers. One way forward could be 
vesting rights in individuals and groups who share rights with others within a variety 
of nested social units, the territorial boundaries of which vary with the resource or 
decision at issue and are thus flexible. The alternative approach also requires that 
decisions concerning these shared and relative rights are subject to the democratic 
principle of downward accountability to a majority of rights-holders. 
Policies for effecting rural development in sub-Saharan Africa should consider 
the role of agriculture in development by examining the impact of alternative growth 
paths on overall growth and poverty reduction in the region. Countries should 
consider better ways to improve the smallholder agriculture in their endeavor to spur 
growth. The source of growth is important in determining not only the total growth 
but also the size of a country’s growth elasticity of poverty. Although some countries 
in the region have potential sources of growth outside of agriculture, growth in the 
industrial sectors is, at least in the short- to medium-term, unlikely to be substantial 
enough in many countries. Moreover, non-agricultural growth is generally less 
effective at reducing poverty as small-scale agricultural growth. The review of 




development was found to be strongest in countries where small farms dominated 
agriculture.   
Land formalisation is not a panacea for economic malaise in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is notable that structural weaknesses in the sub-Saharan African economies 
persist and that agricultural supply response to neoliberal reforms (SAP, PRSPs, and 
now formalisation) have been weak. The policy makers should question their 
solutions to the regions’ economic/agricultural sector malaise, that is whether they 
have right target and wrong mechanism? However, for an answer they need look no 
further as theory and empirical research have identified key  intervention areas 
including research and technology development, agricultural advisory services, rural 
finance, agro-processing and marketing, agricultural education, supportive 
infrastructure, and sustainable natural resource use and management. Therefore, in 
making agriculture policy all these elements should be included if agriculture is to 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide / Questions 
 
        Saint Mary’s University 
        Department of International  
        Development Studies 
        923 Robie St. Halifax NS  
        B3H 3C3, Canada 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Broad Protocol of Interview Questions 
 
Section A: Background Information  
A1. Please tell me a bit about yourself.  
How old are you?  
Are you married?  
Do you have children?  
Where do you currently live?  
How long have you lived there?  
What do you do for employment?  
How long have you been doing this job?  
A2. Can you tell me about your family?  
What part of the country is your family from?  
Where did you grow up?  
Do you still have family in that area?  
Did your family farm when you were growing up? Do they farm now? 
 
Section B: Connection to land and agriculture  
B1. Do you have land?  
If not, why not? Would you like to have land?  
If so, how much land do you have?  
B2. In your experience, how do people decide what land each family is able to use? 
B3. How did you gain access to this land?  
Please describe the process that you had to go through to get land.  
Is this process the same for everyone?  
B4. What property rights do you have on this land? For example,  
Is it customary or statutory land?  
Do you have formal title for the land?  
What are you able to do on the land? (i.e. build, cultivate, etc.)  
Are other people allowed to use this land? (i.e. access to water, etc.?)  
Can you sell or rent the land?  
B5. Do you participate in agricultural activities?  
Is this land near to where you grew up?  
Describe these activities (i.e. crops, livestock, etc.)  
Do you live at the same place as you farm?  
If not, how regularly do you go to your farm?  




Why do you participate in agriculture?  
B6. Please describe what value land has to you.  
i.e. is it important for spiritual reasons? Livelihood? Inheritance for your children? 
Investment/income?  
Do you plan to return to this land when you retire/finish working?  
B7. What other activities are you (and your household) engaged in? 
 How important are they to your household livelihoods?  
 
 
Section C: The formalisation process  
C1. What do you know about land legislation or land regulations?  
C2. Can you tell me about the state’s plans for land (village land)?  
C3. Why did you and your village participate in the program? How did it happen (initiated)? 
  Was there a specific problem that was being solved? 
  Or are there benefits that you expected to get? 
  Was the problem solved? Are the benefits being realised? Explain. 
C4. Can you describe how the program was done in your village? Your land? 
  Who were involved? How was the process? How long did it take?  
 Did you pay for your title? If yes, was it worth it? If not, given what you know now 
about the program would you have paid? How much? 
C5. Are there costs for maintain the title (fees, land rent, taxes)? If yes, are they justifiable?    
C6. Can you describe what has changed (in terms of access and use)? 
 Has the program changed how to part with the land? Sell, rent, sub-divide, 
bequeath? 
 Is it any easier/harder/the same? Explain 
 
 
Section D: Changes in access to and use of land 
D1. Has access to land changed? Which land? How?  
D2. Was there redistribution of land (e.g. parcelling of the commons)? Who gained/lost? 
D3. (If you know) Is the amount of land controlled by your clan, and the people of your 
village the same as it was when you were a child? Do the villagers (in your home village) 
farm the same amount of land that they did when you were a child? 
D4. Has the change affected your capacity to earn revenue? How? 
 By disrupting reciprocity/cooperation? Connected to H2 
 By reducing land choices / restricting movement? 
Due to increased/decreased land conflicts? We will talk more about conflict in Sec. 
E. 
 Has choice of crops changed? Is it an issue? 
Has diversity of sources of revenue changed? Connect to C2 
D5. Do changes to access to land mean you need more cash input to work this land? 
 Are there different needs? 
 Are there new sources of inputs—cash or otherwise as a result of the program? 
 Does the formalisation program make a difference to that? How does it work? 
 
Section E: Conflicts and decision-making processes  
E1. Are there disagreements over land access/use? Are disagreements common?  
What happens when disagreements occur? How are disagreements resolved now? Before 
the program?  
        Can you describe a situation where people disagreed over land issue?  




How do you assess the new conflict resolution mechanisms? 
Can you describe the current system? The old? How do they compare (cost, time, etc.)? 
E3   How is your clan/tribal leader chosen?  
What is his/her role? Describe. How has it changed with formalisation? 
E4. Who is included in the process of making decisions in villages?  
        How do people interact with the local/traditional leader vs government official?  
 
Section F: Customary land as a social safety net  
F1. Has the program resulted in changes in role customary lands play in acting as a social 
safety net? 
  If yes, how? 
Is there a greater reliance on external inputs for people in customary lands to sustain their 
rural livelihoods? (In other words, are they more dependent on transfer payments from 
other family members or less?). [Linked to the issue of revenue in C5)  
F2. Have options for livelihood diversification changed? Think of access to various natural 
resources (i.e. wild spinaches, fuelwood, wooden utensils, edible fruits, grass hand-brushes, 
and twig hand-brushes, edible insects, wood for construction, thatching grass, bush-meat, 
wild honey, reeds for weaving, and medicinal plants). 
 
Section G: Changes in agricultural (food) production  
G1. How has the program influenced what you produce?  
Have you increased/decreased local food production (amount & variety)? 
Are you now producing more for market (cash crops)? 
G2. Has access to inputs been any easier? Explain 
 Have you been able to access credit? Have you tried? Why? 
G3. What is holding your productivity down? What could be done to help? 
G4. How much of what you produce do you keep for consumption? How much do you sell? 
How much do you give away? (i.e. %)  
Is this division typical of your neighbours?  
 
Section H: Changes in the attributes of social organisation  
H1. How has the division of labour in your village/group/clan changed?  
Are people becoming more/less specialised? What about you? 
Has the role of women changed? How? 
H2. Tell me about various forms of labour organisation and working habit in your 
village/clan.  
Think about ‘exchange (or reciprocal) labour’ and ‘festive (or non-reciprocal) labour’. Do 
people rely more/less on these forms of labour organisation?  
 How does this contribute to rising/falling productivity? Connected to C4 
H3. Has any of the following changed in your village as a result of formalisation: size 
(customary lands, population—migration), leadership (and their roles), spatiotemporal 
cohesion (frequency of common activities, multitude of common places), and 
communication systems (what and how)?  
H4. Formalisation restricts flexibility of land rights (i.e. access and use). Is this something that 
worries you?   
  If yes, what is the concern? 
H5. What shocks/risks do you (household and village) face (e.g. lose access/use of land, 
natural calamity, conflicts)? 
 What risk-coping strategies do you use? Have they changed (or are they expected to 






Section I: Concluding questions  
I1. Is there anything else related to customary land and/or the formalisation program that 
we have not talked about that you would like to talk about?  
     Is there anything that you would like to comment on further?  
I2. Can you suggest any other people that might be interested in participating in this study? 
 
Questions for government officials 
K1. How well are land formalisation programmes working? 
K2. What do you think makes it work or not? 
 What are the challenges faced? 
 How have you been solving them? 
K3. Is it reaching its objectives as written now? 
 What has been achieved and what has not? 
K4. What are the main criticisms of the formalisation programmes? 
K5. Can you describe what happened to land tenure and land productivity under the Ujamaa 
policies, and under structural adjustment programmes? 
 Howa does it compare to what is happening under the formalisation programme? 
Can you talk about agricultural support services (extension services, subsidies, R&D, 
marketing, etc.) under these three policy periods?  
K6. How are the formalisation programmes balancing concerns for the tenurial security of 
small-scale landholders and users against commercial interest?  
K7. Do you have any suggestions on how I could improve this study? 
K8. Can you suggest any other departments/officials/institutions that might give valuable 














Appendix B: Summary of interviews conducted during the field research 
 
National level Number of interviews 





District level  
District Executive Director 1 
District Land Office 3 
District Agriculture Office 2 
  
Village Level  
Mzeri Village Executive Officer 2 
Mzeri Focus Group 1 
Mzeri: Individual household 25 
  
Sindeni Village Executive Officer 1 
Sindeni Focus Group 1 
Sindeni Individual household 19 
  
Mbagwi Village Executive Officer 1 
Mbagwi Individual household 27 
  
Others  
Loan officer – bank branch 1 








Appendix C: Household interview profiles 
 








1 Mzeri HZ01 Female Nuclear 4 
2 Mzeri HZ02 Male Joint/polygamous 7 
3 Mzeri HZ03 Male Nuclear 3 
4 Mzeri HZ04 Female Polygamous 6 
5 Mzeri HZ05 Female Polygamous 3 
6 Mzeri HZ06 Female Nuclear 6 
7 Mzeri HZ07 Male Nuclear 4 
8 Mzeri HZ08 Male Polygamous 5 
9 Mzeri HZ09 Female Joint/polygamous 7 
10 Mzeri HZ10 Male Nuclear 9 
11 Mzeri HZ11 Male Nuclear 5 
12 Mzeri HZ12 Male Nuclear 6 
13 Mzeri HZ13 Male Joint/polygamous 11 
14 Mzeri HZ14 Female Nuclear 2 
15 Mzeri HZ15 Male Joint/polygamous 10 
16 Mzeri HZ16 Male Joint/polygamous 12 
17 Mzeri HZ17 Male Nuclear 6 
18 Mzeri HZ18 Male Nuclear 3 
19 Mzeri HZ19 Male Joint/polygamous 8 
20 Mzeri HZ20 Male Nuclear 6 
21 Mzeri HZ21 Male Nuclear 4 
22 Mzeri HZ22 Male Joint/polygamous 7 
23 Mzeri HZ23 Male Nuclear 6 
24 Mzeri HZ24 Female Joint/polygamous 7 
25 Mzeri HZ25 Female Nuclear 4 
26 Mbagwi HB01 Male Nuclear 6 
27 Mbagwi HB02 Male Joint/polygamous 13 
28 Mbagwi HB03 Male Nuclear 7 
29 Mbagwi HB04 Male Nuclear 6 
30 Mbagwi HB05 Female Nuclear 5 
31 Mbagwi HB06 Female Nuclear 7 
32 Mbagwi HB07 Female Nuclear 9 
33 Mbagwi HB08 Male Joint/polygamous 3 
34 Mbagwi HB09 Male Nuclear 1 
35 Mbagwi HB10 Male Joint/polygamous 13 
36 Mbagwi HB11 Male Joint/polygamous 17 
37 Mbagwi HB12 Male Nuclear 7 
38 Mbagwi HB13 Male Joint/polygamous 11 
39 Mbagwi HB14 Female Nuclear 0 
40 Mbagwi HB15 Female Nuclear 7 
41 Mbagwi HB16 Male Joint/polygamous 9 
42 Mbagwi HB17 Male Joint/polygamous 15 
43 Mbagwi HB18 Female Nuclear 5 
44 Mbagwi HB19 Male Nuclear 6 
45 Mbagwi HB20 Male Nuclear 5 
46 Mbagwi HB21 Male Nuclear 7 




48 Mbagwi HB23 Female Nuclear 8 
49 Mbagwi HB24 Male Joint/polygamous 21 
50 Mbagwi HB25 Female Nuclear 6 
51 Mbagwi HB26 Male Joint/polygamous 6 
52 Mbagwi HB27 Female Joint/polygamous 13 
53 Sindeni HS01 Male Nuclear 6 
54 Sindeni HS02 Male Nuclear 5 
55 Sindeni HS03 Female Nuclear 6 
56 Sindeni HS04 Female Nuclear 5 
57 Sindeni HS05 Male Nuclear 7 
58 Sindeni HS06 Male Joint/polygamous 12 
59 Sindeni HS07 Male Joint/polygamous 9 
60 Sindeni HS08 Female Nuclear 7 
61 Sindeni HS09 Male Nuclear 6 
62 Sindeni HS10 Female Nuclear 9 
63 Sindeni HS11 Male Nuclear 5 
64 Sindeni HS12 Male Nuclear 2 
65 Sindeni HS13 Male Joint/polygamous 13 
66 Sindeni HS14 Male Joint/polygamous 3 
67 Sindeni HS15 Female Joint/polygamous 8 
68 Sindeni HS16 Male Joint/polygamous 6 
69 Sindeni HS17 Male Joint/polygamous 8 
70 Sindeni HS18 Female Nuclear 6 
71 Sindeni HS19 Female Joint/polygamous 5 
 
 
 
 
